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Abstract 
This empirical study investigates the performance of cross border M&A. The first stage is to 
identify the determinants of making cross border M&A complete. One focus here is to extend 
the existing empirical evidence in the field of cross border M&A and exploit the likelihood of 
M&A from a different perspective. Given the determinants of cross border M&A completions, 
the second stage is to investigate the effects of cross border M&A on post-acquisition firm 
performance for both targets and acquirers. The thesis exploits a hitherto unused data base, 
which consists of those firms that are rumoured to be undertaking M&A, and then follow the 
deal to completion or abandonment. This approach highlights a number of limitations to the 
previous literature, which relies on statistical methodology to identify potential but non-existent 
mergers.  
This thesis changes some conventional understanding for M&A activity. Cross border M&A 
activity is underpinned by various motives such as synergy, management discipline, and 
acquisition of complementary resources. Traditionally, it is believed that these motives will 
boost the international M&A activity and improve firm performance after takeovers. However, 
this thesis shows that such factors based on these motives as acquirer’s profitability and 
liquidity and target’s intangible resource actually deter the completion of cross border M&A in 
the period of 2002-2011. The overall finding suggests that the cross border M&A is the 
efficiency-seeking activity rather than the resource-seeking activity. Furthermore, compared 
with firms in takeover rumours, the completion of M&A lowers firm performance. More 
specifically, the difficulties in transfer of competitive advantages and integration of strategic 
assets lead to low firm performance in terms of productivity. Besides, firms cannot realise the 
synergistic effect and managerial disciplinary effect once a cross border M&A is completed, 
which suggests a low post-acquisition profitability level. 
Keywords: determinants of M&A, productivity, profitability, efficiency, takeover rumour. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Many companies have resorted to corporate restructuring and strategic expansion by virtue of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A)1. The corporate investment in M&A activity has become a 
trend to maximise a firm’s profit and expand beyond the extent of its organic growth. M&A are 
an important means of reallocating resources to where they are most needed and of removing 
underperforming management. In the first decade of the new millennium, global M&A activity 
is fuelled by several factors such as readily-available credit, historically low interest rates, rising 
equity markets, technological change, and industry consolidation (Henry, 2002). Since mid-
2003, the volume of global M&A activity increased through to mid-2007 (Bena, et al., 2008). 
In terms of dollar volume, M&A transactions reached a record level (US$ 1.045 trillion) 
worldwide in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2014). However, the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis 
in the US during the second half of 2007 made the financial system become exceedingly 
selective and largely withdrawn from financing highly-leveraged M&A transactions. By 2008, 
a combination of record high oil prices and a reduced availability of credit led most of the 
world’s economies into recession, reducing global M&A activity (US$ 0.626 trillion) by more 
than one-third of its previous level. In spite of the slump in M&A activity due to the global 
recession, the dramatic drop in energy prices and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies are 
stimulating the volume of global M&A activity to previous levels. The total value of cross 
border M&A in 2013 was approximately US$ 0.349 trillion (UNCTAD, 2014). Increasing 
international trade has brought the opportunities and challenges to engage in cross-border M&A 
(Hitt et al., 2000), in particular, at the post-acquisition stage (Child et al., 2001). 
M&A has provided important implications for various economic actors and for the operation of 
economies. As for actors, these would include shareholders, corporate management teams, 
employees, consumers, creditors, and governments and their agencies. As for economic welfare, 
there are potential consequences (both positive and negative) for the capital, product and labour 
markets. These consequences could include: change in concentration, abuse of market power 
                                                             
1 The abbreviation for mergers and acquisitions, M&A will be employed throughout the chapter However, in a strict sense 
there is a clear distinction between the two words. A merger is an incorporation of two separate firms into one single entity 
(Titman and Grinblatt, 2006), whereas an acquisition refers to one firm acquiring the majority of shares from another firm 
(Straub, 2007). Although there is the formal distinction between mergers and acquisitions, both terms frequently replace each 
other regardless their real strict meaning (Titman and Grinblatt, 2006). Cross border M&A is defined as deals between an 
acquirer firm and a target firm with their headquarters located in different home countries (Shimizu et al., 2005). 
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and featherbedding, international competition, rationalization of excess capacity, the realisation 
of economies of scale and scope, as well as other synergistic benefits. It is impossible to expect 
that any one study could contain all these factors. However, these factors are important to be 
addressed for policy makers in both the public and private domains. Thus the application of the 
knowledge from empirical evidence may provide insights into consequences of M&A for both 
public and private welfare.  
Some industrial economists and financial economists attempt to exploit these consequences of 
M&A. Although they have not achieved a consistent result from their respective empirical 
evidence, they present the same question. For instance, Caves (1989) and Bradley (1987) 
present the question of whether M&A can improve the efficiency of corporate assets. This 
question can be readdressed in a slightly different way: whether it is the case that efficient 
corporate management teams discipline the less efficient. Besides, it is suggested that the 
analysis of firm performance provides an important tool to assess the effects of M&A. From 
previous literature, a firm’s productivity and profitability are two effective indicators to 
measure the performance of firms. They are distinguished from the aspects of firm’s internal 
returns and external returns respectively (Girma et al., 2006). Therefore, the question of 
evaluating the effects of M&A has evolved to the assessment of post-M&A firm performance 
in terms of productivity and profitability.  
This thesis will challenge some conventional understanding of M&A activity. Cross border 
M&A activity is underpinned by various motives such as synergy, management discipline, 
acquisition of complementary resources, and so on. Traditionally, it is believed that these 
motives will boost the international M&A activity and bring positive effects after takeovers. 
However, the finding from this thesis will show that some factors based on these motives 
actually deter the completion of cross border M&A. Besides, those completed deals fail to 
realise their objectives underpinned by some mentioned motives. The completion of M&A 
lowers firm performance. 
Given the increasing number of cross border M&A and their growing importance in the global 
market, a better understanding of the opportunities and challenges for firms following this 
strategy is required. It is interesting to identify the reason why the number of cross border M&A 
increases. What motives support these takeovers? Besides, almost all M&A deals are subject to 
10 
 
takeover rumour2 before they actually take place in the market. However, some deals do not 
subsequently complete. We start out, therefore, by analysing the factors which deter the further 
completion of cross border M&A and those which facilitate this activity. In addition, do these 
motives achieve their objectives? In other words, how do these takeovers perform after the 
event of M&A? This type of research on M&A activity is mainly concentrated in the domain 
of international business (IB) study. Previous literature has identified some important motives 
behind M&A activity such as synergy, management discipline and acquisition of 
complementary resources. This thesis will build on the analysis of these motives and explore 
the reasons that make a cross border M&A deal complete from an M&A rumour. This point will 
be discussed in detail in the contribution section of this chapter. Additionally, in order to 
examine the firm performance after the event of M&A in terms of the internal returns and 
external returns (Girma et al., 2006), some factors are adopted from both IB and finance 
disciplines.  
Furthermore, the present research will adopt an ex-post study to analyse performance of M&A. 
The issue surrounding performance of corporate M&A continues to experience considerable 
controversy and disagreement in the literature. According to Tichy (2001), the scholars in 
finance and industrial organisation have predominantly studied this area from different 
perspectives. The financial academics assess stock market reactions to M&A announcements 
with an event-study approach. They generally find the positive effects of acquisitions on the 
average return from the aspect of firm’s stock price. They argue that M&A can effectively 
allocate spare resources through best management. However, the stock price cannot reflect the 
actual operation and true performance of firms because it only represents the expectation of 
shareholders on the firm’s future value. Besides, the event studies used by financial scholars 
neglect the rapid detriments of shareholder value afterwards M&A announcements. This 
research will not adopt the event study approach from the financial perspective. From another 
point of view, the industrial organisational academics generally report negative gains from 
M&A for participating firms. They mainly use the ex-post study approach to examine balance 
sheet data. It is argued that this approach tends to reveal the actual operational performance of 
firms in M&A activity. Therefore, the present research will mainly focus on the ex-post study 
approach to investigate firm performance in M&A activity.  
                                                             
2 A deal status indicating that there is an unconfirmed report, or an announced deal but the identity of one of the parties is not 
known, e.g. Company A is to buy a German engineering firm for GBP 5 million (source from Zephyr user guide). 
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The remainder of this chapter will provide the theoretical and historical context for the review 
of the empirical literature and methodological issues that follow in chapters 2 and 3, and the 
empirical research reported thereafter, in chapters 4 through 6. The second section reviews the 
research context of M&A activity and extant research on cross border M&A. The third section 
presents the research questions and objectives. To achieve the research objectives, the main 
contributions of this project are listed in the fourth section. The fifth section discusses some 
implications for policy and economy. The final section presents a summary and conclusions. 
1.2 Research Context of Cross Border M&A Activity  
Before the research questions are presented in detail, it is necessary to introduce some research 
background of M&A activity and dominant research trend of cross border M&A. The industrial 
consolidation and privatisation, and the liberalisation of economies accelerate the growth of 
cross-border M&A. As an alternative entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI), cross 
border M&A involves the ownership change and investment flows in existing entities rather 
than directly increasing the employment or production capacity in the host country (Harris, 
2009). Firms often choose cross border M&A as their investment type to enter new and lucrative 
international markets, especially when there is a high entry barrier to new markets, an excess 
production capacity in the host industry, a requirement of rapidly occupying the markets, or a 
possession of valuable proprietary assets in target firms which can build a competitive 
advantage immediately (Harris and Robinson, 2002). 
The academic literature on cross border M&A spans various disciplines, including strategic 
management, international business, human resource management, industrial economics and 
finance. The research emphasises a number of important issues, such as mode of entry 
(Andersen, 1997; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Hennart and 
Reddy, 1997; Kogut and Singh, 1988), performance outcomes from acquisitive entry (Brouthers, 
2002; Li and Guisinger, 1991; Nitsch et al., 1996), and shareholders’ wealth creation by cross 
border M&A (Datta and Puia, 1995; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Kang, 1993; Markides and 
Ittner, 1994; Morck and Yeung, 1992). They also study post-acquisition issues such as 
integration processes (Child et al., 2001; Inkpen et al., 2000; Lubatkin et al., 1998; Olie, 1994; 
Weber et al., 1996), integration processes from an employee viewpoint (Risberg, 2001), post-
acquisition turnover of acquired firm executives (Krug and Hegarty, 2001; Krug and Nigh, 
2001), post-acquisition performance of acquired (Very et al., 1997) and acquiring firms 
(Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Morosini et al., 1998), and the resulting knowledge transfer 
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and organisational learning (Bhagat et al., 2002; Bresman et al., 1999; Vermeulen and Barkema, 
2001).  
The focus on M&A activity is considerably different across the various disciplines. A major 
focus of the research in industrial economics is on whether M&A create, destroy or merely 
redistribute economic value through market concentration and the realisation of economies of 
scale and scope (Barton and Sherman, 1984; Mueller, 1985; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Chatterjee, 
1992). Finance theory in turn focuses on the realisation of tax advantages (Hayn, 1989), risk 
diversification (Mueller, 1969; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) or the 
realisation of financial gains through the acquisition of undervalued targets (Ravenscraft and 
Scherer, 1987a). Management theory on the other hand is built on agency theoretical 
considerations in interpreting M&A through the pursuit of personal goals or hubris on the part 
of management (Jensen, 1986b; Roll, 1986). Finally, the literature on transaction costs focuses 
on the costs arising from market transactions and the advantage of their internalisation through 
M&A (Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1985). 
Because of the international nature, the dynamics of cross-border M&A are impacted by 
different economic, institutional, and cultural structures across countries (Hofstede, 1980; 
House et al., 2002). When discussing the firm’s choice of entering a new foreign market, various 
explanations support cross border M&A, such as ‘internalisation’ and ‘assets-seeking’ approach 
(Buckley and Casson, 1998; Wesson, 1999). In particular, Buckley and Casson (1998) indicate 
that the establishment of foreign affiliates through M&A can save huge learning costs and 
reduce a high level of competition. However, M&A may generate some immediate costs due to 
issues associated with integration and formulation of internal trust in the post-acquisition stage. 
Caves (1996) argues that multinational enterprises can improve their profitability through M&A 
by obtaining local knowledge embodied in the target firms and by reducing uncertainty. Martin 
et al. (1998) found that international M&A may be motivated to take advantage of a new 
opportunity or to avoid a possible future threat. Through takeovers, acquirer firms are able to 
learn new knowledge and acquire new capabilities. Furthermore, Wesson (1999) notes that only 
if the foreign acquirer firms exert more advantages in using some already possessed assets than 
their local competitors, the acquired local asset can show a greater value after being 
incorporated into foreign acquirers. Otherwise, a foreign investor could not apply the local 
assets more efficiently than local rivals.  
The research on cross border M&A has been established upon the dominant theoretical 
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foundations from economic perspectives such as transaction cost economics (TCE) and an 
ownership – location - internalisation (OLI) framework for a long period (Dunning, 1977; 
Williamson, 1975). Based on these frameworks, cross border M&A is often investigated in the 
context of FDI, and researchers pay more attention on entry mode decisions and resulting value 
creation. This stream of research aims to minimise the transaction costs and maximise the 
effective exploitation of a firm’s ownership advantage. Thus firms can reduce the uncertainty 
and risk due to different national cultures and institutional settings and improve the efficiencies 
in the entry of foreign markets.  
Recent trend of researching the value of international expansion and cross-border M&A also 
includes the resource based view (RBV) and organisational learning (OL) perspectives 
(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Madhok, 1997; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Furthermore, 
the focus has been shifted from the antecedents of M&A to the processes and outcomes of post-
M&A activities (Child et al., 2001). However, little insight into M&A implementation 
processes is concerned in TCE and OLI frameworks. It is worthy of investigating the processes 
and outcomes of cross border M&A from TCE and OLI perspectives. 
It is found that most firms exhibit a low ability in international operation during cross border 
M&A. Such underperformance of firms is caused by various factors such as organisational 
compatibility, technological applicability, the support from local political environment, and 
communication between acquired affiliates and parent headquarters during the integration 
process (Harris, 2009). According to OLI and IB frameworks, some challenges and risks also 
come with cross border M&A, such as ‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995) and ‘double-
layered acculturation’ (Barkema et al., 1996). These factors contribute to the explanation of 
why international M&A is not always successful. For example, it is difficult for acquirer firms 
to adapt and learn from both the local market and target firm in the host country due to 
uncertainty and information asymmetry in foreign markets (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Zaheer, 
1995). It is also hard for acquirer firms to achieve their strategic conceptions completely 
because of differences in national culture, consumption custom, commercial practices and 
governmental regulations (Kogut and Singh, 1988). Therefore, the ‘liability of foreignness’ and 
‘double-layered acculturation’ prevent firms acquiring new knowledge and capabilities in cross 
border M&A activity.  
The research on cross border M&A has studied various factors from aspects of country level, 
industry level and firm level. According to Shimizu (2004), at national and industry levels, 
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M&A activity is found to be highly related to factors such as capital, labour, natural resource 
endowments and institutional variables (e.g. the legal, political, and cultural environment). At 
the firm level, acquirer firms firstly need to identify and evaluate the characteristics of potential 
targets in the host countries. After that, acquirers can report the outcomes of integrating the 
target firms into their operations and assess whether such integration realises the potential value 
of their investment. Cross border M&A activity is also influenced by firm-level heterogeneity, 
most importantly, at the aspect of capacities. From a general equilibrium framework, Nocke 
and Yeaple (2007) predict that either the most or the least productive firms will be involved in 
M&A. They also indicate that country and industry characteristics will affect the distribution 
of firm’s efficiency through the firm heterogeneity. Generally, firm characteristics will be the 
main measuring target in this thesis. Moreover, this thesis is developed conceptually in the IB 
area, but it draws on all of the other areas theoretically and methodologically.  
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
Recent evidence suggests that M&A are not all successful. One basic question presented is that 
what advantages M&A activities can bring to the involving firms. In other words, will firms 
benefit from M&A activity through either acquiring other firms or being acquired by other firms? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to identify the factors which determine the occurrence 
of M&A before evaluating the performance of M&A. Why would an M&A deal happen and 
complete finally? Once the determinants of an M&A deal are identified, one can understand 
what motives underpin M&A activity from their announcement to completion. With 
acknowledgement of the motives behind M&A, another question is whether the M&A have 
achieved their objectives.  
According to Child et al. (2001), the issues both on pre-M&A implementation and the outcomes 
of post-M&A implementation should be thoroughly examined in M&A contexts. The 
relationship between foreign acquisition and firm‐level productivity directly relates to other 
measures of performance such as profitability (Girma, et al., 2006). It is assumed that cross 
border M&A usually do not change the industry and firm characteristics, at least in the medium 
term. This enables firm performance to be compared prior to takeovers and after takeovers 
based on a relatively stable observation. Accounting studies examine the operating performance 
of the merging firms. This usually consists of a comparison of pre- and post-M&A profitability 
based on accounting measures to appraise post-M&A performance in industrial economics 
(Shimizu, et al. 2004). Such measures include: net income, sales, return on assets or equity, 
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EPS, firm liquidity, profit margins, and so on. Although the empirical evidence on the 
profitability of takeovers is extensive, the relationship between cross border M&A and firm’s 
profitability is inconclusive. Generally, some studies show a decline in post-acquisition 
profitability by employing earnings-based measures, while some studies show merger gains by 
using cash flow performance measures (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987b; 1989). By observing 
firms’ pre- and post-M&A profitability level, this research expects to find the link between firm 
performance and ownership change and to exploit some supporting explanations. 
Furthermore, given the influence factors of M&A, it is also interesting to answer what effects 
they bring to firm performance through the completion of M&A. In light of locations of acquirer 
firms from the same country or not in the M&A activities, takeovers are categorised to cross 
border M&A and domestic M&A. Amongst all influence factors of M&A, one may be curious 
whether the completion of M&A can generate positive synergy in international takeovers with 
acquiring profitable targets. Meanwhile, it needs to answer whether the completion of M&A 
can effectively discipline the underperforming managements in international takeovers with 
acquiring unprofitable targets. From the productive efficiency perspective, it is worthy of 
assessing the effects of cross border M&A on firm’s productivity through differentiating the 
motives that make acquirers conduct a takeover. One question is whether the technological, 
managerial or marketing advantages possessed by acquirers can be transferred successfully to 
targets in the M&A with expansion through advantages. Another question is whether the 
acquirers have successfully utilised the complementary assets acquired from the targets in the 
strategic resource seeking M&A.  
Given these questions, the empirical study aims to investigate the effects of cross border M&A 
on post-acquisition performance of both target and acquirer firms over the period from 1st 
January 2002 to 31st December 2011. Specifically, the study aims to investigate the following 
aspects that will construct three empirical chapters. Firstly, this study will identify the 
determinant factors of cross border M&A completions. Secondly, it will examine the impact of 
cross border M&A on post-M&A firm performance in terms of productivity. When examining 
productivity effects, this study will further evaluate whether takeovers can improve post-M&A 
firm’s productivity. The dataset will be divided into two subsamples through differentiating the 
M&A based on whether acquirers have more intangible assets than targets. The productivity-
effects research will be conducted by comparing different productivity measures, i.e. total factor 
productivity (TFP) and labour productivity. Thirdly, this study will also assess the impact of 
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cross border M&A on post-M&A firm performance in terms of profitability. When assessing 
profitability effects, this study will further investigate whether international M&A can increase 
firm’s profitability if targets are more profitable before M&A. It will also assess whether 
international M&A can improve the poor firm’s operative position in terms of profitability if 
targets are less profitable before M&A. In addition, the profitability-effects research will 
construct dynamic model and static model by incorporating or not the variable of pre-M&A 
firm’s profitability.  
1.4 Research Contributions 
Firstly, this study exploits the rumoured but abandoned M&A data from a different perspective 
and incorporates the takeover rumour data into the M&A-likelihood model developed from 
previous literature. In previous motive analysis on M&A, some research attempts to exploit the 
takeover target likelihood by examining the characteristics of target firms in M&A activity (e.g. 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Powell and Yawson, 2005). Some research 
devotes efforts to improve the accuracy of prediction in developing takeover target likelihood 
models (e.g. Stevens, 1973; Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984). The use of M&A rumour is also 
exploited in several ways when previous researchers study M&A activity. They primarily 
employ takeover rumours date as an influential factor in predicting likely targets in M&A 
activities (Chou et al., 2010; Schausen, 2011). Alternatively, they use takeover rumours in 
assessing the shareholder wealth (Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2006; Lachapelle, 
2011; Wortche and Nguyen, 2011). However, to the author’s knowledge, no previous literature 
has been found to use takeover rumour data in assessing the likelihood of M&A. Thus, this 
research will employ takeover rumour data in the control group and to construct the dependent 
variable, which will be the primary contribution of our research. 
Being different from the previous research on M&A, the rumoured but uncompleted M&A data 
is employed to construct the control group in this study. In the previous research, the target 
likelihood prediction models have extensively applied non-target population as a control group. 
In sampling the non-target firms, there are often sample selection bias and counterfactual issues 
which affect the consistency of estimation. Researchers attempt some methods to solve the 
problems. For example, they sample the control group non-randomly (Stevens, 1973) or 
randomly (Palepu, 1986; Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003) from the non-target population. 
Considering the shortcoming of previous methods, most research prefers to use propensity score 
matching (PSM) technique to construct the control group (Girma et al. 2001; Conyon et al. 
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2002). However, the rumoured but uncompleted M&A data can evade the selection bias and 
play a role of counterfactual case. It can be directly employed to construct the control group 
rather than sampling non-target by using a matching approach. 
With this advantage of the control group, this research will use the takeover rumour or actual 
takeover as a dependent variable which is a probability of an M&A being completed or not. 
This is different from the previous literature that uses probability of a firm being the target of 
takeovers as a dependent variable. The work of previous researchers is to explore the likelihood 
of a potential takeover target, while the present study is to explore the likelihood of an M&A 
event being completed. This research aims to explore the influence factors of cross border M&A 
being completed. In this means, an M&A likelihood model will be established in an effort to 
detect the determinants of making rumoured M&A deals completed among the firm level 
factors. This research will define the likelihood of cross border M&A as the possibility of an 
international takeover being successfully completed. To our knowledge, no literature has 
employed this strategy before. This is the first time the status of M&A completions has been 
used as a dependent variable in the model of M&A likelihood. Therefore, this will provide a 
new perspective to the literature on likelihood of M&A.  
Secondly, the analysis of firm performance in the later empirical chapters will use the status of 
M&A completions as an influential factor to examine the cross border M&A effect on firm 
performance. There is an endogeneity problem between firm performance and M&A activity 
because they influence each other during the takeover implementation (Stiebale, 2013). For 
instance, a firm’s profitability may influence M&A completions. Adversely, whether an M&A 
is completed or not will influence the involving firm’s profitability level. In the motive analysis 
of cross border M&A, the variable of M&A completions shows a recessive trait because it is a 
probability value for the completion of a cross border M&A deal. However, in the performance 
analysis of cross border M&A, the completion of M&A is used as a static variable which 
indicates a deals status. Such status describes whether a cross border M&A deal is completed 
or just in a rumour. The status of M&A completions is considered as a state variable rather than 
a recessive variable, which can represent the status that an M&A deal is completed or not. This 
can directly reflect the role of M&A activity in the performance study model. The use of this 
explanatory variable in performance analysis will avoid the potential endogenous problem 
which may happen, for example, in using the probability parameter of a firm being acquired.  
Furthermore, this research will investigate the impacts of cross border M&A on firm 
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performance by using the determinants of an M&A being completed, while previous research 
conducts such performance analysis by employing the characteristics of a potential firm which 
is acquired in M&A (e.g. Schiffbauer et al., 2009; Harris, 2009). The factors which can make 
an M&A completed can identify a target firm in M&A, while the factors which can locate a 
potential target firm do not necessarily make an M&A complete due to other potential uncertain 
conditions such as the regulatory factor. Therefore, the factors that influence M&A completions 
should have different impacts on the firm performance compared with the characteristics that 
influence a likely target.  
Thirdly, this study will identify the determinants of M&A by selecting the factors from both 
target firm side and acquirer firm side. Previous researchers focus on employing characteristics 
of firms to predict likely targets, so these characteristics of target firms were widely examined 
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Powell and Yawson, 2005). When detecting the determinants 
of M&A likelihood, it is not only the characteristics of target firms but also those of acquirer 
firms that will influence the probability of M&A activity (Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003). 
However, the impact of acquirer firm’s information on M&A propensity has been discussed 
little before to my knowledge. Therefore, in this research, targets and acquirers are clearly 
marked. Using information from both targets and acquirers will be a contribution in 
constructing M&A likelihood model. These can then be combined with the industry/market and 
country oriented variables in the takeover likelihood prediction model. 
1.5 Policy Implications 
This study was conducted at a time when the financial economies were recovering from global 
recession caused by the financial crisis in 2007. The M&A activities were influenced 
significantly by this credit crunch caused by the financial crisis. In the recent past, almost every 
government dedicated itself to stabilise its financial order by bailing out major banking systems. 
According to some financial commentators, the banking industry underestimated some risks 
and neglected the importance of market liquidity, which leads to a credit crunch. Its serious 
consequences brought profound repercussions to M&A activities. 
Some analysts indicate that the population of M&A will reduce because there is less liquidity 
in the financial system so less funds can finance other companies’ M&A. Based on these recent 
developments, M&A have attracted the unmatched attention of researchers, academics and 
government regulatory bodies. This empirical study will consider the extent to which firm 
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liquidity affects the completion of M&A when estimating the performance of M&A. The 
research findings will have implications for the academics, shareholders, managements, 
practitioners, and policy makers who could be interested in this research. The detailed 
discussion will be addressed in the final chapter. 
Cross border M&A activity is underpinned by various motives such as synergy, management 
discipline, acquisition of complementary resources, and so on. This thesis will challenge some 
conventional understanding for M&A activity. Traditionally, it is believed that target’s 
intangible resource, acquirer’s profitability and liquidity are positively related to international 
M&A activity. However, the finding from this research implies that these factors actually deter 
the completion of cross border M&A. Further evidence from this thesis shows that the 
completion of M&A could not bring targets or acquirers high post-acquisition firm performance. 
For example, neither firm’s productivity nor firm’s profitability is improved after international 
takeover completions. In spite of the good intentions, involving firms have not realised the 
objectives of M&A such as synergistic effect and managerial disciplinary effect. On the contrary, 
comparing with the completed international M&A, the firms with similar characteristics to 
those in completed deals improve their operations after they have experienced takeover rumours. 
Those firms in takeover rumour grow well per se in terms of firm’s productivity and profitability. 
Therefore, it may suggest that the takeover rumour can exert the disciplinary function on the 
improvement of corporate managements. The potential M&A attempt is able to motivate the 
incumbent management team to prioritise their shareholder’s interest and reduce the agent cost 
without replacing the current management team. 
From another aspect, there is still increasingly a large population of cross border M&A all over 
the world although the completion of M&A could not improve firm performance for targets or 
acquirers in the short run based on the evidence from this thesis. This is in line with the 
traditional understanding for public merger policy which considers any merger as an activity to 
either raise the market concentration or provide barriers to entry, or both. In other words, 
mergers restrict the competition in the market. This consequence damages social welfare and 
hence the M&A activities were often boycotted. However, being different from the orthodox 
definition of competition, Demsetz (1973a, 1973b, and 1982) and Baumol et al (1982) shift the 
focus of attention and transform the concept of competition from a static measure of 
concentration to a more dynamic conception which regards competition as a process. They 
suggest that market power has only a transitory effect and its competitive forces will be 
20 
 
eliminated in the long run. Whilst much attention has also been paid to other factors in shaping 
forces of competition, such as barriers to entry and barriers to exit. Therefore, there may be 
potential positive improvement for firm performance in the long term after M&A. This is 
beyond the range of this project, but it is worthy of investigation in the future research. In order 
to improve the success rate of cross border M&A, the author proposes policy suggestions to the 
participants of M&A. The firm’s managements should provide the convincing information 
disclosure on the pre- and post-acquisition appraisal before potential M&A take place. The 
firm’s managements should carry out the effective risk control during the whole implementation 
process of upcoming M&A activity. These suggestions will facilitate the involving firms to 
improve their post-M&A performance.  
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide context and background for the research. In addition 
to setting out the theoretical context and the aim of the thesis, the chapter presents an overview 
of research questions, objectives and policy implementations as well as the empirical 
contributions of this thesis to the literature on M&A study. In order to address the issues raised 
above, the thesis focuses on the nature of a cross border M&A together with the influence of 
particular variables on the performance of M&A activity. It is found that the resource-based 
motives deter the completion of cross border takeovers compared with the efficiency-based 
motives. The productivity and profitability measures capture internal returns and external 
returns respectively for target firms and acquirer firms. The further results show that the 
international takeover suffers from a lower post-acquisition performance in completed deals 
than that in takeover rumours. This suggests that the international M&A with some obstructive 
factors may generate a negative impact on firm’s performance in the short term if managements 
choose to ignore obstructions and insist on completing the deal. 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 seeks to provide an overview of the factors which drive M&A activity and some 
potential issues on integration post cross border M&A. This chapter discusses a broad survey 
of theoretical explanations for motives of M&A activity and extant empirical literature on M&A 
studies. In this chapter, previous research on M&A is reviewed within the disciplines of finance, 
management, international business and industrial economics. It draws a number of firm-level, 
industry-level and country-level factors out of aforementioned motives and reviews their 
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impacts on international takeovers as well as the consequence of M&A. This chapter will also 
discuss the limitations of prior studies. 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology for the core analysis of the thesis. The chapter seeks to 
explain the methodological issues such as the bias in accounting data and sample selection. It 
presents necessary methodological information used in analysis of the current study. This 
involves a full understanding of the counterfactual issue, sample selectivity and the correction 
approaches. This chapter provides a more direct way to address selection issue with using 
takeover rumour data. It also justifies the use of probit model in exploring the determinants of 
international M&A. 
The subsequent empirical chapters (4, 5 and 6) will use the takeover rumour from a new 
perspective. Specifically, chapter 4 aims to identify the factors which may affect the completion 
of cross border M&A. It exploits five firm-level factors which are firm size, profitability, 
liquidity, financial leverage and intangible resource. The research shows an empirical research 
on determinants of cross border M&A completions. By being incorporated into the dependent 
variable, the rumoured M&A data act as a control group to address the selection bias and 
counterfactual issue. At the same time, this chapter examines the likelihood of M&A rather 
than that of a potential target.  
Furthermore, after identifying the determinants of cross border M&A completions, chapters 5 
and 6 investigate the impact of cross border M&A on the firm performance by using the 
determinants of M&A completions. Chapter 5 conducts the empirical research on impacts of 
M&A on a firm’s productivity from aspects of targets and acquirers. The data sample will be 
divided into two subgroups in terms of difference between acquirer’s and target’s pre-M&A 
intangible assets. With this classification, the effect in the market seeking expansion is exploited 
through the M&A with high acquirer’s intangible assets, while that in the strategic resource 
seeking expansion is exploited through the deal with high target’s intangible assets. The firm 
performance in terms of productivity is measured by firm’s post-acquisition TFP level and 
labour productivity level.  
Chapter 6 presents an empirical research on impacts of M&A on firm’s profitability for both 
targets and acquirers. The data sample is divided into two subgroups according to the target’s 
pre-acquisition profitability. Amongst, the M&A with a target of high profitability and that with 
a target of low profitability are used to examine the effect of synergy and managerial discipline 
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hypothesis respectively. The empirical research on the profitability effect of takeover is also 
conducted in static and dynamic models respectively. 
Finally, chapter 7 concludes this thesis. Based on findings from the above three empirical 
chapters, some implications and suggestions are proposed. This chapter recommends potential 
areas for the real economy and further research. It is expected that this research will interest 
managers and policy-makers who can use the research findings to formulate strategic and 
economic policies. 
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Chapter Two: Theory and Empirical Literature on M&A 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a critical review of previous theories and empirical literature on M&A 
determinants and performance. This review will highlight a broad consensus achieved and some 
considerable controversy. In particular, the disagreement between the results from the industrial 
economics tradition and those from the financial economics tradition will be demonstrated. This 
review especially relates to the intended areas of this research.  
Many studies show a link between the role of M&A and strategic restructuration and resource 
reallocation. Academic research has developed quite a number of theories trying to explain why 
firms are involved in M&A activity. These theories argue that firms conduct M&A to achieve 
firm growth, economic benefit or efficiency gains. Nevertheless, these theoretical developments 
often give mixed empirical results. According to Tichy (2001), analysis of M&A based on 
finance theory focuses on stock market reaction to announcement of M&A in order to assess 
the shareholder wealth. They support the role of M&A in the effectiveness of allocating spare 
resources via best management. Holding the view of perfect capital markets, financial scholars 
emphasise on the abnormal reaction of share prices around the announcement of M&A (Fama 
et al., 1969). They employ ‘event studies’ which was introduced initially by Fama in 1969. 
Financial academics examine share price validity in a window of certain time period before and 
after the event and conclude an optimistic opinion of value-creating in M&A (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983). Nevertheless, Mueller (2001) indicates that the negative return will be shown 
with the extension of the observation window in the long term.  
From another aspect, the industrial specialists doubt the role of M&A event on firm 
performance improvement by examining the data from the balance sheet. The implications of 
M&A activity for social welfare in the school of industrial economics have been debated 
exclusively within a public policy domain. The industrial organisation economists utilise ‘ex-
post studies’ and conclude M&A as a ‘disappointing marriage’ (Meeks, 1977). After 
scrutinising the firm economic performance and balance sheets around M&A, they draw a 
pessimistic conclusion that the acquisitions neither create value nor are profitable for both firms 
involved.  
In order to explain fluctuation of takeovers occurrence, Manne (1965) develops the market for 
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corporate control which displays a disciplinary mechanism to replace inefficient and ineffective 
managements. It is argued that M&A can generate value by management displacement and 
unspecified synergies (e.g. Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen, 1986a). Drawing from a 
principal-agent issue framework, takeovers are explained as pursuit of managerialist objectives, 
such as growth. The free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986b) demonstrates that M&A will 
generally destroy value and enhance principal-agent problems unless the management teams 
can make good use of free cash flows. With respect to the managerial discretion due to 
objectively sufficient funds, the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986) captures the subjective 
willingness of acquirer management teams. It suggests that the overoptimistic valuation on 
takeovers make acquirer management teams participate in M&A activities, which results in 
poor performance. 
The chapter is organised as follow: the next section discusses the motives for M&A which are 
developed from previous theories. These theories are developed from industrial academics’ and 
financial academics’ perspectives. Within the discussion on the motives of M&A, this section 
also shows how the theories on M&A have evolved briefly and what their divergences are based 
on. The third section reviews the recent research tendency on M&A and lists some important 
factors of affecting M&A from the aspects of firm-, industry- and country-levels. This section 
also outlines some literature on firm post-M&A performance effects. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the evidence and presents a short analysis that introduces the specific aims 
of the current study. 
2.2 Theoretical Explanations for Motives of M&A 
2.2.1 Mergers and Managerial Theories of the Firm 
Analysis of M&A dates back to the classic theory of the firm of Berle and Means (1932), who 
highlight the corporate governance issues due to the separation of ownership and control of the 
modern corporation, which is different from the traditional theory of the firm. In their formal 
analysis of mergers, managers tend to exploit their further managerial interests when they are 
not shareholders of the companies. By means of M&A activity, non-profit maximising 
behaviours can create benefits for managers other than the competition in product markets. 
Based on the framework of Berle and Means, Marris (1963) also introduces a number of 
alternative managerial theories of the firm with different emphases. The managers are 
disciplined by shareholders and competitive market forces, but managers can discretionarily 
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expand their welfare at the expense of the owners. Corporate managers can use profitability to 
measure whether they have achieved the growth objective. This managerialist approach 
incorporates M&A into theories of the firm.  
Of above these alternative theoretical developments, Marris (1963) explains the motivation of 
management engaging in M&A, and he also introduces the takeover threat to confine the 
discretionary behaviours of managers. There is an equilibrium point to balance between 
managers’ own welfare and interests of shareholders. The decrease in the firm's market value 
implies that managers pursue too much for themselves and that the firm is vulnerable to be 
acquired. However, it is problematic to directly examine the managerialist theories of the firm 
(Francis, 1980). For example, it is arbitrary to differentiate between owner-controlled and 
manager controlled firms (Nyman and Silbertson, 1978). Although there are various limitations 
for these managerialist theories, the principal-agent theory is developed from these theories 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
2.2.2 Synergy 
The theory of efficiency suggests that mergers will only occur when both parties believe the 
deal will make enough realisable synergies beneficial to them. Hitt et al. (2001) argue that 
‘synergies’ generated from mergers increase the value of both acquirer and target firms. That 
is to say, M&A takes place because the integration of the two firm’s resources brings increased 
economic benefit. To achieve a ‘friendly’ merger, the synergies should have symmetric gains. 
Neither acquirer nor target is willing to complete the deal if the counterpart obtains a positive 
gain while it suffers from negative value itself. Hence, according to efficiency theory, a merger 
deal creates positive value for both acquirer and target (Klein, 2001). 
Mueller (1969) makes a contribution to the theory about the efficiency effects of merger activity. 
Mueller (1969) analyses conglomerate mergers and negates the conventional theory of the firm. 
If firms merge in unrelated industries, less support is found for the usual synergy and managerial 
displacement hypotheses, especially when target firms are given certain degree of operation 
autonomy. According to the agency theory and the work of Porter (1987), the performance of 
an incumbent management team can be improved through change in their contract of 
employment rather than replacement of managers. The terms of contracts can be adjusted to 
satisfy the objectives of shareholders. Mueller develops a managerial growth motive for 
mergers. The separation between ownership and control brings a direct conflict of interests 
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between managers and shareholders. Without an effective disciplinary mechanism, managers 
have considerable discretionary power to abuse the assets they control, especially in mature 
companies.  
With the assumption of profit maximisation, Mueller (1969) concludes synergy is the only 
plausible motive for conglomerate mergers in a profit-maximising framework. However, the 
nature of conglomerate mergers makes synergies difficult to be detected. Additionally, Mueller 
postulates three types of conglomerate synergy. First, conglomerate mergers may introduce 
better management than horizontal or vertical integration because an acquirer’s managers are 
incompetent in industry or market-specific skills and knowledge in order to improve the 
performance of targets. Second, the synergy comes from financial aspects such as a lower cost 
of capital. If the acquirer is larger than the target, it cannot reduce cost of capital to risk-adjusted 
terms in an efficient markets framework or with an effective arbitrage. If the acquirer owns 
sufficient free cash flow compared with the target, it can enjoy a low cost of capital. The target 
firm has to raise funds at a higher return rate in the capital market. If that were so, the acquirer 
would rather purchase stocks or bonds issued by the target than pay high premiums to acquire 
control of the target firm. Third, conglomerate mergers can decrease the risk in earnings. 
According to modem portfolio theory, firms should diversify to reduce risk for the interest of 
its shareholders (Levy and Sarnat, 1970).  
However, Mueller (1969) summarises that the explanations of potential synergies and 
differences in expectations between the two shareholder groups may be not convincing for 
conglomerate merger activities in the US. He finds that a conglomerate merger can occur even 
if the two groups of managements and shareholders expect different future earnings with the 
same discount rate. Furthermore, the acquirer’s managers will still conduct conglomerate 
merger when they raise capital more easily than their shareholders, e.g. the presence of 
sufficient free cash flow. Thus, according to Mueller (1969), managers may conduct 
conglomerate mergers under the motivation of non-profit maximising objectives, e.g. 
managerial self-interest.  
Under the rational mind assumption, the acquirer’s managers should pursue the M&A which 
can gain synergies. In the profit maximising framework, there are decreasing opportunities for 
synergistic mergers. This is expected to see a decline in merger activity but the opposite is the 
case. Empirical evidence implies that synergy is the major aim of takeover (see e.g. Berkovitch 
and Narayanan, 1993; Bruce and Christopher, 2000; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Two 
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types of synergies have been advanced in the literature: operational synergy and financial 
synergy.  
2.2.2.1 Operating Synergy 
The assumption of operating synergy is that a firm achieves economies of scale and scope in 
production. The accomplishment of major determinants ensures firms promptly obtain a 
dominant position after M&A activities, which provides firms with the potential opportunity to 
improve their operating income. As noted by Weston et al. (2001), the indivisibility of 
production factors leads to reduced costs of output and thereby formulates economies of scale 
and scope. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) argue that the gains for both target and acquirer 
will be positively associated with each other if synergy is the motive of their acquisition. That 
is because the competition among potential acquirers increases a total gain of the target. 
Economies of scale and scope lower the cost of production per unit, and then improve the output 
and profit (Berger et al., 1999; Lewis and Webb, 2007). The operating synergies result in 
economies of scale and scope in profitability for the two combining firms. The benefit generated 
from operating synergy of two firms is greater than the sum of the benefits when each firm runs 
separately. By modeling the cost frontier, Lewis and Webb (2007) find that the overall economy 
of scale will change and return of scale becomes higher due to the synergy effect in two firms. 
This suggests that both target and acquirer may achieve operating gains through the merger 
activity. One pre-requisition is that firms run under production capacity and have the potential 
to exploit economies of scale and scope through acquisition, thereby achieving greater 
profitability.  
Chatterjee (1986) distinguishes between ‘operative synergies’ and ‘allocative synergies’. The 
economies of scale achieve the former synergies, while increased market power and an 
improved ability to extract consumer surplus result in the latter synergies. Behr and Held (2011) 
imply that most mergers might be motivated by achieving economies of scale and scope or 
market power. Devos et al. (2008) indicate that operating synergies are the more significant 
gain of mergers, although the market power theory is suggested to be a valid merger motive. 
Above all, M&A may broaden management functions from the managerial economies view.  
Another aspect of explanations on M&A is supported by market power hypothesis, which 
stresses market shares and price-setting power as one dominant motive of takeovers. Feinberg 
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(1985) argues that the firm can obtain positive and significant private benefits through the 
‘allocative’ synergies because the greater market power enables firms to charge higher prices 
and earn greater margins. Cefis et al. (2008) stress that many mergers are accompanied by 
increased profits and decreased sales after announcement. Strong market power to some extent 
deters the entrance into certain markets from other potential rivals under a dynamic viewpoint 
(Motta, 2004). Besanko et al. (2006) indicate that firms can obtain a significant premium and 
so win another long-term gain through increased market power. 
2.2.2.2 Financial Synergy 
The financial synergy motive means that the two combined firms reduce their cost of capital 
and improve their debt capacity. It also means that the firm’s insolvency and default risk are 
reduced through mergers. Similar to operating synergy, financial synergy should provide the 
two combined firms with more profitability and cost efficiency after a merger than if the two 
firms run on their own. Thus, it can be expected that the two combined firms should experience 
positive future profit maximisation. Due to the decreases in the cost of capital and insolvency 
risk based on the financial synergies hypotheses, the firm’s size and investment projects are 
expected to increase, which contributes to both target and acquirer during the combination of 
two separate cash flows. 
Another aspect of financial synergy about M&A comes from a tax motive. M&A is motivated 
because firms involved will enjoy tax benefits or tax savings. The privilege of tax laws in a 
certain country will encourage potential acquirers to attempt M&A to gain a tax benefit. In fact, 
firms can obtain generous tax benefits from these kinds of acquisitions. Auerbach and Reishus 
(1986) imply that both combined firms use their tax losses and tax credits to reduce their tax 
liability in the M&A with tax motive. This incentive on tax reduction enables firms to gain 
financial synergy via a merger (Cook et al., 1992). Shih (1994) finds that some firms conduct 
conglomerate mergers to avoid tax burdens and such a tax shield can be transferred through 
mergers. He further indicates that the low earnings can reduce firms’ expected future tax 
burdens in such conglomerate mergers driven by a tax motive.  
2.2.3 The Market for Corporate Control  
Manne (1965) proposes a capital market discipline hypothesis which can recover profit 
maximising behaviour and allocating efficiency of free markets. He assumes managers exploit 
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their discretionary potential rather than profit maximisation in industrial and commercial 
markets. The rule of a modern company grants its shareholders rights to discipline behaviours 
of managers, but implementation of discipline is difficult due to the wide dispersion of 
ownership and the asymmetry of information between the shareholders and managers. There is 
a high cost for any individual shareholder in monitoring and enforcement as well as organising 
an effective coalition. Besides, the individual shareholder usually adopts free-riding strategy, 
so it is almost impossible to discipline managerial discretion by shareholders.  
The concept of the market for corporate control provides a profound contribution to economic 
thinking on M&A. According to Manne (1965), the owners often prefer those managers who 
can provide the highest value for their assets. Thus, inefficient managers are replaced and 
managers are forced to maximise the profit. In the theory on corporate value, share prices reflect 
net present values of a firm’s future profits flows. The market for corporate control views the 
decline in a firm’s share price as the signal for management underperformance. In an efficient 
merger market, corporate control hypothesis suggests that other firms or management teams are 
always willing to acquire an underperforming firm. They can remove those managers who 
cannot create synergies in order to promote the performance of its assets (Weston et al., 2004). 
Jensen (1986a) concludes the market for corporate control brings benefits for shareholders and 
the whole economy. It allows resources mobilised freely to higher-valued end without 
limitation. 
In M&A, acquirers overtake the right of corporate control from targets. With the assumption of 
an efficient capital market, Manne (1965) explains M&A as a disciplinary mechanism to 
enhance economic efficiency. Thus M&A activity can confine harmful managerial 
discretionary behaviour. Eckbo (1986) concludes that M&A generates significant gains to 
shareholders of both acquiring and target firms since effective competition in corporate control 
relieves the agency problem, such as managerial divergence. As a result, when internal 
corporate governance mechanisms within firms cannot discipline their managers, these poorly 
performing firms will be raided by hostile takeovers (Palepu, 1986). 
Numerous empirical studies have explained the rationale behind the market for corporate 
control in M&A. However, the necessity for large fluctuations of market discipline has been 
questioned (Mueller, 1992; Dickerson et al., 1997). There are mixed views on the market for 
corporate control. On the one hand, the underperforming firms are thoroughly disciplined by 
the market for corporate control. On the other hand, some researchers argue there is no evidence 
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to advocate this notion of discipline. De Young (1997) finds that acquirers are averagely more 
efficient than their target firms no matter whether at pre-merger or post-merger stages in related 
and unrelated circumstances. The author concludes that inefficient firms will be acquired in 
efficient markets, which supports the market for corporate control hypothesis. Dickerson et al. 
(2002) prove the effect of the market for corporate control in disciplining unsuccessful firms in 
the UK. Jensen (1987) also acknowledges the effect of M&A on replacement of inefficient 
management, although changes in technology or market conditions also influence M&A 
activities.  
Conversely, Weir and Laing (2003) and Siriopoulos et al. (2006) have not found significant 
evidence to support the managerial disciplinary effect for the corporate control motive in the 
UK and Greece respectively. They imply that acquisitions in these countries are usually friendly 
rather than hostile in the takeovers driven by a disciplinary motive. Ferreira et al. (2005) suggest 
that incumbent managers of firms tend to raise firms’ market share internationally for effective 
restructuration in the agency cost framework. However, they find no evidence of the market for 
corporate control disciplines for underperforming firms. 
By using a binary logit model methodology, Weir and Laing (2003), Koke (2004), Weir, et al. 
(2005), Sinha (2006) and Siriopoulos, et al. (2006) focus on different issues about the market 
for corporate control. Their research shows that change in control, as a disciplinary measure, is 
related to poor performance in market-based economies. They also show evidence that high 
ownership concentration makes control change possible, in line with a managerial discipline 
hypothesis. Particularly, Weir et al. (2005) find that the privatisation of firms is related to high 
CEO or institutional shareholdings, but is statistically insignificant with regard to the presence 
of non-executive and independent directors. Sinha (2006) identifies that incumbent 
management is disciplined by outside management in hostile takeovers.  
Apart from the mixed academic evidence, the practices in M&A are sometimes different from 
the theoretical hypotheses. For example, the frequency of management turnover is not as high 
as expectation. The process of integration cost a rather long time in many cases (Cosh and Guest, 
2001). Furthermore, Capron (1999) claims that many indicators show deteriorated post-
acquisition performance, as restructuration of target assets frequently damage its capabilities. 
Therefore, it is questioned that unprofitable or inefficient firms will be acquired. 
2.2.4 Managerial Inefficiency  
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The managerial efficiency hypothesis concerns the asset management and its efficiency. This 
hypothesis assumes that inefficient management fails to use a firm’s resources in generating 
output. In this case, the full potential value of the firm’s resources has not been exploited. In 
the empirical study of Rege (1984), lower activity is regarded as a sign of inefficient 
management. He shows that M&A can enable the firm to be more efficient and profitable for 
the benefit of the owners. He also doubts the effectiveness of forecasted data in predicting 
takeover targets compared with historical data.  
Building on the property rights literature, Fama (1980) extends the work of Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) and shows that the operation if primary 
disciplinary mechanism depends on the efficiency of managerial labour market. Fama argues 
that economic organisation can explain efficiently the separation of ownership and control 
through the set of contracts. He starts from the concept of ownership in production factors and 
security bills, and differentiates the function of management and risk-bearing. The security 
holders are ‘risk bearers of last resort’. Therefore, market disciplines over managers and 
shareholders should be applied only in the appropriate markets. In the case of managers, the 
market for managerial labour which runs outside of firms exerts the primary disciplinary 
mechanism.  
Fama (1980) states that when self-interested discretion is not restricted in the managerial labour 
market, the market for corporate control has to employ takeover as its disciplinary mechanism. 
Of course, all of these require the pre-requisition of an efficient capital market. It is an important 
contribution that Fama adjusts the neo-classical theory of the firm to be more relevant to the 
modern business world. His theory of corporate discipline shows advantage in explaining 
merger activity from aspects of efficiency and effectiveness of the market for corporate control 
(Jensen, 1986a). However, Fama’s theoretical approach could not explain the reason for 
periodic failure affecting the managerial labour market.  
With the assumption that inefficient management is replaced in takeovers, North (2001) focuses 
on investigating whether a firm’s relatively poor financial performance (i.e. efficiency) is the 
main reason for it being acquired. He finds that acquirer firms recognise under-management in 
target firms and attempt takeover to remove and replace inefficient management. The 
acquisition is believed to overcome inefficiency in the target firms in order to increase value 
and create potential gains for target firms. Empirical studies usually use the return generated 
from the assets of the company to measure the managerial efficiency. For example, Palepu 
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(1986) uses the target’s return on equity prior to the acquisition as a measure of management 
efficiency in order to investigate the impact of inefficiency management on takeover decisions. 
2.2.5 Management interest hypotheses 
The manager’s interest hypotheses also support M&A activity, which involves hubris 
hypothesis, free cash flow hypothesis and empire-building hypothesis. These theories provide 
to some extent explanations for failure of performance in M&A (Puranam and Singh, 1999). 
Generally, there are two categories of arguments for these theories (Dickerson et al., 1997). The 
first assumes that the acquirer’s management initially intends to increase value, but accordingly 
makes mistakes and losses due to constraint of information. The second presumes self-serving 
managers only maximise their private value rather than positively improve firm value. 
2.2.5.1 The Hubris Hypothesis of Mergers 
Within the first category, the theory of managerial hubris (Roll, 1986) implies that managers 
with good value-increasing intentions may overestimate their abilities to create synergies due 
to their over-confidence. Jensen and Ruback (1983) review twenty of the US empirical studies 
and conclude that the market for corporate control can reinforce efficiency by reallocating 
corporate assets. However, Roll (1986) questions this survey and argues that the efficiency of 
capital markets necessitates the efficiency-enhancing outcomes of M&A. With a rationality 
assumption, Roll (1986) studies the identification of a potential target and the value benefits 
from a takeover. The calculation on value is built on private information held by the acquirer 
management and the publicly available information. If acquirer managers believe the value of 
takeover benefits is greater than the current market price, they will precede with the takeover.  
Roll’s insight emphasises the nature of the bidding process. The valuation of takeover benefits 
can be predicted wrongly due to the price distribution. In assuming the efficient capital market, 
Roll claims that an over-valuation on targets makes acquirers conduct M&A which is not 
efficiency-enhancing. If capital markets are not efficient, it will be possible for acquirers to gain 
profits due to their exclusive access to private information. Nevertheless, if the capital market 
is efficient, the acquirer needs to pay a premium which exceeds the potential benefits of the 
takeover. In other words, the inefficient capital market increases the opportunity of acquirer’s 
valuation error which is detrimental to the putative efficiency of corporate control market. 
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Roll relies little on the assumption of efficient product markets. The information asymmetry 
may lead to inefficiency of the managerial labour market, but an appropriate incentive 
mechanism can compensate for this inefficiency. Holding this argument, there is no question 
about Roll’s assumption of efficient managerial labour markets. Based on Roll’s hubris 
hypothesis, it is found that the market value of acquirer and combined assets from target and 
acquirer will decrease, while the market value of the target will increase. The hubris theory of 
Roll (1986) contributes to the financial economics literature on M&A within an efficient 
markets framework. In the process of constructing his hypothesis, Roll justifies the inconsistent 
use of assumptions of efficiency in product, labour and capital markets. His inferences explain 
the value-destroying process of managers’ actions even though the managers have a wealth 
maximising intention.  
Empirically speaking, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) find strong evidence of hubris in the 
US takeovers. In addition, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) predict that managerial hubris is 
faced by one third of the large European takeovers in the 1990s. Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
indicate that over-confidence improves the chance that managers involve less profitable 
diversifying mergers. According to Rau and Vermaelen (1998), low book-to-market ratio firms 
are more likely to attract managerial hubris than high book-to-market ratio firms. 
The managerial hubris infers that acquirers pay higher takeover price over and above the 
target’s true economic value. This dramatically increases the chances of overpaying which leads 
to failure (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). It is apparent that acquirer managers overestimate the 
value in takeovers due to managerial hubris, which results in being called the winner’s curse 
phenomenon (Roll, 1986). The misevaluation on merger opportunities is usually followed by 
negative total gains in acquisition if the hubris hypothesis holds. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) 
indicate that acquirers usually pay significantly higher premiums than the value they expect to 
be created. They also show a significant and positive relationship between management hubris 
and the size of premium paid. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) identify that managerial 
hubris makes acquirers achieve no gains from takeover in which errors or poor decisions in 
evaluating benefits are made by the acquirer management. Mueller and Sirower (2003) argue 
that the hubris is not the only reason for impairing the wealth of takeovers, but the hubris from 
managers of diversified firms is more than that of undiversified firms’ managements. Thus, 
poor managerial decisions are gambles where acquirer managers believe that their foresight in 
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value is more than others. 
2.2.5.2 The Free Cash Flow hypothesis of Mergers 
Building on the agency cost literature, Jensen (1986b) develops the free cash flow hypothesis 
of merger activity which mainly discusses the managerial discretion over, and abuse of, free 
cash flow. It is assumed that there are the different interests between managers and shareholders 
and insufficient competitive pressures in the product and the managerial labour markets. With 
these assumptions, managers will utilise discretionarily free cash flows and unused debt 
capacity. Myers and Majluf (1984) indicate that managers should distribute free cash flows to 
shareholders. Jensen (1986b) implies that agency problems usually exist when firms hold large 
amounts of free cash but experience a slow organic growth. In this situation, managers prefer 
to involve takeovers rather than return free cash to their shareholders. Jensen believes that 
managers may wish to maintain their fund accessibility unconstrained. He argues that takeovers 
tend to have a value-destroying effect. This detrimental effect appears obviously, especially in 
unrelated mergers where it is difficult to achieve synergistic benefits. 
Jensen (1986a) firstly presents that underperformed acquisitions do not result from over-
confidence but the presence of excess liquidity, or free cash flow (FCF) in the theory of 
managerial discretion. The excess fund over required investments leads managers to make 
quick and large-scale strategic decisions without careful analysis compared with their fund-
strapped peers. For the free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis, with high levels of liquidity, managers 
have more managerial discretion to choose poor acquisitions when there are no good ones 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Moreover, it is suggested that the other stakeholders in the 
firm may believe their management and approve acquisition plans on the basis of high past and 
current cash flows in such situations (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Thus, the hypothesis of FCF 
suggests that the high level of caution in the absence of excess liquidity will lead managers to 
make better decisions (Harford, 1999). 
In the second category, Jensen (2005) points out that a self-interested manager will be more 
likely to seek for self-serving acquisitions with increasing the degree of their managerial 
discretion in FCF. Researchers have shown their support for the role of managerial self-interest 
in M&A. For example, Lewellen et al. (1985) prove that the manager as a large shareholder in 
the acquiring firm generally generates higher bidder returns. While Harford (1999) shows that 
the managers with a small stake in the share of the acquiring firm usually produce lower bidder 
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returns. It is implied that managers will devote more effort to an acquisition due to concern of 
their own financial interest. Further, both agency problems (Berle and Means, 1932) and 
managerial theories of the firm (Marris, 1963) argue that managers pursue self-serving 
acquisitions which lead to value-destruction. 
From another aspect, Jensen (1986b) argues that M&A may resolve these agency problems. If 
the targets which hold sufficient free cash flows are acquired by other firms, acquirers can 
generate excess benefits for both groups of shareholders with proper use of the funds. This type 
of takeover will replace the incompetent management in applying free cash flows appropriately. 
Jensen suggests that corporate debt can be used to solve agency problems associated with free 
cash flow. The managers have to pay out free cash flows to repay the debt; otherwise firms will 
go bankrupt (Jensen and Smith, 1985; Smith, 1986). If managers would not like to distribute 
free cash flow in a dividend, the issue of debt could be a better disciplinary device in forcing 
managers to pay.  
Although the free cash flow hypothesis is developed in an efficient market framework, it does 
not limit its insights into the empirical testing only on share price reactions to merger 
announcements. A variety of hypotheses about merger activity are developed to test this theory. 
For example, this theory suggests that the type of financing M&A will yield different results 
for shareholders. The takeovers financed by cash and debt usually gains greater benefits than 
those financed by stock exchange because stock financed acquisitions are often related to 
growth opportunities and a shortage of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Thus, the free cash flow 
theory allows both industrial and financial economists to mediate their approaches. It explains 
the positive and negative effects on agency problems related to free cash flow, which 
contributes to the understanding of merger activity. 
2.2.5.3 Empire-building Motive 
According to the theory of managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), some 
investments are made by managers in order to maximise the difficulty of being replaced, which 
leads to occurrence of unsuccessful mergers. This implies that managers make an effort to 
entrench themselves by increasing their individual value in the firm rather than maximise the 
firm’s value. Accordingly, entrenching managers will pursue manager-specific projects to 
protect themselves from being replaced by shareholders. Consequently, the value of 
shareholders will be damaged because free resources flow to manager-specific assets, 
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especially when managers are not major shareholders in the firm. Amihud and Lev (1981) 
empirically indicate that diversifying mergers are chosen to reinforce the stability of managers’ 
earnings in order to strengthen corporate survival and maintain their positions. 
Of course, entrenchment mechanism is a way to ensure job security, while it enables managers 
to obtain more wealth, power, reputation and fame (Black, 1989). Entrenchment theory 
primarily demonstrates the behaviours of managers’ self-defending the interest and positions 
of their own. The theory of empire-building provides both the motivations and evidence behind 
these behaviours (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987b). The empire-building theory explicitly 
encourages managers to pay more attention in the growth of their firms rather than profit 
maximisation (Mueller, 1969). Kanniainen (2000) finds a positive relation between over-
investment and managements with a linear compensation scheme. He also derives that the 
empire-building motivates a low degree of uncertainty such as risk aversion and preference for 
prudence. Under empire-building theory, managers prefer to measure the firm with a lower 
discount rate than the average in the market, so they have a large pool of undervalued potential 
targets (Mueller, 1969). However, it is evidenced that the market shares of manager-chosen 
targets usually reduce after acquisitions and those targets are often non-related and less 
attractive than others (Lang et al., 1991; Harford, 1999). Besides, managerial orientated 
takeover will result in declined share prices of acquirers (Morck et al., 1988). 
2.2.6 Diversification Motive  
The issue of diversification has been debated as an M&A motive over the years. The empirical 
literature documents conflicting results on the role of diversification in actually decreasing risk. 
In most cases of the diversification hypothesis, shareholders show their ability more in risk 
control than managers by restructuring portfolio efficiently to diversify risk. It is advocated that 
firms can achieve profit maximisation and simultaneous risk minimisation through 
diversification. Diversification considerations suggest that investment to profitable targets in 
different markets or industries will increase post-acquisitions profits or lead to expansion in 
new fields. The management of acquirer claims that the diversification can ensure the robust 
returns and lower the risk, which increases the potential value for the firms (Villalonga, 2004; 
Mukherjee et al., 2004).  
According to the portfolio theory in finance, optimal diversification is achieved through a 
diversified range of stocks. Therefore, firms attempt to diversify the risk through acquiring 
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other firms. There is a positive relationship between undiversified firm and high risk premium 
in investment, thus the bad risky consequence tends to be weakened by diversification. 
Comparing with undiversified firms, a significantly lower cost of debt and more positive 
premium are found in diversified firms within the same industry (Aivazian and Qiu, 2006). 
Aivazian and Qiu (2006) also show that the default risk can be diversified by creditors through 
hedging uncertain future cash flows. Geographic diversification constitutes another aspect of 
diversification strategies in international M&A activity. A large literature seeks to examine the 
origin of country in cross border M&A transactions and the firm performance in these 
transactions. According to Bodnar et al. (2003), geographic diversification offers acquiring 
firms an effective risk reduction which is different from the aspect of financial diversification. 
Geographic diversification enlarges a firm’s access to multimarket exploitation. For example, 
the US attracts more FDI because the international diversification can exploit the economy of 
scale within its domestic markets so as to obtain cost deduction and superior returns compared 
with other developed countries. By contrast, the internationalisation from Asian firms aims to 
learn from foreign customers and rivals (Yang and Driffield, 2012). 
There is a body of research which suggests that MNEs are more likely to experience an adverse 
performance effect before they can obtain positive returns given that the downside of overseas 
expansion such as high organisational costs and complexity in integration often exceed the 
benefits of diversification in the initial stage (Qian, 1997; Ruigrok and Wagner 2003). Even so, 
some countries with a small market capacity give firms pressure to expand abroad quickly 
because their domestic markets are easily to be saturated (Autio et al., 2002; Moen and Servais, 
2002). However, along with the environmental uncertainty and liabilities of foreignness, a rapid 
move may lead to a fall in a firm’s performance in the early stage of overseas expansion. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the diversification motive has lost importance since takeovers in 
related industries (product extension) and related markets (market extension) have increasingly 
shown improved performance compared with other ones (Tichy, 2001).  
2.2.7 Motives Based on Theories of International Business 
According to Markusen (1995), two alternative explanations have been summarised 
traditionally for different types of M&A. Firstly, horizontal M&A is directly driven by a 
market-seeking motive which attempts to enhance existing markets or exploit new ones. In 
horizontal M&A, relocation of production within overseas markets is originated from market 
demands. Multinational corporations involve horizontal international integrations across 
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developed economies in the small home markets with supply surplus and in the adequate host 
markets with excess demand. Acquiring foreign plants may duplicate production capacity in 
overseas markets which serves foreign customers at low trade costs and makes firms more 
competitive abroad. It is concluded that the firm’s decisions on horizontal investment are 
affected by foreign market size, trade barriers and transport costs (Harris, 2009). 
Secondly, a vertical M&A model is driven by the motive of efficiency-seeking which integrates 
either upstream or downstream production stages to optimise firms’ resource allocation. Under 
vertical integration through M&A, multinational corporations reallocate its certain production 
stages to low cost markets abroad so as to reduce its overall costs of productions. They may 
provide foreign customers with different goods/service from home countries. When there is 
heterogeneous factor advantage in different countries, firms can benefit from their production 
specialisation with respect to these advantages. According to traditional trade theory, the use of 
scarce production factors may generate high return in some countries, which attracts vertical 
integration. In order to reinforce competitiveness, there is a tendency for firms to seek to 
vertically enter labour-intensive production in less developed countries, while capital-intensive 
production in more developed countries (Bevan and Estrin, 2004). 
2.2.8 Resource Based Transfer Motive 
M&A is motivated by the resource-based transfer from the target firm to the acquirer firm. 
From a resource-based view, Dunning (2000) develops resource-seeking motives and strategic 
asset-seeking motives for M&A, both of which aim to reduce production costs and explore 
material resources especially for specific intangible assets (Barba-Navaretti and Venables, 
2004). The aim of the acquirer firm is to make good use of the resources acquired from the 
target firm and generate more decent results from the obtained resources. It is noted that highly 
skilled human capital is one of the most needful strategic resources for acquirers in knowledge-
intensive and innovation-driven industries (Ranft and Lord, 2000). Another study indicates that 
a key objective of acquisition is to seek knowledge-based resources. The knowledge can be 
transferred successfully only when the target’s technologies and capabilities are properly 
utilised in the acquirer firm (Ranft and Lord, 2002). Ranft and Lord (2002) argue that the 
complex process of M&A implementation makes transfer of technologies and capabilities 
difficult and time consuming. They explain that the managements in acquirer and target hold 
different philosophies due to distinct cultural backgrounds and it takes time to build up 
consensus between managements and digest the acquired technologies and capabilities.  
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Capron (1999) and Capron et al. (2001) demonstrate that the performance of M&A is influenced 
by asset divestiture and resource redevelopment and the extent of asset divestiture in targets 
being affected by resource redevelopment is higher than that in acquirers. Karim and Mitchell 
(2000) suggest that both targets and acquirers are more likely to change their business resources 
following M&A comparing with non-acquired firms in the US. This substantial change brings 
combined firms with averagely higher post-acquisition efficiency than non-acquired firms due 
to big heterogeneity in business restructuration. Karim and Mitchell continue that non-acquired 
firms experience less resource redevelopment than acquirer firms because acquirers can realise 
resource deepening through adapt acquired resources to maximise their existing potentials.  
2.2.9 Reaction Mechanism Hypothesis 
The last aspect of explanations is supported by acquisitions as a reaction to changes in the 
environment, which includes disturbances from new technologies or deregulations (disturbance 
hypothesis) and competitor policy (defensive acquisitions).  
The disturbance hypothesis has been exploited in very early stages of M&A research. Gort 
(1969) explains that the divergence of evaluation on the 'true' value of assets between the 
acquirer management and the target management will influence M&A activity among industries 
and over time. The shocks to the financial system and in the real economy bring the economy 
with disturbances. In particular, the uncertainty from changes in product process and technology 
causes greater variance in the valuations for agents and corporate management teams. Gort 
(1969) also postulates high barriers of entry result in a big variance in valuations and increased 
merger activity. The disturbance hypothesis has also been developed to show that M&A activity 
could be influenced by a new production technology, a new form of governance, a restrictive 
merger policy and deregulation. Some of them directly influence the intention of acquisition, 
while some do so indirectly (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Bockem (2001) indicates that a 
certain event within one firm can trigger a series of takeovers or even a merger wave in an 
economy of firms with different marginal costs.  
As for the defensive acquisitions, it is acceptable for the unprofitable deals. Fridolfsson and 
Stennek (1999) present the pre-emptive merger hypothesis which suggests the larger the loss 
of acquisitions are, the more successful those deals are. One motive states that a defensive 
transaction is implemented to protect the firm itself from being acquired by another firm or a 
raider (Greer, 1986). Another motive is explained by Rasmusen (1988) to be a reaction against 
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an aggressive competitor. Dickerson et al. (1997) indicate that if the survival of an acquisition 
is under threat, its goal of increasing profits has to surrender to the second place. No matter 
whether a firm conducts an offensive acquisition or a defensive one, its rivals have to do the 
same as well to retain a competitive position. The latter acquisitions are definitely defensive. 
Rajan et al. (2000) argue that those defensive takeovers are behaviours of bandwagon. 
2.3 Research Issues Relevant to Cross Border M&A 
Firms can use cross border M&A to enter new markets and expand their current goods. More 
specifically, Martin et al. (1998) indicate that suppliers often acquire the related international 
buyers to resist their relationships with local suppliers, which enhances the competitive 
advantage of the acquiring suppliers over their rivals. Additionally, cross border M&A enables 
acquirers to access the new knowledge and to obtain new capabilities. It is argued that 
technological capabilities are transferable between borders, but brand and marketing are distinct 
among markets (Anand and Delios, 2002). During the process of cross border M&A, choosing 
a potential target in the host country will be the first task for acquirers. After finishing the 
transaction, integration between two involving firms and value realisation of their investment 
will be the task for the next stage. Transaction cost economics (TCE) and ownership location 
internalisation (OLI) provide frameworks from economic perspectives for cross border M&A 
(Dunning, 1993). Moreover, the value of international expansion is also investigated from the 
resource (RBV) and organisation learning perspectives (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Madhok, 1997; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001).  
2.3.1 Influence Factors on Cross Border M&A 
When a firm implements a cross border M&A, a number of factors should be taken into 
consideration. Previous research has identified some factors from various aforementioned 
motives of M&A, which involves country level, industry level and firm level. Madhok (1997) 
indicates that previous research focuses on the influence of national and industrial level factors 
under the TCE/OLI framework. The findings at national and industrial levels relevant to 
advantages of international expansion have shown some consensus. Factors at national and 
industrial level such as high or low market growth (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Hennart 
and Reddy, 1997), low cultural distance between home and host countries, and low uncertainty 
avoidance in the home country (Kogut and Singh, 1988) have been investigated to show high 
likelihood of cross border M&A. The findings at firm level have identified a large range of 
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factors. It is found that some firm-level factors, such as multinationality (Harzing, 2002), 
investment size (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Kogut and Singh, 1988), intangible assets 
(Delios and Beamish, 1999), local experience (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998), and the degree 
of product diversification (Wilson, 1980; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000), have a positive 
relationship with cross border M&A. Nevertheless, these factors suffer from the drawbacks 
which may lead to unsuccessful takeovers. 
2.3.1.1 Firm- and Industry-level Factors Affecting Cross Border M&A 
Madhok (1997) implies that recent research explicitly emphasises firm resources from the value 
side. From a resource based perspective, Anand and Delios (2002) distinguish between 
technological capabilities and advertising intensive capabilities. The difference of resource 
types depends whether a firm adopts capability-seeking or capability-exploiting acquisitions. 
For example, when transferring brands to overseas markets, an entry barrier such as high level 
of advertising intensity will restrict the investment of firms in the host countries. As such, they 
argue that firms often choose the acquisition of existing brands in target markets. Another 
example, Hennart and Park (1993) indicate that investors will acquire an existing firm in a target 
market with high growth rate, so that they can penetrate the target market quickly to avoid 
losing the potential profit opportunity.  
Furthermore, it is often reported that the relative size of the investment is a determinant of 
acquisitions, but it is necessary to investigate the influence of total value of investment on 
acquisitions. Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) find a positive relation between cross border 
M&A and large firm size, while Hennart and Reddy (1997) identify the opposite due to the 
difficulty of integration between large firms. Erramilli and D’Souza (1993) show that large 
multinational enterprises tend to expand their investments in small- and medium-sized firms 
(SMEs). Weitzel and McCarthy (2009) find that M&A activities provide SMEs with an external 
growth base and takeovers of SMEs are more flexible. Due to the limitation of capital and 
market abilities, SMEs are often the targets in the cross border M&A activities. Nevertheless, 
Cho and Padmanahan (1995) do not find the association between investment size and 
acquisitions. 
Shaver (1998) argues that the resource differences at the firm level are often neglected by 
researchers. For example, some research investigates the impact of acquiring firm’s proprietary 
intangible assets and their transferability on acquisitions. Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) 
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identify that adopting a form of non-equity based corporation will share some protective 
information with local partners, which could cultivate new competitors outside that specific 
local market. Thus, firms with a high degree of technological capabilities prefer to choose an 
acquisition to protect their specific competences from potential foreign rivals (Brouthers, 2002; 
Pan and Tse, 2000). When a firm chooses cross border M&A as a diversification strategy, it 
will desire complementary resources. Wilson (1980) implies that the existence of target firms 
with complementary resources influences the likelihood of cross border M&A. Accordingly, 
Delios and Beamish (1999) suggest that the possibility of cross border M&A is high when 
intangible assets are mainly acquiring resources and the targets have high R&D and advertising 
intensity. 
However, although most investing firms are interested in intangible and knowledge-based 
resources, it is extremely difficult for investors to identify and manage those intangible assets. 
Based on the framework of TCE and RBV, it is very difficult to transfer this kind of technology 
to a foreign location. For example, it is expensive and potentially unsuccessful in training the 
acquired staff. Therefore, Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) indicate that the competitive 
advantage based on a complex technology will reduce the likelihood of cross border M&A. 
Hennart and Park (1993) also stress that acquisitions cannot enable firms to possess strong 
technological advantage in Japan. Few studies analyse this kind of advantage possession from 
the firm level. 
Apart from the difficulty in technology transfer, it is also necessary to consider the qualities of 
resources and their complementarities to the firms’ current resource portfolio, as well as their 
degree of embeddedness in the targeted organisation during M&A (Shimizu et al., 2004). For 
example, according to Hennart and Reddy (1997), sometimes only a part of target assets is the 
complementary resource desired by acquirers. The investing firms may wish to acquire only 
this complementary part of assets. However, the organisational form of target may determine 
the ability of detaching the complementary assets from the others. Thus, when the 
complementary resources are located within certain division of target firms, the investing firm 
can obtain interested assets only through acquiring the specific division. While, when the 
complementary resources are embedded deeply across the whole organisation, this may reduce 
the possibility of acquiring the whole target in considerations of high transaction costs. 
Other factors affecting cross border M&A includes the extent of prior experience of the 
investing firm, and the product and market diversity of investing firms. From an organisational 
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learning perspective, Huber (1991) indicates that the experience factor is important, since the 
experience from various circumstances provides firms with a more extensive knowledge 
foundation, stronger technological competencies and more inventive abilities. Besides, 
Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) advocate that firms could operate cross border M&A to reduce 
organisational inertia in expanding the knowledge base. However, Hitt et al. (1991) imply that 
firms’ capability of innovation might be impaired by intensive acquisitions. In addition, reduced 
number of competitors and clients due to M&A reduces firms’ chances to learn from different 
events. Empirically, Hennart and Park (1993) and Cho and Padmanahan (1995) do not find that 
firm experience is related to acquisitions, while Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) identify strong 
support that high experience level will restrict the likelihood of acquisitions. Thus, it is 
important to pursue a balance between acquisitive and internal growth of capabilities (Levinthal 
and March, 1993). 
From another aspect, firms can benefit from the operational variety of national markets and 
product markets. However, multinational diversification has been found to decrease the 
likelihood of cross border M&A (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). Whereas, it is found that the 
same factor does not influence the likelihood of cross border M&A (Kogut and Singh, 1988). 
In fact, learning is beneficial to both multinational operations and multiproduct marketing. 
Nevertheless, excessive product lines could impair information flow and knowledge interaction 
within the whole organisation. As such, the extent of organisational learning will reduce with 
increasing the level of product diversification.  
2.3.1.2 Country-level Factors Affecting Cross Border M&A 
The cultural issue has been examined in the literature of cross border M&A. the majority of 
academics consider the ability of resources integration, particularly human resources. A high 
level of cultural distance is regarded as the main obstacle of successful integration (Brouthers 
and Brouthers, 2000; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Kogut and Singh, 1988). Investors will apply 
different strategic advantages according to various locations. For instance, based on TCE and 
institutional theory, Hennart and Reddy (1997) imply that the higher the cultural distance is, the 
less likely the investor will prefer an acquisition. It is explained by the high managerial cost of 
integrating employees stemmed from cultural distances (Child et al., 2001), or limited to the 
foreign acquirer’s governance activities in the local targets (Kang and Kim, 2010). However, 
with the same theoretical framework, Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) present the opposite 
argument that acquisitions make firms more legitimate in the host country when large cultural 
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distance exists.  
At the country level, it is important for foreign entrants to have a legitimacy which refers to 
obtaining acceptance from local customers and institutions. The rules of game such as laws and 
regulations in the host country are established by local institutions (Davis et al., 2000). Entry 
to a certain target country is sometimes obstructed by the institution structure. The legal 
restriction on ownership of outsiders is often used as a governmental protection for local firms. 
According to Brouthers (2002), the markets with high legal restrictions and high level of 
investment risk tend to constrain the occurrence of acquisitions. Due to such constraints, 
institutional theory suggests that invested institutional background may alter the firm’s ability 
of enhancing foreign capability (Caves, 1996). Thus, Wilson (1980) indicates that acquisition 
of existing local firms provides a better way to cope with the strange environment for the firms 
without much foreign experience.  
Based on institutional theory, Davis et al. (2000) identify that both internal pressure from the 
parent firm and external pressure from the host country influence firms’ foreign expansion. 
When the institutional norms of the parent firms mainly affect the subsidiaries, the internal 
system such as homogeneity of organisational practices and structures will prompt the 
likelihood of acquisitions. Against this, the environmental factors of the host country retard the 
likelihood of acquisitions. Acquisitions will encounter the difficulty of adaptation of investors 
in the local environment, especially in the countries with strong regulations, but Davis et al. 
(2000) find that the internal impact is greater than the external one.  
2.3.2 Research Issues on Integration after Cross Border M&A 
According to Child et al. (2001), not only should the issues on pre-M&A implementation but 
also the processes and outcomes of post-M&A implementation should be well examined in 
international contexts. The large scale of previous literature on acquisition strategy investigates 
the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition performance of the target and acquiring firms (e.g. 
Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Lubatkin, 1987; Seth et al., 2002). Much of them regard 
productivity and profitability as closely related. However, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1999) 
differentiate between measures of productivity and profitability. This distinction also offers a 
number of contexts related to this research. According to Girma et al. (2006), productivity is 
considered as the internal returns, which means that the increase in productivity will increase 
potential resources available to both the internal stakeholders (ie. employees and management) 
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and the external stakeholders (in particular shareholders and loan creditors). Contrary to this, 
profitability is considered as the external returns which can be obtained by external shareholders. 
The profits can be paid out as dividends or retained for reinvestment in order to create more 
corporate value.  
Existing empirical evidence on the causal link between foreign M&A and a firm’s productivity 
is inconclusive. Some research reports positive impact of foreign acquisition on the acquired 
firm’s post‐takeover productivity (McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001, for the US evidence; Conyon 
et al., 2002, for the UK evidence; Piscitello and Rabbiosi, 2005, for Italian evidence; Moden, 
1998, for Swedish evidence; Arnold and Javorcik, 2005, for Indonesian evidence). The above 
studies neglect sample selection issues surrounding the link between the pre-acquisition 
characteristics of the firm which impact on post-acquisition performance. Based on the 
propensity score matching technique with a difference in difference estimator, Karpaty (2007) 
and Fukao et al. (2005; 2006) find positive evidence for the acquired Swedish firms and 
Japanese manufacturing firms respectively.  
In addition, many studies argue that such a positive productivity impact of foreign acquisition 
reported is affected by various firm- and/or industry-level factors such as pre-acquisition 
productivity level (Girma, 2005; Girma et al. 2007), size (Bellak et al., 2006), nationality of 
ownership (Bellak et al., 2006), and domestic competition (Girma et al., 2006). For example, 
Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) report a more significant productivity improvement in smaller 
firms. Additionally, Girma et al. (2006) indicate that the high potential productivity gains are 
more likely to be achieved in the more competitive industry where international M&A take 
place. Furthermore, Girma (2005) and Girma et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between 
the pre-acquisition productivity level and efficiency gains.  
However, the negative post-takeover effects could result from some factors relating to 
information asymmetry during foreign operations, resource shortage due to coordination over 
distance, lack of political influence and knowledge networks, difficulty in organisational 
integration, and so on. Thus, some research finds very limited impact of foreign acquisition on 
the acquired firm (e.g. Salis, 2008, for Slovenian manufacturing sector; Bellak et al., 2006, for 
Austrian firms). Meanwhile, various other research also reports negative impacts of foreign 
takeovers on the productivity of acquired firm following M&A. Harris and Robinson (2002) 
indicates that foreign acquisitions make firm’s productivity level slightly decline after takeover 
in the UK manufacturing sector. Gioia and Thomsen (2002) also find a similar negative impact 
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of foreign takeovers on the performance of acquired firms with using Danish firm data. 
After discussing the internal performance, we further explore the impact of profitability, which 
reflects the ability of firms to lever their specific advantage into final markets. Previous 
literature has examined the success of M&A from several perspectives. They include the 
perspective of the target’s or acquirer’s shareholders, the combined shareholder wealth effect, 
and a wider range of stakeholders such as bondholders, managers, employees, and consumers. 
According to the survey of Martynova and Renneboog (2008), the shareholder wealth is usually 
the primary objective of finance theory. The event study approach is applied to assess the short-
term and long-term shareholder wealth effects of M&A. The approach assumes the new 
information from an M&A announcement will be reflected in the share prices; it attempts to 
investigate the difference between the realised returns and the expected returns after M&A, 
which is call an abnormal return. The abnormal return studies are listed in panel A of table 2.1. 
From table 2.1, these event studies show mixed abnormal returns after takeovers. However, the 
event study on share price movement is criticised from several aspects. First, the effect of 
takeover can be mingled with many other changes in strategic and operational decisions or the 
financial policy in the long term. Some long-term shareholder wealth effects may not results 
from M&A. Second, the approach requires that the financial market is efficient, but the short-
term and long-term shareholder wealth effects of M&A are conflicting with this assumption. 
The efficient financial market assumes the new information about takeover should be reflected 
in short-term returns rather than long-term returns. This implies that either short-term returns 
or long-term returns should be identified based on the assumption of financial market efficiency. 
Apart from event study on abnormal returns, some studies evaluate the operating performance 
of M&A by comparing pre- and post-acquisition accounting measures. These measures 
comprise net income, sales, number of employees, return on assets or equity, EPS, leverage, 
firm liquidity, profit margins, and so on. Many of these measures are used to assess the firm’s 
profitability, particularly in the examination of operating gains of takeovers by accounting 
studies. Accounting studies examine the combined operating gains of takeovers. Some 
profitability studies in the literature report a positive impact on ex-post profitability due to 
international takeovers (Cosh et al., 1980; Healy et al., 1992; Switzer, 1996; Lipsey and 
Feliciano, 2002; Carline et al., 2002; Gugler et al., 2003; Bellak et al., 2006; Chari et al., 2009), 
while other literature reports negative profitability after M&A (Singh, 1971; Herman and 
Lowenstein, 1987; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989; Dickerson et al., 1997). Generally, studies 
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report a decline in post-acquisition profitability on examining earnings-based measures, while 
studies demonstrate firms can achieve gains in foreign takeovers on examining cash flow 
performance measures. These studies are shown in panel B of table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 The lists of previous research on M&A performance  
Panel A Shareholder wealth effect around M&A announcements 
Author (Year), Sample country 
Sample 
period 
Event 
window 
Sample 
size 
Abnormal Returns 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), UK 1983-1995 (-1, +1D) 519 acquirer↓ 
Bradley and Sundaram (2004), US 1990-2000 (-2, +2D) 12476 acquirer↑ 
Moeller et al. (2005), US 1980-2001 (-1, +1D) 1967 acquirer↑ 
Ang and Cheng (2006), US 1984-2001 (-1D, close) 848 target↑; acquirer↓ 
Martynova and Renneboog (2006), Europe 1993-2001 (-5, +5D) 1659 target↑; acquirer↑ 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), UK 1983-1995 (+2, +36M) 519 acquirer↓ 
Moeller et al. (2004), US 1981-2001 (0, +36M) 12023 acquirer↑ 
Bradley and Sundaram (2004), US 1990-2000 (+1, +24M) 12476 acquirer↓ 
Croci (2007), West Europe 1990-2001 (0, +12M) 83 acquirer↓ 
Panel B Post-acquisition operating performance 
Author (Year), Sample country 
Sample 
period 
Event 
window 
Sample 
size 
Performance 
measure 
Results 
Meeks (1977), UK 1964-1972 (0, +5Y) 161 EBIT acquirer↓ 
Mueller (1980), US 1962-1972 (0, +3Y) 247 ROE, ROA acquirer↓ 
Clark and Ofek (1994), US 1981-1988 (0, +3Y) 25 EBIT acquirer↓ 
Dickerson et al. (1997), US 1948-1977 (0, +5Y) 2914 ROA acquirer↓ 
Lee and Caves (1998), US 1980-1990 (+2, +5Y) 125 ROS acquirer↓ 
Martynova et al. (2007), Europe 1997-2001 (0, +3Y) 155 EBIT acquirer = 
Cosh et al. (1980), UK 1967-1969 (0, +5Y) 225 Net income acquirer↑ 
Healy et al. (1992), US 1979-1984 (0, +5Y) 50 CF acquirer↑ 
Powell and Stark (2005), UK 1985-1993 (0, +3Y) na CF acquirer↑ 
Bellak et al. (2006), Austria 1994-2002 (-1, +5Y) na Profit margin acquirer↑ 
Chari et al. (2009), US 1980-2007 (0, +5Y) na ROA target↑ 
Result: "↓", "↑", "=" - performance measure decreases, increases, and is not significant respectively. 
Event window: 0 - the day or year of M&A announcement; (0, +nY) – The period of n years from the announcement; Close 
– The day of acquisition completion; (0, +nD) – The period of n days from the announcement; (0, +nM) – The period of n 
Months from the announcement. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989) indicate that the different benchmarks for both earnings-
based measures and cash flow measure result in these conflicting conclusions. With 
investigating the moderate effect of market power, Mueller (1985) argues that the profit 
decreases due to a decline in the market share of combined firm, while Gugler et al. (2003) 
show that the improved market power is responsible for the profit improvement. It is noted that 
post-merger operating performance studies suffer from measurement errors due to the various 
statistical problems, such as manipulation by managements of firms or different accounting 
standards across countries. Thus this may lead to difficultly in comparing the conclusions across 
countries and over time. Some accounting distortions may disturb the result of operating 
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performance studies. 
Some research on ex-post M&A are concentrated on human resource issues which involves the 
HR programme, personnel development, and shifts in communication and remuneration 
schemes. To some extent, the change in workforce due to M&A will influence the post-
acquisition firm performance. For example, Lehto and Böckerman (2008) indicate that the cross 
border M&A results in downsizing in manufacturing employment and changes in ownership. 
The workforce restructure proposed by the acquiring firm will produce significantly immediate 
negative effects after acquisition, but the subsequent dynamic impacts on the target firm’s 
employment become positive with the enhancement of management efficiency during the post-
M&A long-term period (Yamada and Taguchi, 2010). It is capital deepening rather than TFP 
changes that improve the labour productivity so as to bring good performance after cross border 
M&A (Schiffbauer, et al. 2009). Due to the difficulties of ‘double-layered acculturation’ in the 
cross border M&A, Barkema et al. (1996) present the necessity of more research on post-
acquisition integration. The national cultural facet has attracted much attention, while more 
focus should be guided to the facet of corporate cultural differences.  
The early theoretical literature on foreign direct investment, known as the Ownership-Location-
Internalization (OLI) framework (Dunning, 1977), has identified three characteristics of 
multinational firms to explain their advantages in better performance compared with domestic-
owned firms. These characteristics are: (i) large endowments of intangible assets that 
compensate for the lack of local knowledge (e.g. markets, consumer preferences and business 
practices), to compete with domestic firms; (ii) location advantages that originate from a foreign 
location rather than exporting; and (iii) advantages from internalising technology rather than 
licensing it to foreign producers. These elements have been formalised in seminal papers by 
Markusen (1995, 2002), Helpman (1984, 1985), and Markusen and Venables (1998). More 
recently, comparing fixed costs of exporting and undertaking foreign direct investment in 
equilibrium, Helpman et al. (2004) order heterogeneous firms in terms of productivity as 
follows: the least productive exit, the more productive firms serve only the domestic market, 
the next more productive serve the domestic market and export, and the most productive firms 
serve the domestic market and undertake foreign direct investment. Accordingly, it follows that 
multinationals are the most productive firms in their origin countries. 
The importance of firms’ active engagement in the formation of integration teams is widely 
acknowledged. An effective integration team for cross border M&A should involve planning, 
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coordination and implementation during the integration process (Inkpen et al., 2000). 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) imply that the integration leaders have a better insight of the 
personnel issues and the operation processes within teams. Shane (1995) indicates that leaders’ 
competencies affect the qualities of organisational innovation. However, few papers contribute 
to the theoretical and empirical research on the integration team and their leadership, and most 
of them are for practitioners (Ashkenas and Francis, 2000; Ashkenas et al., 1998). 
Very and Schweiger (2001) insist firms should learn from their prior experiences if they have 
made multiple cross border M&A deals. These experiences could be beneficial to the success 
of acquisitions (Hitt et al., 1998). Thus, it is worth to study the process of learning and applying 
experience from prior practices. Considering the factor of absorptive capacity, Hayward (2002) 
indicates that the knowledge absorption relies on an adequately similar knowledge base. He 
finds that significant difference between the prior and current acquisitions make prior 
knowledge useless for the specific circumstance. Alternatively, the current acquisition with 
high similarity to previous acquisitions may appreciate the prior knowledge, but little new 
knowledge could be learned for application in future acquisitions. Whereas, according to the 
finding of under-performance in the second acquisition, Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002) argue 
that the prior experience often has a misleading impact. In order to enable learning from 
acquisition experience be the firm’s competitive advantage, a more systematic approach in 
learning mechanisms requires to be introduced for cross border M&A (Ashkenas et al., 1998).  
It is also important to analyse the consequences of cross border M&A failures. The extant 
literature stresses that many cross border M&A failures such as closure and divestiture result 
from the overpayment of premium or inevitable problems in post-M&A integration (Child et 
al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2001). Hayward (2002) argues that firms have studied small mistakes to 
reduce the payment size of excessive premiums, but there is no literature to investigate the 
relatively large failed cases such as divestitures and liquidation of cross border M&A. Moreover, 
Shimizu and Hitt (2005) suggest that the managements may be replaced due to their failure in 
investments. Although the mistakes and failures are not a pleasant topic for the managers who 
made the poor investments, they or successive managers should seize the opportunity to learn 
the lesson from the failures. If there is no rational investigation to unpack the prior failed cases, 
the management may not dare to touch future potential M&A with worrying about the risk of 
failures (Shimizu, 1999). Therefore, this research will also investigate post-acquisition issues 
because of the high international risk in cross border M&A. 
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2.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter was organised to critically review the existing literature in the area of M&A. The 
in-depth empirical literature had also reviewed that despite prior research using different 
approaches, a comparative analysis revealed that their findings are different due to their 
different standing positions and focus points. In the efficient market, the market for corporate 
control removes the confines on the mobility of resource factors and allows them to flow freely 
to better utility, which benefits the owners of firms and the whole economy. In general, with 
the effective disciplinary function, M&A are considered as value-increasing events by financial 
economists, although considerable inconsistent evidence exists in the efficient markets 
framework from which financial economists proceed (Dutz, 1989; Jensen, 1987). However, 
industrial economists are inclined to provide the critical empirical evidence (Mueller, 1989; 
Caves, 1989). 
The divergence between these two traditional economists lies in their respective starting points 
and the issues with which they are concerned. The industrial economists start from market 
concentrations, and they prove the presence of market transaction costs in the restructuration of 
large corporate agglomerates. They are concerned with issues about improving public interest 
and social welfare and correction of market failure (Caves, 1989). Nevertheless, the financial 
economists start from the forecast of stock market efficiency. They focus on the return based 
on share-price movement and they are concerned with the private gains (e.g. Jensen and Ruback, 
1983; Jensen, 1986a; Bradley and Jarrell, 1988; Jarrell et al., 1988). However, it is difficult to 
keep the assumption of efficient markets, especially when the economy of scale is achieved due 
to mergers (Fama, 1991). Moreover, industrial economists are attempting the method used by 
financial economists. For instance, Duso et al. (2010) use event study to assess the anti-
competitive effect of mergers. 
The motives of takeovers are derived from relevant theories on M&A. The influence factors are 
identified to show their impacts on M&A. However, previous studies have not yet been able to 
document consistent results concerning these factors, especially in their different research 
approaches and perspectives on predicting M&A. Therefore, this research will continue 
exploring the determinants of M&A from a different perspective. This will be demonstrated in 
a later chapter. In order to reconcile the different strands of empirical evidence, it is worthwhile 
to propose the question whether cross border M&A improve performance in terms of productive 
efficiency and profitability. Thus, the empirical research on determinants of cross border M&A 
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and ex-post studies of post-acquisition performance will form the substantive empirical part of 
the current project. It will attempt to provide a direct test about the impact of takeovers on the 
productive efficiency and profitability of corporate assets. Before starting the formal studies of 
this project, it is necessary to introduce the relevant methodology and approaches in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review critically the methodological approaches adopted in the empirical 
research literature concerned with M&A. The aim of this chapter is to provide an appropriate 
starting point for the empirical analysis. Given the theoretical approaches to M&A outlined in 
chapter 2, it is perhaps not surprising that the methodological approaches to explaining and 
examining the outcomes of M&A are equally broad.  
From the review of the voluminous empirical literature in the second chapter, the interpretations 
of empirical results still result in much debate and controversy in the literature (Bradley, 1987; 
Mueller, 1989). These mixed results on outcomes of M&A are, to some extent, produced by the 
different research methodologies such as event studies and ex-post M&A studies. Although 
both methods occupy most of the recent empirical literature on the effect of M&A, neither of 
them has shown convincing and consistent results. Researchers have attempted to reconcile the 
contradictions and inconsistencies in the empirical literature by utilising reconciliation of the 
two methodological approaches (Bradley, 1987; Caves, 1989; Higson, 1991; Healy et al., 1992). 
Accordingly, it is essential to reconsider the methodological issues from an empirical 
perspective.  
By using accounting data, financial ratios have often been used to measure the characteristics 
of firms, although they suffer from some distortion and bias. Three examples of methodological 
approaches have been reviewed to demonstrate the types and sources of the main biases and 
distortions when using accounting data. The use of accounting data is less reliable, but the 
methodologies of using it offer direct tests of disciplinary and synergy hypotheses. In addition, 
a large number of studies have confirmed the importance of accounting data to corporate 
management teams and to the stock market (Kelly and Tippett, 1991; Brief and Lawson, 1991; 
Higson, 1991; Breton et al., 1993). 
Moreover, the ex-post performance analysis is also used to discover whether takeovers improve 
a firm’s profitability and productivity. However, this type of study usually suffers from the 
sample selection bias. Previous research offers several approaches to control it, but this study 
will employ takeover rumour data to address this problem. The different way of using rumoured 
M&A data will provide a new insight into the M&A research. 
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The remainder part of this chapter is structured as follows: the next section will review the study 
methodology by using published accounting data. The bias and distortion which cause 
inconsistent estimation of accounting data study are examined. Particularly, the following 
section will mainly discuss the selection bias and the counterfactual issue and review several 
prevalent approaches which are used to overcome these issues. The fourth part will explain the 
choice of a probit model. The final section offers a summary and conclusion of this chapter. 
3.2 The Use of Accounting Data 
The use of accounting data shows advantages in direct tests of the disciplinary and synergies 
hypotheses. For example, the accounting data can be used to examine the pre-M&A 
performance of targets and acquirers in which to test whether the efficient firm overtakes the 
inefficient one. However, the accounting data suffers from the potential bias and distortion 
(Cubbin and Hall, 1979; Meeks and Meeks, 1981). 
3.2.1 Biases in Published Accounting Data 
The bias can result from the historic cost convention and the accruals concept with using 
accounting data. Three examples of these biases and distortions are reviewed below. First, 
researchers usually use ratios of profits (earnings) to sales to measure profitability. Sales 
revenue seems to be most reliable of all the accounting numbers because it is seldom influenced 
by subjective judgments comparing with many other accounting categories. However, Meeks 
and Meeks (1981) argue that the mutual sales between merging firms or trade with the third 
parties prior to the merger will be considered as an internal transaction post-merger. This will 
make sales decrease, which accordingly lifts measures of profitability on an upward bias. The 
replacement in an internal transaction takes place in the M&A practices. Thus, it is impossible 
to articulate the extent of this potential bias. The phenomenon can be identified more easily in 
the case of vertical mergers, although it exists in all types of M&A activities. More specifically, 
to transform an external trade into an internal trade may reduce the transaction cost for firms, 
which motivate firms to evolve into vertical M&A.  
The second example is that the financial gearing may cause bias to the rate of return on equity. 
It is suggested to use ratio of return on equity cautiously to measure the improvement of 
performance (Meeks and Meeks, 1981). Meeks and Meeks indicate an positive causality 
between gearing ratio and the return on equity. If gearing ratio changes in certain M&A, it may 
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simply affect the return on equity measure. This means that the return on equity can be shown 
as an increase due to more gearing, even though the actual productive efficiency may have 
decreased post-merger. Hence, there is an bias to use the return on equity as an efficiency 
measure. 
The third distortionary bias comes from accounting practice during consolidating a firm's assets 
between targets and acquirers (Meeks and Meeks, 1981). Given the assumption of managerial 
hubris, acquirers often pay a higher price, which exceeds the true value of the target’s assets in 
M&A. A higher book recording of the acquired assets will be reflected in the books of the 
acquirer firm. Therefore, any return on assets measure will be biased downward post-merger. 
3.2.2 Implications of Distortionary Bias 
The problems outlined above show that the post-merger profitability observed will be generally 
overstated. Thus, Meeks and Meeks (1981) imply that any profitability improvement cannot be 
claimed as evidence for increased efficiency post-merger on a conventional accruals basis. In 
fact, given the expected upward bias, any increase in post-acquisition profitability does not 
necessarily mean improvements in productive efficiency. However, the decline in post-
acquisition profitability will expect a fall in productive efficiency.  
3.3 Sample Selection Issue and Correction 
3.3.1 The Sample Selection Issue 
The sample selection brings out another bias which more severely influences the consistency 
of ex-post studies than that of ex-ante studies by using pre-M&A financial characteristics. This 
section will address this problem by using firm’s productivity analysis because the selectivity 
issue is often raised in such a study. There is an argument that the improvement of firm 
performance might not result from the effect of takeover but from the productivity advantage 
on its own. Harris and Robinson (2002) show that foreign investors tend to acquire firms with 
higher productivity in comparison with other manufacturing firms in the UK. Furthermore, 
Griffith et al. (2004) indicate that the foreign-owned multinationals are observed with higher 
productivity at the economy-wide level because they are located in high productivity sectors 
per se. 
Abstractly, the sample selection issue often occurs when estimating the relationship between 
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treatment status (e.g. one firm is acquired by another firm) and productivity using firm‐level 
data (Moffitt, 2004). Ample studies make attempts to compare a ‘treatment’ group with the rest 
of the population because some doubt the randomness of the treatment group sampled from the 
population of all firms. Heckman (2000) and Heckman and Navarro‐Lozano (2004) illustrate 
the standard evaluation problem in their literature. The focus is on the existence of a bias in 
assessing the outcome (Yi) of the treatment effect with differentiating the firms which receive 
the treatment (Ti) or not. This can be expressed as:  
E[Yi| Ti = 1] - E[Yi| Ti = 0]      (3.1) 
The above expression can be used to assess the effect of treatment with knowing the observed 
information. This equation can be rewritten as:  
E[Yi
1| Ti = 1] - E[Yi
0| Ti = 0]      (3.2) 
The above expression refers to the difference between the outcome (Yi
1) after receiving the 
treatment (Ti) in terms of participants (Ti = 1) with the treatment experience and the outcome 
(Yi
0) without the treatment (Ti) in terms of non‐participants (Ti = 0) without the treatment 
experience. However, the outcome for those participants of treatment is unobserved if they had 
not receive the treatment (i.e. E[Yi
0| Ti = 1]). This counterfactual term expands the above 
expression to be:  
E[Yi
1 - Yi
0| Ti = 1] + {E[Yi
0| Ti = 1] - E[Yi
0| Ti = 0]}   (3.3) 
Hence, the difference of outcomes between treated and untreated firms can be decomposed into 
two parts which are the effect of ‘treatment on the treated’ (the first term in the above expression) 
and a bias term (the second major term after the plus sign). According to Angrist (2001), the 
random assignment of treated firms or the independence between Ti and Yi
0 would make the 
bias term be zero. For example, if the potential of acquisition target is independent of the 
improvement of firm’s productivity from the acquisition, the bias term would be zero. However, 
this kind of independence seems to be unrealistic because the potential of obtaining productivity 
gains from M&A often becomes the consideration factor when choosing targets for acquisition. 
One expectation is that the firms with high growth potential will be more likely to achieve better 
performance than average. In particular, the bias term of above expression shows that the 
improvement of involving firm’s productivity might have originated from the advanced 
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characteristics of the firm itself rather than the effect of takeover. Besides, the advanced 
characteristics will influence the decisions on acquisition. Thus, it is essential to achieve an 
estimate of the unobserved counterfactual information in assessing the effect of takeovers. This 
counterfactual information is unbiased due to the simultaneous relationship between the 
decisions on acquisition and the potential gains from such acquisition. 
3.3.2 The Problem of the Counterfactual Issue 
There is a counterfactual issue in the case of post-merger performance research. This issue 
presents a question: how the performance of the two involving firms would change if the M&A 
had not happened? There is rarely a direct answer fort this question, but researchers attempt a 
number of proxy methods to solve the problem. Researchers either attempt an industry or size 
control group or compare pre-acquisition performance of the acquirer and target firms. The 
accuracy of estimates depends on the appropriateness of these proxies in solving the 
counterfactual problem. There is heterogeneity between the characteristics of firms even in the 
same industry or sector, which leads to a potential problem in control group methods. However, 
the advantage of these methods is that the control group provides a reference in predicting the 
pre-acquisition performance of targets and acquirers. The alternative comparison methods show 
less satisfaction due to the change in trading conditions over time. The difference between pre- 
and post-acquisition performance is affected by the feature of industry, timing and the 
fluctuation of the business cycle. Besides, there is no direct relation between the difference of 
firm’s profitability and change in its productive efficiency.  
3.3.3 The Selection Bias in Performance Study on M&A 
It is necessary for the study on the effect of foreign M&A to compare both the pre- and post-
acquisition performance of the involving firms. With respect to the pre-acquisition firm’s 
productivity, it is argued that the foreign MNE will either acquire outperforming firms to take 
advantage of their better firm performance based on the operational efficiency view, or acquire 
underperforming firms to improve them stemming from the managerial discipline hypothesis 
(Conyon et al., 2002; Girma et al., 2001). In either case, there is usually a selection bias in the 
investigation of post-acquisition impact of foreign M&A with simply comparing acquired and 
non‐acquired firms. Thus, such a simple analysis cannot reveal a causal link between the foreign 
takeover and its effects.  
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The selection issue suggests that firms involved in a foreign M&A may not be sampled 
randomly from the total population of domestic firms. It is believed that the choices of foreign 
M&A are impacted by certain criteria, i.e. the pre-acquisition performance of firms such as 
productivity, return on assets/shares, managerial performance, growth potential and industry‐
specific characteristics. This implies that M&A activity may not be a random process but 
subject to pre-acquisition characteristics. It is explained that the pre‐acquisition characteristics 
of the involving firms are related to possible gains for the acquired firm. According to Bellak 
et al. (2006), the disciplining effect of the takeover will be exerted on the acquired 
underperforming firm’s management and improve the efficiency of acquired firms based on the 
managerial inefficiency argument. From the other aspect, the acquired firm can get access to 
the new parent’s firm‐specific resources and obtain additional efficiency gains (Bellak and 
Pfaffermayr, 2002). 
Numerous researchers adopt the pre- versus post-M&A performance approach. The evaluation 
of change in firm performance on the certain periods after the year of cross border M&A 
occurrence provides a base for the comparison between the actual performance and the situation 
had the firm not invested abroad. However, the focus of concern is whether an acquired firm 
would have had a different firm performance (e.g. productivity), if it had not been acquired by 
other foreign firms. This is so called unobservable counterfactual situation. Although the post-
M&A firm performance of the combined entity and the joint pre-M&A firm performance of 
independent firms can be compared, it is hard to assess the imponderable counterfactual 
situations of firm performance where M&A is non-existent because there is the unobservable 
post-M&A firm performance of the combined entity in the non-existent case. Specifically, it is 
not observable for the change in productivity or profitability if the firm naturally grows per se 
without considering the impact of M&A in the counterfactual situation. Thus, simple 
comparisons between foreign owned and domestic firms are biased. Traditional regression 
analysis is not robust due to this endogeneity problem and will also yield biased results. If the 
counter-factual issue can be coped with adequately, less constraint will be limited to measure 
the validity of inferences drawn from these performance studies. Recently, many suitable 
econometric methods, e.g. a matching estimator approach, have been employed to simulate this 
counterfactual situation. These methods will be introduced in the following section. 
3.3.4 Correction Approaches 
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3.3.4.1 The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Approach 
Several approaches are exploited to eliminate the bias resulted from self‐selection (Blundell et. 
al., 2005). The first approach is matching in the firm’s productivity study, which refers to match 
every acquired firm with another non‐acquired firm but possessing (very) similar characteristics. 
The matching approach presumes the same observable features in affecting firm’s productivity 
between acquired‐ and non‐acquired firms except for the condition of receiving treatment (here 
is acquisition). In other words, the impacts on productivity should be the same in both cases 
without considering the acquisition. Accordingly, the non‐acquired matching group proxy the 
real counterfactual group, which provides the missing information on the change in 
performance of acquired firms if they had not experienced takeovers. 
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), a probit/logit regression technique is used to 
generate scores in order to match firms in the propensity score matching algorithms. The 
matching process requires a rich dataset covering all the relevant influence factors of firm 
performance and those of takeover occurrence. Thus, unobservable selection bias seems to 
impact insignificantly on the performance without respect to takeovers. Heckman and Navarro‐
Lozano (2004) argue that too much information about the decisions on takeover will reduce the 
size and significance of the treatment group, which limits the effectiveness of the matching 
approach.  
In empirical design of matching firms, Bryson et al. (2002) and Imbens (2004) provide a 
detailed and useful discussion. The propensity score matching approach commonly develops a 
model to predict the probability of likely target. Thus, the propensity score can be derived to 
identify the closest match during the matching procedure (Girma et. al., 2004). Several issues 
should be considered in the propensity score matching technique.  
First, it is important to decide the variables which should be included in the probit model. It is 
indicated that the propensity scores could be seriously biased in generating the control group 
due to lack of important variables. However, some variables are affected contemporaneously 
by treatment such as acquisition, and the anticipation of acquisition has not impacted their value 
before acquisition. These variables at period (t-1) can be included (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2005). Additionally, Heckman and Navarro‐Lozano (2004) imply that the variables with 
insignificant impact on the outcome variable should be excluded. Indeed, Bhattacharya and 
Vogt (2007) show that the propensity score model should exclude some instrumental variables 
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which determine the potential of the acquired firm but are uncorrelated with the outcome 
variable.  
Second, the fixed effects should be concerned when estimate the propensity score model with 
the panel data. The equation is written as follows: 
Pit = βXit + μi + εit      (3.4) 
where μi is fixed effects. Such fixed effects are potentially related to the explanatory variables, 
which result in biased estimates of the model parameters β. This is especially problematic for 
the probit estimator which involves a non‐linear approach. The maximum likelihood methods 
are employed in the estimation of above equation. An inconsistent estimate of sample μ̂i (β) 
constructs the unobserved term μi into the function of other parameters β in the model. 
According to Fernandez‐Val and Vella (2007), the parameter estimates are biased due to their 
correlation with the individual fixed effects in these models. To solve this problem, they present 
correcting the bias in the probit fixed effects estimator, but this approach is practically 
unavailable in standard econometric packages (e.g. STATA). Wooldridge (2002) attempts an 
alternative approach which divides the panel probit model into cross‐sectional one by period t, 
and then derives the propensity scores of each firm i. Finally, a control group is generated from 
the results constructed by period t and firm i. 
With respect to the fixed effects, an alternative panel data estimator is random effects, which 
assumes that the term μi is unrelated to the explanatory variables and thus reflected in the error 
terms in the model. The random effects approach requires that the panel data is composed of 
firms chosen randomly from a large population. This ensures a random distribution of μi. In 
contrast, the fixed effects approach is more appropriate in the panel data without randomly 
choosing from the population because a time-invariant individual effect is expected to relate 
with each firm (Lancaster, 2000). The random effects approach and the fixed effects approach 
are exclusive to use for the regression model. Accordingly, a fixed effects regression approach 
will provide inconsistent estimates for a random effects selection model. Similarly, the fixed 
effects regression approach requires the normal distribution of the error terms in the model. 
Therefore, it cannot be applied to a logit model due to a logistic distribution of the logit 
estimator.  
3.3.4.2 The Difference in Difference Matching Approach 
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The second approach of eliminating the bias caused by self‐selection is the difference in 
difference estimator. With holding the pre- and post-treatment information (denoted t-1 and t 
respectively), the effect of treatment can be predicted as following expression: 
{E[Yit
1| Ti = 1] - E[Yi(t-1)
0| Ti = 1]} - {E[Yit
0| Ti = 0] - E[Yi(t-1)
0| Ti = 0]}   (3.5) 
where the first part of expression refers to the difference in outcomes of treated firm between 
the pre- and post-treatment periods (from t-1 to t). The second part refers to the difference in 
outcomes of untreated firms between the pre- and post-treatment periods (from t-1 to t). The 
difference‐in‐difference estimator assumes that the change in outcomes of counterfactual term 
is identical to that of untreated firm (i.e. non-acquired firm) between two periods (t-1 and t). 
This is expressed as follow: 
{E[Yit
0| Ti = 1] - E[Yi(t-1)
0| Ti = 1]} = {E[Yit
0| Ti = 0] - E[Yi(t-1)
0| Ti = 0]}   (3.6) 
The missing counterfactual outcomes that acquired firms would have undergone, if they had 
not been acquired, can be derived as: 
{E[Yit
0| Ti = 1] = E[Yi(t-1)
0| Ti = 1]} + {E[Yit
0| Ti = 0] - E[Yi(t-1)
0| Ti = 0]}   (3.7) 
Therefore, specifically, the counterfactual outcome equals the outcome of the acquired firm 
before takeover plus the change in outcomes of all non-acquired firms over the period t-1 and 
t.  
The assumption about the counterfactual term is the major issue that should be concerned in the 
difference‐in‐differences approach. Essentially it is assumed that the outcome effect for 
acquired firms without takeover happening would actually be the same to that experienced by 
non‐acquired firms. However, this assumption of condition may not be hold if the acquired 
firms possess the characteristics which can ensure the better performance of firms themselves 
in absence of takeover.  
Furthermore, the difference in difference approach is usually conducted along with matching 
method, which is called the difference in difference matching method. The ex-post empirical 
research aims to investigate the causal effect of takeover on firm performance in terms of 
profitability or productivity. One challenge is the unobserved performance of acquired firms in 
the absence of takeover which is the counterfactual issue. This aforementioned issue has been 
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addressed by previous researchers who use a propensity score matching (PSM) approach 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This approach aims to compare the performance of acquired 
firms with that of control group (i.e. non-acquired firms) with similar observable characteristics. 
However, the selection bias might also bring inconsistent estimates with time-invariant 
unobserved firm characteristics. To eliminate this latter bias, previous researchers combine the 
propensity score matching with the difference-in-difference estimator (Heckman et al., 1979; 
Schiffbauer et al., 2009). 
According to Schiffbauer et al. (2009), in the first stage, the propensity score is generated from 
the vector of pre-treatment characteristics with the propensity score matching approach. The 
propensity score is actually a conditional probability of a firm to be acquired. In the second 
stage, the counterfactual observations are substituted by non-acquired firms with a similar 
propensity score. This control group is used to predict the impact of M&A on a firm’s post-
acquisition performance. The difference-in-difference matching estimator is employed to 
control possible selection bias. Hence, it is compared between the change in pre- and post-
M&A performance of acquired firms and that of non-acquired firms with an equivalent ex ante 
probability of being acquired in terms of firm characteristics and time-invariant unobservables 
(Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). 
Based on Schiffbauer et al. (2009), the difference-in-difference matching method offers a robust 
inference in predicting the impact of acquisition on the firm’s productivity if the acquisition is 
unrelated to the potential counterfactual pre- and post-M&A outcomes derived from the 
propensity score. This is the so called independence conditional assumption on observables 
where the pre-acquisition variables should be decided by considering both the acquired and 
matched groups. The unbalance between the two groups possibly results in misspecification of 
the propensity score estimation.  
3.3.4.3 The Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
The third approach of overcoming self‐selection bias is the instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation. If a variable is identified to influence the decisions of takeover but not influence 
outcomes directly, it can provide an instrument for the dependent variable (Pit) in the probit 
model (i.e. whether a firm is being acquired or not) to solve the problem of self‐selection. In 
other words, such an instrumental variable provides the outcomes with an indirect influence 
due to its impact on the decisions of takeover, but is not necessary to include directly such an 
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instrumental in the outcome equation. Consequently, it is an exogenous variable in constructing 
a model to investigate the effect of acquisition decisions. It is crucial to identify an appropriate 
instrument in the IV approach. Angrist and Krueger (2001) indicate: “…good instruments often 
come from detailed knowledge of the economic mechanism and institutions determining the 
regressor of interest” (p. 73). The features of instruments are time invariant (e.g. pre-acquisition 
characteristics) (Blundell et al., 2005). However, in this study the author does not have access 
to any valid instruments; all the variables that determine the status of M&A can validly enter 
the model determining profitability and productivity. 
3.3.4.4 The Weighted Estimation Approach 
The fourth approach of eliminating sample selection bias is weighted regression. The selection 
bias causes that the influence factors are exogenous in the population but endogenous in the 
sample. When the probability of acquisition is correlated with the influence factors, unweighted 
regression will produce the inconsistent estimated parameters (Heckman, 1979; Hausman and 
Wise, 1981; Magee et al., 1998). Therefore, in order to obtain a consistent estimator, it is 
necessary to verify the sampling in terms of endogeneity or exogeneity. If there is a possibility 
of endogenous sampling, a weighted regression should be constructed for use. 
However, a large error variance may occur sometimes in weighted regression, so other 
additional information is included to adjust the estimation with alternative procedures (e.g. the 
two‐stage procedure proposed by Magee et al. (1998). Butler (2000) proves that the weighted 
General Method of Moments (GMMs) can diminish the variance of the estimator comparing 
with unweighted GMM and weighted conditional maximum likelihood estimation.  
The selection bias can be detected with the Hausman test by identifying differences between 
unweighted and weighted models (Magee et al., 1998; Wooldridge, 1999; Butler, 2000). The 
weighted regression is appropriate in the existence of selection bias. However, there is a 
possibility of misspecification in the model if the difference between unweighted and weighted 
models is large (e.g. DuMouchel and Duncan, 1983; Skinner et al., 1989). In addition, the issue 
of endogenous sampling will remain if the model is correctly specified. 
3.3.5 The Use of Takeover Rumours in Tackling Selection Issue 
When investigating the determinants and performance of cross border M&A, it is important to 
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construct the treatment group and the control group in the experiment with certain treatment 
(i.e. whether the cross border M&A is conducted or not in this research). To date the research 
on M&A likelihood has been exploited in several ways to construct the control group. Some 
previous studies have assessed the characteristics of takeover target firms in order to better 
understand M&A activities (e.g. Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Powell and Yawson, 2005), while 
other studies focus on developing takeover likelihood prediction models (e.g. Stevens, 1973; 
Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Hasbrouck, 1985). Ample studies make attempts to compare a 
‘treatment’ group with the rest of the population because some doubt the randomness of the 
treatment group sampled from the population of all firms. In the previous research, non-target 
population has been referenced as a control group in previous target likelihood prediction 
models. These models divide companies into two groups: target companies and non-target 
companies. Amongst these, non-targets are sampled from firms which are not taken over non-
randomly (Stevens, 1973) or randomly with some matching procedures (Hasbrouck, 1985; 
Palepu, 1986; Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003). However, some selectivity bias may occur in 
selecting the control group which are the non-targets sample or non-M&A sample.  
In the process of sample selection, most recent studies have taken the (potential) selectivity bias 
into account. They use propensity score matching techniques to construct a comparison or 
control group (Fukao et al., 2006; Mattes, 2010). According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), 
the goal of the matching procedure is to match non-involving firms with involving firms in a 
similar range of observable characteristics. The propensity score matching procedure requires 
the conditional independence assumption. It is assumed that selection into treatment is on 
observable characteristics only and that unobservable variables do not influence simultaneously 
the treatment assignment. However, one potential concern with propensity matching estimation 
is that decisions of firms in the comparison group might be influenced by the involving firm’s 
decisions to conduct M&A (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The approach is valid only if the 
stable unit treatment assumption holds. If the involving firms affect behaviours of competitors 
in the comparison group because of strategic interaction, the results might overestimate or 
underestimate the likelihood of cross border M&A. 
In the experiment with a treatment of whether to conduct the cross border M&A, the control 
group selected from the non-targets population with matching technique is either the firm which 
satisfies the conditions of M&A but is not acquired or otherwise an irrelevant firm. Whether a 
target is acquired or not might be subject to other factors which do not necessarily determine 
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M&A. Thus, the matching approach in the previous literature can only identify the factors 
which differentiate whether a group belongs to the potential treatment group or not. In particular, 
the firm factors are found to determine whether a firm is the target or not in the research of 
M&A. 
In terms of takeover rumour data, previous researchers primarily explore the effects of takeover 
rumours date and announcement date on predicting likely targets in M&A activities (Chou et 
al., 2010; Schausen, 2011). Alternatively, they assess the effect of takeover rumours on the 
shareholder wealth (Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2006; Lachapelle, 2011; 
Wortche and Nguyen, 2011). Rumour contains some degree of uncertainty (Chou et al., 2010). 
Although only a small proportion of takeover rumours end in an actual acquisition (Clarkson et 
al., 2006), the takeover rumours provide a potential pool of M&A deals with a linkage between 
potential acquirers and targets. However, no previous literature has been found to use takeover 
rumour data as a control group in assessing likelihood of M&A and its performance. Thus, this 
research will employ takeover rumour data. Particularly, the treatment group refers to target 
firms in the previous research and completed takeovers in this research, while the control group 
refers to matched non-target firms in the previous research and rumoured-only takeovers in this 
research. It is directive to sample the treatment group.  
In this study, the rumoured but uncompleted M&A deals compose a comparison group. They 
provide the similarity of in range of completed deals characteristics. The control group selected 
from rumoured but uncompleted M&A population is the deals which satisfy the conditions of 
M&A but do not exist in the end. This control group will facilitate to test what factors may 
influence the completion of M&A and how the M&A affects firm performance. Therefore, the 
use of takeover rumours can identify the factors which differentiate whether a group has 
received an actual treatment or not. In other words, the factors are found to determine whether 
a cross border M&A is completed or not finally in this research. Both matching approach and 
takeover rumours sample can provide a construction of the control group for examining the 
determinants of cross border M&A. However, comparing with matching approach, the latter 
sample offers a more direct way to overcome the potential selective bias and can identify more 
accurately the potential influence factors of M&A. Therefore, this study employs directly 
rumoured data as a comparison group rather than propensity matching techniques. 
3.3.6 The limitations of Rumour Data 
65 
 
The disadvantage of rumours results from their basis on uncertainty rather than on facts 
(Rosnow 1987, 1988). Rumours on M&A can cause insecurity and instability among 
stakeholders of companies. Internally, employees might decrease their trust in management. 
Both management and employees may choose to devote less effort towards the business of their 
company if they feel its future is uncertain. For example, from a view of behavioural psychology, 
Angwin (2004) indicates that sustained uncertainty amongst workforces will erode the 
soundness of post-acquisition integration due to the cumulative effect of rumour. Externally, 
clients and customers may be reluctant to bring firms the new business if they think firms are 
undergoing significant organisational changes that could limit the attention or care they give to 
clients. For instance, business practice provides ample evidence on increased customer 
uncertainty due to M&A rumours in the market (e.g., Reichheld and Henske, 1991). 
Additionally, Hoitash and Krishnan (2008) find that investors usually overreact to takeover 
rumours and firms show a high degree of speculative intensity. Gao and Oler (2012) suggest 
that the highly uncertain information in rumours could be digested by the market and be 
reflected in the significant pre-announcement price change. They find that rumoured firms 
experience a greater price run-up prior to announcements due to circulating rumours. Such 
significant price movement due to rumours and speculation may increase the transaction cost 
in M&A and diminish the potential positive performance of M&A. 
Therefore, takeover rumours could create bias in the estimation of M&A performance, 
especially for the abnormal return, because the change in price and firm performance may take 
place during the rumoured period instead of on the date of the takeover event. The impact on 
M&A performance may be partially determined by rumours other than M&A event per se. Thus, 
any possible significant effect from M&A event could be diluted during the rumoured period. 
According to Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), takeover rumours may be generated from various 
sources, including mandatory disclosure by large shareholders, guru following, and trading 
observers. They can be spread through channels such as word of mouth, online chat-rooms or 
message boards. Analysts, investment advisors and newsletter writers sometimes involve 
themselves as rumour generators. In this research, a takeover rumour can be clearly identified 
based on a variable of deal status which explicitly indicates ‘rumour’ status in Zephyr database. 
Rumour data may encounter challenges and doubts on its reliability as rumours are 
disseminated informally among market participants without constant sources. However, rumour 
data can be collected easily through this approach, and the sample suffices to illustrate its role 
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of comparison. 
3.3.7 Reflection on Data Use 
This research employs M&A data and firm information for 2002-2011 from the Zephyr and 
Orbis databases. Such time span of the data covers the recent global financial crisis. Thus, we 
should consider the impact of this crisis on the fluctuation in M&A activity and their consequent 
performance. The M&A activity may accelerate the fluctuation in its volume as the variations 
of credit tightness and market sentiment in the crisis. Some argue that the crisis has had a 
significant striking effect on the performance of multinationals after overseas transactions.  
However, Yang and Driffield (2012) suggest that the financial crisis has had no direct impact 
on the return to multinationality in their meta-analysis. They argue that the performance of 
multinationality is over-estimated in the studies which focus on firms in a time of crisis. They 
indicate that multinational firms may suffer from difficulty in access to necessary working 
capital and long-term investment financing at a time of crisis, but corporate growth per se also 
undergoes the same situation. As such, the financial crisis does not show a significant 
heterogeneity in the investigation on the impact of cross border M&A on firm performance. In 
other words, the firm performance would be positive if international takeovers indeed improve 
firm’s operation, even such M&A occurs in the period of crisis. In contrast, the firm 
performance would be negative if international takeovers do have a detrimental effect on firm’s 
operation; even such M&A takes place in a period of economic prosperity. 
3.4 The Use of Probit Model 
Many scholars in the mergers field use multiple discriminated analysis (MDA) to study two 
objectives (e.g. Holl and Pickering, 1988; Barnes, 1999). The first objective is to predict 
takeover targets by using the financial characteristics of firms. The second one is to differentiate 
between bidders and targets based on their respective financial characteristics. The assumptions 
of MDA require the normal distributions on multivariate data and the equal covariance 
structures for sampled data. Kolomogorov-Smimov tests are usually employed to test non-
normality. However, some researchers argue that the multivariate normality will affect the 
accuracy of this technique. In practice, it is difficult to identify the critical value of non-
normality where it can maintain the performance of MDA in a statistical test (Flury and Riedwyl, 
1988). 
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The existence of a binary or dichotomous dependent variable for the present study obviously 
violates the usual required assumptions of the error term. Accordingly, the classical statistical 
tests are inappropriate (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). Multiple regressions provide an 
alternative technique because it has no such exacting requirements on the data. The probit 
model in the form of the general log linear models can be used to overcome these problems and 
analyse the dataset with a dichotomous dependent variable. In the context of the present study 
the dependent variable (the probit) would stand for the log odds, or relative probability of a 
M&A deal in the sample being completed or just rumoured but uncompleted. It is defined by a 
binary response variable giving the value 1 if the deal is rumoured and completed and zero if 
the deal is rumoured but uncompleted.  
According to Demaris (1992), probit modelling approach utilises a cumulative probability 
function which constrains estimated values of the dependent variable (probit) to lie within the 
(0, 1) interval. There are a number of alternative cumulative probability functions available, but 
the compositions of logistic and normal distributions are most often seen in the economics 
literature. Different distributions are composed to the logit and probit probability models 
respectively. The statistical software has made logit and probit models ready for use. Logit or 
probit models are more appropriate in the regression with categorical or ordinal variables. 
Compared with least squares regression and discriminated analysis, logistic regression shows 
less restriction on the data and meaningful interpretation for parameter estimates. Most research 
in the M&A literature utilise the logit modelling approach for predict potential targets from the 
general population of firms (Dietrich and Sorenson, 1984; Hasbrouck, 1985; Powell and 
Thomas, 1994). The present study will use the probit modelling technique to discriminate the 
status of M&A completions.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a review and critique of research methodologies applied to M&A. It 
has examined the advantages and drawbacks of the ex-post M&A study approach with using 
accounting data. A number of the important biases were listed, as were the issues of sample 
selection bias and the problem of the counterfactual situation. Several approaches such as the 
propensity matching, IV approach, difference-in-difference matching approach, and weighted 
regression were reviewed as means of controlling for sample selectivity effects in the literature. 
However, they suffer from various limitations which impact the accuracy of such an approach. 
For example, matching approaches can only identify the factors which differentiate whether a 
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firm belongs to the treatment group or not. Nevertheless, the determinants of treatment 
occurrence are different from those of the treatment group. 
By using the takeover rumour data as the control group, this research is able to directly identify 
the factors that differentiate whether a firm has received an actual treatment or not. This chapter 
briefly introduced how the rumoured M&A data overcome the sample selection problem in 
spite of its limitations. It provides a more direct method to construct the control group which 
simulates the counterfactual situation and reduces the selectivity bias for the later empirical 
chapters. 
Due to the distortion and bias associated with methods of accounting data study on takeover 
transactions, this research will not attempt to compare pre-acquisition with post-acquisition 
performance. The use of accounting data will be restricted to provide the characteristics of firms 
in M&A transactions. Therefore, these characteristics will be utilised to assess the determinants 
of cross border M&A and the relative post-M&A performance of acquirer and target firms. 
Details of the descriptive statistics of data sample, research designs employed and hypotheses 
tested will be described in each chapter of the empirical work (chapters 4 to 6). Before assessing 
the post-acquisition performance of cross border M&A, it is useful to understand what factors 
determine international M&A activity. The rational of using a probit model is provided to 
achieve this objective. This also brings us to the next chapter about the motive analysis of M&A.  
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Chapter Four: The Firm Level Determinants of Cross Border M&A 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins the empirical research which constitutes the substantive contribution of the 
thesis. In order to examine the impacts of M&A activities on the firm performance in the 
subsequent chapters, it is necessary to explore the factors which influence international M&A 
decisions. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to investigate the determinants of cross border 
M&A completions. The focus of this work is to extend the existing empirical evidence in the 
field of cross border M&A and to explore the likelihood of M&A from a different perspective. 
This research exploits a hitherto unused database which includes those firms that are rumoured 
to be undertaking M&A, and then follow the deal to completion or abandonment. In other words, 
this work aims to identify the factors that facilitate a cross border M&A deal successfully 
completed after it is experiencing a takeover rumour. This approach highlights a number of 
limitations to the previous literature, which relies on statistical methodology to identify 
potential but non-existent mergers. 
Acquiring an existing business can provide the acquirer with the target’s ready-made resources 
such as a knowledge base, technology and high control over assets (Berk and DeMarzo 2007). 
Thus, a growing number of multinational companies tend to choose the form of cross border 
M&A as their approach to overseas expansion in international markets. The large population of 
cross border M&A interestingly attracts academic research to continually explore the motives 
of international takeovers. 
This research will primarily employ the firm level variables to examine the determinants of 
international takeovers. The previous literature of M&A examines the influence factors on the 
likelihood of takeovers with three different sets of variables: firm level, e.g. size, dividend yield, 
total debt to equity, and others, (Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986), industry/market level, e.g. 
industry disturbance (Palepu, 1986), and country level, e.g. accounting standards, investor 
protection (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). The literature has proved a large number of relevant firm 
level takeover determinants such as size, leverage and liquidity, but only a limited number of 
industry/market level and country level variables (Anand and Delios, 2002). Following the 
majority of research, this research will mainly examine the firm-level factors in terms of the 
profitability, liquidity, corporate financial leverage, intangible resource and firm size. The 
likelihood model of takeover completion in this research includes the firm-level variables.  
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In this research, the author will highlight the distinction point which is different from the 
previous research. The potential contributions are described as follows: first, this study will 
employ the takeover rumour data from a different perspective and build a different M&A 
likelihood model from previous literature. In previous studies on M&A likelihood to date, some 
have assessed the characteristics of takeover target firms in order to predict a likely takeover 
target (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Powell and Yawson, 2005), 
while others focus on exploiting the accuracy of prediction in developing takeover likelihood 
models (e.g. Stevens, 1973; Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984). In the previous research, non-target 
population has been widely exploited as a control group in the target likelihood prediction 
models. Being different from the previous research on M&A, to the author’s best knowledge, 
it is the first time that rumoured but uncompleted M&A data is employed to construct the control 
group in this study. The takeover rumour data provides a more direct way to imitate the 
counterfactual situation and overcome the sample selection problem compared with the use of 
a propensity score matching technique (Girma et al.2001; Conyon et al. 2002). With this 
advantage of the control group, the takeover rumour is used to compose the dependent variable 
together with actual takeover. Therefore, the M&A likelihood model in this research is 
developed to investigate the determinants that influence the completion of cross border M&A.  
Second, this study will identify the determinants of cross border M&A by selecting the factors 
from both the target firm side and the acquirer firm side. Previous researchers employ many 
characteristics of firms to predict likely targets, so the characteristics of target firms are widely 
examined (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Powell and Yawson, 2005). However, when detecting 
the determinants of M&A likelihood, it is not only the characteristics of target firms but also 
those of acquirer firms that will influence the probability of M&A activities (Espahbodi and 
Espahbodi, 2003). In fact, the impact of acquirer firms’ information has almost been neglected 
in the literature. Therefore, in order to fill this gap, the characteristics of both targets and 
acquirers are clearly marked in this research. Using information from both targets and acquirers 
will be a contribution in constructing an M&A likelihood model. These factors can then be 
combined with the industry/market and country oriented variables in the takeover likelihood 
prediction model. 
Third, most previous research reports the impact of absolute size of the investment on 
acquisitions (Beitel et al., 2003). In contrast, relative size of investment is less concerned when 
detecting determinants of acquisitions. Therefore, the relative value of investment between 
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acquirers and targets will be employed in this research. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follow: section 4.2 will provide a review of 
relevant theory and literature, and the hypotheses to be tested will be developed in this section. 
The data for the analyses will be discussed in section 4.3, where a specification of the data 
selection and appertaining descriptive statistics will be presented and discussed. The 
methodology applied throughout the analyses will be discussed in section 4.4. The empirical 
findings will be presented and discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 will conclude the empirical 
findings and comment on further study opportunities. 
4.2 Previous Research and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Firm Level Analysis of Takeover Propensity 
Regarding the exploitation of takeover likelihood, previous empirical studies have developed 
statistical models that use publicly available financial or other information to predict potential 
takeover targets. Palepu’s (1986) article is perhaps the most celebrated one in this literature. 
Palepu (1986) proposes a logit probability model with nine independent variables for the 
estimation of a firm’s acquisition likelihood. Early studies on predicting whether a company is 
subjected to a future takeover argue that their models have high accuracy in prediction (Stevens, 
1973; Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984). However, Palepu (1986) reviews these models and 
criticises a methodological flaw in some acquisition prediction literature which draws a sample 
with an approximately equal number of targets and non-targets. He indicates that these non-
random samples lead to biased and incorrect inferences. Thus previous researchers overstate 
the accuracy of their models. Palepu selects non-target firm randomly and uses conditional 
probability of a likely target to ensure the true predictive ability of the model. His result implies 
that the model does not predict targets with a high degree of accuracy long before the takeover 
announcements. Numerous empirical studies build upon Palepu’s (1986) paradigm to 
investigate the accuracy of the takeover predicted likelihood. The vast majority of these studies 
focus on the USA (e.g. Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Walter, 1994; Cudd and Duggal, 2000) 
and the UK (e.g. Powell, 1997; Barnes, 1999) markets.  
Recently, Brar et al. (2009) extend Palepu’s (1986) model and announce a relatively high 
accuracy of the proposed model in predicting European takeover targets. In Brar et al.’s (2009) 
approach of empirically assessing the distinguishing ability of the variables, they select a 
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random sample of firms from the non-target population as a control group for every year. The 
size of each control group matches the percentage of M&A activity in the corresponding year 
relative to the total activity over the entire sample period. For instance, if 10 per cent of the 
M&A activity occurred in 1998, they randomly select 10 per cent from the pool of the non-
target firms in 1998. Firms from the non-target population are matched to a control group only 
once. Their approach of building up the control groups is different from Bartley and Boardman’s 
(1990) matched-pair approach, i.e. the number of non-targets from each year equals the number 
of target firms for that year (e.g. Hasbrouck, 1985; Powell, 2001). These approaches involve 
significant sample selection biases because they assume equal number of targets and non-targets.  
Most previous research measures the likelihood of cross border M&A by examining whether a 
target firm is acquired. This means that previous researchers pay their attentions on the 
occurrence of cross border M&A. However, this study measures the likelihood of cross border 
M&A by using the status of cross border M&A. In other words, the author is concerned about 
not only the initiation of cross border M&A events but also whether they are completed in the 
end after experiencing the takeover rumours. Therefore, this research will employ the firm 
group from takeover rumours as a control group rather than using random non-targets sample. 
Furthermore, this research will construct takeover rumour and actual takeover into the 
dependent variable, which is different from using probability of target as a dependent variable 
in previous literature. Thus an M&A likelihood model will be developed to explore the 
determinants of deals initially rumoured being completed, using a vector of firm level factors 
for both the target and acquiring firm. To my knowledge, no literature has employed this 
strategy before. Therefore, this will provide a new perspective to the literature on the likelihood 
of M&A, which will be the primary contribution of my research.  
4.2.2 M&A Motives and Theories 
The extant research in the field of studying motives of corporate M&A has experienced 
considerable controversy and disagreement within the economics domain (Chatterjee, 1992). 
In comparison to any other economic phenomenon in the corporate sector, the complexity of 
M&A activities results in the difficulty in obtaining the consistent results on influence factors 
of M&A likelihood. Some researchers exploit the firm specific advantages based on the 
framework of ownership – location – internalisation (OLI) which argues that multinational 
firms possess some advantages on the firm-level characteristics compared with domestic-
owned firms (Dunning, 1980). Some researchers introduce motives of cross board M&A from 
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the resource based view (RBV) which states that the competitive advantage of a firm lies 
primarily in a bundle of valuable tangible or intangible resources within the firm's assets 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Conner, 1991; Barney, 2001).  
According to Dunning (1980), decisions on entering a new market in a different country could 
be based on the firm’s success in the domestic country, where the firm wishes to exploit its 
competitive advantage to penetrate the market of another country. The successful core elements 
could be a brand name, good reputation, competent management or a high efficiency level, 
which could bring potential growth in cross border markets. Sudarsanam (2006) also indicates 
that motives behind cross-border M&A mainly involve enhancing market share, increasing 
presence in other geographical areas, acquiring new products or services or obtaining 
economies of scale. Furthermore, researchers have also developed a number of academic 
theories on M&A activities such as synergies motives, the market for corporate control, free 
cash flow theory and managerial theories and so on. 
Chatterjee (1986) suggests that mergers will only occur when both parties believe the deal will 
make enough realisable synergies beneficial to them. Hitt et al. (2001) argue that ‘synergies’ 
generated from mergers increase the value of both acquirer and target firms. To achieve a 
‘friendly’ merger, the synergies should be created for both parties symmetrically. Neither 
acquirer nor target is willing to complete the deal if the counterpart obtains the positive gain 
while it suffers from negative value itself (Klein, 2001). Therefore, synergy is a motive of 
takeover, especially when firms acquire more profitable targets (Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004).  
According to Chatterjee (1986), operating and financial synergies are the two of the rational 
explanations why firms acquire others. Devos et al. (2008) indicate that operating synergies are 
the significant gain of mergers through the economies of scale and economies of scope. Many 
firms strive to lower their fixed costs by obtaining economies of scale (Behr and Held, 2011). 
Firms can also benefit from combining distribution and marketing for related but diverse 
products via economics of scope (Berk and DeMarzo, 2009). 
Financial synergies can be obtained when firms with large internal cash flows and limited 
growth opportunities incorporate other firms with low internal cash flows and greater growth 
opportunities. The capital can be lead from the former firm to the latter one. Thereby the lower 
internal financing costs will exhibit its advantage compared with possible expensive external 
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financing in the new combined entity (Sharstri et al., 2005). Another financial synergy 
concerning tax benefits can arise when merging. The debt capacity of the combined firm can 
exceed the sum of debt capacity from each firm prior to their merger, thus larger tax shield 
generates more possible benefits from investment (Shih, 1994). 
There is another group of arguments that suggests unsuccessful takeovers although the potential 
volume of M&A activities may increase. In consideration of the potential unsuccessful results 
of takeovers, managements of firms may abandon the takeover attempts prior to the completion 
of M&A. This will cause some M&A deals uncompleted in the end. These explanations 
comprise free cash flow hypothesis (FCF) and empire-building hypothesis. In the first category, 
Jensen (1986b) developed free cash flow hypothesis (FCF) building on the agency cost 
literature. He argues that managements tend to exert their discretion over the capitals in 
existence of excess free cash flow. The second category is about the empire-building hypothesis 
which presumes that self-serving managers only maximise their private value rather than 
positively improve firm value (Dickerson et al., 1997). The empire-building hypothesis is 
highly related to the FCF theory. This implies that managers are implementing mergers to 
maximise their own utility rather than shareholder’s value (Trautwein, 1990). The empire-
building hypothesis is also supported by Mueller’s (1972) growth hypothesis. He indicates that 
the salary and bonus of the management increase with the size of company, hence purchasing 
less profitable target firms provides a motivation for making the combined entity larger.  
4.2.3 Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Development 
Building on the aforementioned theories and frameworks, this section will develop the 
hypotheses from a different focusing point. For some years, studies on M&A have attempted to 
characterise the variables that are likely to influence the likelihood of a takeover target. Many 
hypotheses have been tested in an effort to distinguish between more likely targets and less 
likely targets. Amongst these, the inefficient management, size, undervaluation and leverage of 
the target firm as well as acquisition activity in firm’s industry have been widely tested (see 
Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Cudd and Duggal, 2000; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 
2004; Brar et al., 2009). In order to build a model that can predict whether the rumoured deals 
can be completed, this research will develop the hypotheses about the following influence 
factors of cross border M&A according to previous empirical evidence. These factors are 
discussed as follows in terms of firm size, profitability, liquidity, corporate financial leverage 
level, and intangible assets from the firm level. 
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4.2.3.1 Firm Size 
According to the theory of transaction cost, an acquirer always encounters costs such as 
integration of companies and fighting a long battle for the target during M&A activities. It is 
suggested that these costs increase with the target firm’s size. Thus, the successful completed 
takeovers anticipate a negative relationship with firm size (Brar et al., 2009). Hennart and 
Reddy (1997) argue that cross border M&A will take place in the firms with small investment 
size due to the difficulty of integration between large firms, while the findings of Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2000) are totally opposite. They indicate that a large firm will encourage cross 
border M&A. Nevertheless, Cho and Padmanahan (1995) do not find the association between 
investment size and acquisitions. The mixed empirical evidence leads to hypothesis 1a:  
Hypothesis 1a: The smaller a target firm, the higher the likelihood that a cross border M&A is 
completed. 
It is often reported that the absolute size of the investment is a determinant of acquisitions, 
while it is necessary to investigate the influence of relative total value of investment on 
acquisitions (Beitel et al., 2003). Erramilli and D’Souza (1993) present that the application of 
research findings on large multinational enterprises need to be extended to small- and medium-
sized firms. Weitzel and McCarthy (2009) recently studied the distinctive features of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) M&A. They find that M&A activities provide SME with an 
external growth base and deals of SME are more flexible. Due to the limitation of capital and 
market abilities, SMEs are often the targets in the cross border M&A activities. However, no 
significant impact from the SIZE-variable is detected in any of these models (Beitel et al., 2003; 
Zollo and Leshchinkskii, 2000). Based on the above evidence, the acquirer is expected to be 
bigger than its target in a takeover. Therefore, the hypothesis 1b about the firm size of acquirers 
is generated as follows. Additionally, the relative value of investment between acquirers and 
targets will be examined in this research. 
Hypothesis 1b: The larger an acquirer firm, the higher the likelihood that a cross border M&A 
is completed. 
Hypothesis 1c: The higher the relative firm size of an acquirer to targets, the higher the 
likelihood that a cross border M&A is completed.  
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4.2.3.2 Firm Profitability  
Building on operative synergy, in an efficient merger market, corporate control hypothesis 
suggests that other firms or management teams are always willing to acquire an 
underperforming firm. Acquirers can remove those managers who cannot create synergies in 
order to promote the performance of target’s assets (Weston et al., 2004). According to Manne 
(1965), the owners of firms often prefer those managers who can provide the highest value for 
their assets. The managers won’t be replaced unless owners find another team who can offer 
higher value for their assets. Thus, inefficient managers cannot survive and managers are forced 
to maximise the profit.  
When using profitability as the explanatory variable, the evidence of target under-performance 
relative to various control benchmarks is mixed. In consistent with the disciplinary hypothesis, 
targets are found to be less profitable compared to industry averages or the general population 
in some UK studies. Powell and Thomas (1994) postulate the less profitability of targets among 
the general population of firms. However, based on the discrimination analyses, Hughes (1989) 
reports that targets are not necessarily less profitable than average firms, and they show above-
average performance in the case of non-horizontal takeovers.  
Further to the UK evidence, the findings from the US studies are also rather mixed on this issue. 
For example, Bannister and Riahi-Belkaoui (1992) imply that targets underperform industry 
averages in terms of both cash flow and earnings as ratios of total assets by using data in the 
period 1977-89. Likewise, employing a control sample of the US firms from 1981-1990, 
Gonzalez et. al. (1998) identify that the US targets are lower in returns on equity and sales 
growth under foreign acquisitions. In contrast, Matusaka (1993) indicates that targets have 
significant higher profit rates over industry averages. This result supports the earlier finding 
from Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987a), that targets have high profitability prior to takeover. 
Although some targets are acquired precisely because of being profitable (Lipsey and Feliciano, 
2002), Chari et al. (2009) find the success rate of M&A is marginal for the previously profitable 
targets. Based on the corporate control hypothesis, foreign firms prefer to acquire less profitable 
firms because takeovers are seen as a mechanism to replace a management team that fails to 
maximise the market value of the firm (Bellak, 2004). Powell (2004) also implies that 
underperforming firms are more likely takeover targets than others. Therefore, the low 
profitability of target firm can affect the occurrence of cross border M&A, then it can facilitate 
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the cross border deals to be completed after experiencing the takeover rumours. The hypothesis 
2a is generated regarding profitability from target side factors as follows. 
Hypothesis 2a: The lower a target firm’s profitability, the higher the likelihood that a cross 
border M&A is completed. 
From the acquirer’s perspective, if acquiring firms are profitable prior to the cross border M&A, 
it means that acquirers possess the high earning ability due to some specific advantages such as 
managerial skills according to the OLI framework. The corporate control hypothesis originates 
partially from efficiency theory. First, it focuses on the acquirer’s managerial capabilities on the 
targets assets rather than the existence of synergies between the corporate assets of both firms. 
Hence, corporate control theory implies that efficient management reallocates poorly utilised 
assets, i.e. the firms with the advantage of high profitability will overtake those without this 
kind of advantage. Second, it is predicted that the takeover attempts will encounter resistance 
from the management team of the target because they are afraid of being replaced due to the 
managerial inefficiency on their own. Because of this resistance, the takeovers may not be easily 
completed. The success of a takeover completion depends on the extent of resistance from the 
target’s management. Aforementioned FCF hypothesis implies that the management of an 
acquirer with low growth and sufficient cash flow will attempt various takeovers. Typical 
acquirers such as private investors and corporate raiders usually introduce a more competent 
management team or more efficient firms with better growth prospect and excellent 
performance (Houston et al., 2001). In general, the acquirers with high profitability are more 
likely to initiate the cross border M&A, but these deals are less likely to be completed 
successfully due to the potential managerial resistance. Therefore, the hypothesis 2b is deduced 
regarding profitability from acquirer side factors as follows. 
Hypothesis 2b: The higher an acquirer firm’s profitability, the lower the likelihood that a cross 
border M&A is completed. 
4.2.3.3 Firm Liquidity 
Building on the agency cost literature, Jensen (1986b) developed the free cash flow hypothesis 
to explain the way of using excess liquidity of the firm supported by some M&A deals. Jensen 
firstly presents that unsuccessful acquisitions do not result from over-confidence but the 
managerial discretion due to the presence of excess liquidity in his hypothesis of free cash flow 
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(FCF). He characterises assumptions of the divorce between the interests of managers and 
shareholders and a lack of competitive pressures in the product and the managerial labour 
markets. With these assumptions, the managers can exercise considerable free cash flows and 
unused debt capacity to undertake all positive net present value (NPV) projects, but wealth 
maximisation requires managers to pay out free cash flows to shareholders. However, Jensen 
implies that managers might prefer to retain free cash flow as a means of self-interested 
‘financial flexibility’. 
A firm’s fund can be either generated internally from the free cash flow within the firm or raised 
externally from the monetary market. The potential lender would have asked for a higher 
investment return rate if firms have to raise funds externally from the money market. However, 
if firms have sufficient free cash flow generated internally within the firms, the management 
would bear a very cheap cost of capital. According to Jensen (1986b), the internally financed 
investment is more difficult to be overseen compared with that financed externally because the 
former one uses the fund by allocating the financial resource from inside the firm. The difficulty 
in supervision of internally financed investment increases the chance of management abusing 
the large amount of free capital. In other words, when there is lack of surveillance, the 
management has more freedom to invest in any attractive investment project which another 
external potential lender might not favour. Especially, when firms experience low 
organisational growth but simultaneously generate large amounts of free cash flow, managers 
will attempt various ventures including unprofitable takeovers rather than reduce their 
discretionary powers by disgorging free cash flow to their shareholders. Namely, with high 
levels of liquidity, self-serving managers have more managerial discretion to choose poor 
acquisitions when there are no good ones (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  
Moreover, it is suggested that the other stakeholders in the firm may trust their management 
and approve acquisition plans on the basis of high past and current cash flows in such situations 
(Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). The excess fund over required investments leads managers to make 
quicker and larger-scale strategic decisions without careful analysis than their fund-strapped 
peers. Thus, the FCF hypothesis suggests that the low level of caution in the existence of excess 
liquidity will lead managers to make poor decisions (Harford, 1999).  
According to the managerial hubris argument, Malmendier and Tate (2005) indicate that over-
confidence increases the chance that managers involve less profitable diversifying mergers. 
Empirically, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) find strong evidence of hubris in the US 
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takeovers. In addition, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) predict the managerial hubris is faced 
by one third of the large European takeovers in the 1990s. Based on the argument above, 
sufficient cash flow makes managers attempt more potential M&A activities. However, with 
more discretionary power and hubris, management is less likely to choose good business. This 
dramatically increases the chances of overpaying in M&A which leads to failure (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2008). Therefore, given the reasons which lead to potentially poor consequence, those 
M&A deals are more likely to be opposed by shareholders and disapproved by boards. 
Accordingly, they are less likely to be completed in the end. Hypothesis 3 is generated in terms 
of the liquidity from acquirer side factors.  
Hypothesis 3: The lower the liquidity in an acquirer, the higher the likelihood that a cross 
border M&A is completed. 
4.2.3.4 Corporate Financial Leverage 
According to Lang et al. (1996), corporate financial leverage demonstrates the degree to which 
a firm's activities are funded by an owner's funds versus creditor's funds. It can be measured by 
gearing ratio. Generally, companies with higher leverage are thought to be more risky because 
they have more liabilities and less equity. A company with high gearing (high leverage) is more 
vulnerable to downturns in the business cycle because the company must continue to service its 
debt regardless of how bad sales are. A greater proportion of equity provides a cushion and is 
seen as a measure of financial health. Furthermore, from financial synergy theory, positive 
synergies can be obtained when a firm chooses to purchase another firm to lower its risk of 
bankruptcy at certain debt ratios. It makes the newly combined firm have an optimal proportion 
of debt in the capital structure and thus possibly declining the cost of capital for the firm (Titman 
and Grinblatt, 2006). 
Jensen (1986a) has suggested a possible principal-agent problem that managers will fail to 
maximise shareholder wealth by keeping free cash flows and unused debt capacity away from 
shareholders. Holding large amount of cash flow financed from debt, managers have an 
opportunity to acquire other firms. Thus, it might be expected that acquirers display a higher 
gearing ratio than the industry average and targets. Although Jensen (1986b) pays considerable 
attention on acquirers rather than targets about the misuse of free cash flows and debt capacity, 
the firms with an inadequate use of leverage might be more likely to be targeted by acquirers 
(Bartley and Boardman, 1986).  
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Palepu (1986) assumes that financially distressed firms are more vulnerable in acquisitions 
because of their high probability of insolvency. In a principal-agent context, financial gearing 
is often considered as a form of managerial bonding cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
1986b). The issue of debt forces managers to pay out free cash flows under threat of bankruptcy 
(Smith, 1986). Thus, management teams of acquirers often use high gearing to show their 
stronger intentions to hold the mutual interests with shareholders than target managements 
(Jensen, 1986a). Jensen (2005) argues to use corporate debt as a much more powerful 
disciplinary device for avoiding agency problems associated with free cash flow. This means 
that high level of debt may reduce the M&A deals resulted from discretionary use of excess 
free cash flow. 
However, there is an opposite effect with increased leveraged buyouts (LBOs). When 
innovative debt instruments are used to finance acquisitions such as so-called leveraged buyouts, 
financial leverage has become a major impact on takeover activity. Certainly the use of these 
techniques has enabled hostile takeover to be more powerful (Jarrell, 1988). The undervalued 
firms with sufficient cash are often acquired by other funds by using leverage to finance their 
transaction (Brar et al., 2009). However, Jensen (1987) argued that higher leverage has a 
negative impact on the takeover likelihood, because it is anticipated that the insolvency factor 
will weigh more than the influence of LBOs. Therefore, with a similar argument to liquidity 
factor, although managers equipped with high level of corporate leverage can conduct more 
potential M&A activities, those deals are less likely to be completed in the end due to their high 
operational risks. Underpinned by the principal-agent theory, hypothesis 4 is deduced about 
corporate financial leverage from acquirer side factors as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of corporate financial leverage in an acquirer firm, the lower 
the likelihood that a cross border M&A is completed. 
4.2.3.5 Intangible Assets 
During selecting the international partners, firms from emerging countries focus on financial, 
technological and intangible assets, while firms from developed countries exploit for resources 
(Hitt et al., 2000). When a firm choose cross border M&A as a diversification strategy, it will 
seek complementary resources. It is indicated that the complementarity exists in assets between 
the acquiring foreign firms and the domestic target facilitates of the M&A entry (Norback and 
Persson, 2008). Shaver (1998) argues that the firm-level resource differences are often 
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neglected by those researchers. The resource based view (RBV) requires academics to pay more 
attention to organisational capability framework.  
From a resource based view, Anand and Delios (2002) distinguish between technological 
capabilities and advertising intensive capabilities. The difference of resource types depends on 
whether a firm adopts capability-seeking or capability-exploiting acquisitions. A capability-
seeking motive drives firms to look for the complementarities of assets such as technological 
advantages and certain brand reputation to the home country. For example, when transferring 
brands to overseas markets, an entry barrier such as a high level of advertising intensity will 
restrict the investment of firms in the host countries. As such, Anand and Delios argue that 
firms often choose the acquisition of existing brands in target markets. By contrast, in 
capability-exploiting takeovers, the tradability, fungibility and transferability of intangible 
assets influence significantly the accuracy of evaluation on such assets. For example, it is 
usually difficult to measure quantitatively the extent of absorption for technology and 
manufacturing technique. Accordingly, the uncertainty on the extent of acquiring intangible 
capability reduces a firm’s willingness to participate in M&A activity. Thus, in an international 
business context, the M&A involving intangible assets will generate different propensity based 
on capability-seeking motive and capability-exploiting motive. 
Delios and Beamish (1999) suggest that the possibility of cross border M&A is high when 
intangible assets are mainly acquired resources or the targets have high R&D and advertising 
intensity. Although most investing firms are interested in intangible assets or knowledge-based 
resources, it is difficult for investors to identify and manage those intangible assets or resources. 
Accordingly, based on the framework of TCE and RBV, it is very difficult to transfer the 
technology acquired from the target to a foreign location due to the potentially high transferring 
cost. By considering this high integration cost, acquirers may finally abandon the potential 
takeover attempts. For example, it is expensive and potential unsuccessful in training the 
acquired staff. Therefore, Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) indicate that the competitive 
advantage based on a complex technology will reduce the likelihood of cross border M&A. In 
the research of Hennart and Park (1993), further evidence stresses that acquisitions cannot 
enable firms to possess strong technological advantages in Japan. This kind of advantage 
possession is a variable which few studies analyse at the firm level.  
According to the accounting definition, an intangible asset refers to identifiable long-term assets 
with no physical existence or substance. They include goodwill, patents, copyrights, etc. 
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Intangible assets can be created from either a business acquisition or internal development. In 
the former case business records intangible assets at their fair value in acquisitions, while in the 
latter case business recognises such assets from the cost incurred in the development phase. The 
value of intangible assets from internal developments relies obviously on the cost incurred in 
the balance sheet. Normally, the book value of such intangible asset equals its market value. 
However, it is usually difficult to evaluate intangible assets due to their intangibility. The value 
of intangible assets from business acquisitions is created during the process of transactions. It 
is influenced by the mutual consensus between targets and acquirers based on their respective 
value appraisals. For example, intangible assets often measure the tacit resources of firms which 
are often over-valued by firms themselves (Crook et al., 2008). This often causes different 
appraisals from targets and acquirers about the valuation of targeted assets. The price which 
acquirers pay targets for acquired intangible assets is often higher than their book value. The 
price premium paid by acquirers generates the difference between book value and market value 
of such intangible assets. This might increase the difficulty in the process of negotiating an 
acquisition price between acquirers and targets. Thus, the intangible asset in an accounting 
context encounters the difference in evaluation, while it in the IB context faces the difference 
in the transmission process. Both definitions share different perspectives of influence on M&A 
activity.  
Based on the above arguments, although the high amount of intangible complementary assets 
will attract an increased volume of cross border M&A, these deals may not complete ultimately 
in consideration of the high integration cost or the unachievable consensus between both firms 
on the transaction price. Thus, hypothesis 5a is developed about intangible resource from target 
side factors below. 
Hypothesis 5a: The higher the amount of intangible assets in a target firm, the lower the 
likelihood that a cross border M&A is completed. 
From the aspect of acquirer, more research is required to investigate the impact of acquiring a 
firm’s proprietary intangible assets and their transferability on acquisitions (Pan and Tse, 2000). 
Adopting a non-equity based corporation form will share some protective information with 
local partners, which could cultivate new competitors outside that specific local market 
(Brouthers, 2002). Therefore, Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) identify that firms with a high 
degree of technological capabilities prefer to choose an acquisition to protect their specific 
competences from potential foreign rivals. Hence, the high amount of intangible resource in an 
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acquirer firm usually facilitates the completion of an overseas takeover. The hypothesis 5b is 
specified about intangible resource from acquirer side factors below. 
Hypothesis 5b: The higher the amount of intangible assets in an acquirer firm, the higher the 
likelihood that a cross border M&A is completed. 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Data Sources  
In terms of sampling the data, this study employs cross border M&A data mainly from the Orbis 
and Zephyr databases published by Bureau van Dijk. Bureau van Dijk has a wide range of 
company information products that are co-published with many renowned information 
providers. Its product range includes databases of company information and business 
intelligence for individual countries, regions and the world. One of its global database, Orbis, 
combines information from around 100 sources and covers over 100 million companies. 
Another of its databases, Zephyr, is the most comprehensive database of deal information 
updated hourly. It contains information on M&A, IPO, private equity and venture capital deals 
and rumours. Compared to other M&A data sources like Thompson Financial Securities data, 
Zephyr has the advantage that there is no minimum deal value for a transaction to be included 
in the database.  
In the first instance the cross border M&A deals are transactions only selected during the period 
from 2002 to 2011. Thus, the financial information of acquirers and targets is also in the ten 
years period. The selected period encompasses different economic tendencies including the US 
debt crisis and European solvency debt crisis. This period has not been analysed in prior studies. 
In addition, the cross border M&A deals are rumoured or completed among all industries and 
worldwide. Worldwide data have not been studied before compared with studies from other 
developed countries such as the US and European countries. Thus an analysis of worldwide 
M&A in this period makes it interesting and relevant for comparison.  
According to the definition in Zephyr, the research selects the M&A deal with the criteria of at 
least £1 million or equivalent in deal value or at least two per cent of a stake acquisition. 
Regarding the actual deals, only M&A will be included as the objects of investigation. 
Consequently IPOs, Institutional buy-outs, joint ventures, demergers, minority stakes, 
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management buy-ins, management buy-outs, share buy-backs, etc. will be excluded from this 
study. The initial stake has to be a minority of the total stake and the deal has to increase the 
stake with more than 51 per cent to own the majority of the target firm and thereby controlling 
the newly purchased company. This is vital because a shift in the power of the target firm is an 
important reason for M&A (DePamphilis, 2009). Moreover, the use of sampling the rumoured 
but uncompleted deal data from whole M&A deals population rather than other non-M&A 
activities will generate a relevance. A completed M&A deal means that an acquirer obtains 
control of the target firm by acquiring a majority of target’s shares, eventually leading to 
delisting of the target firm’s stock (so partial and cleanup offers are excluded). A rumoured but 
uncompleted deal indicates that the acquirer’s offer to acquire target shares does not lead to a 
real M&A deal completed in the end. 
When using Zephyr and Orbis to derive relevant financial information, one is restricted 
according to the limitation of the databases used. Thus some of the deals are deleted because of 
information shortage. Problems of missing data cause a substantial reduction in the number of 
cases in the sample and so the observation’s number was shortened from 19,685 to a sample of 
4,241 matched acquirers and their respective targets. I have dropped the duplicate deals and all 
deals with country code of ‘NL’ because there is no information for these deals. This omission 
could influence the outcome of the analysis and should be criticised when evaluating the 
validity of the results and conclusions, especially if some deals are systematically removed from 
the sample, which is caused by lack of information. However, the sample size should be a 
random selection.  
4.3.2 Independent Variable 
The independent variables are chosen to proxy a number of attributes or dimensions of 
economic performance and financial position, including: profitability; cash flow; corporate 
leverage; intangible asset; firm size. The descriptions for all variables are listed below. In this 
research, gearing ratio is used to measure corporate leverage. The profitability is measured by 
profit margin. Total assets of firms are employed to measure firm size. The relative size variable 
is constructed in the model separately with absolute size variables and constitutes a comparable 
model. The relative size variable is calculated by dividing the total assets of the acquiring firm 
with the assets of the target, thus making a ratio for the relative size. In this research, several 
control variables will be used such as firm’s listed status, GDP growth for each host country, 
cross border M&A type, year, and host country. A listed firm will be denoted by 1 and an 
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unlisted firm by 0. According to Dunning’s (1977) OLI framework, the quality of foreign 
business environment is worthy of consideration (Malhotra et al., 2009). The location of targets 
and the economic growth rate are two motivations for multinationals to conduct M&As in 
overseas markets (Kohli & Mann，2012). 
According to Markusen (1995), horizontal M&A and vertical M&A are driven by different 
motives, which are market-seeking and efficiency-seeking respectively. They may influence 
the decision of cross border M&A completion. Therefore, it is necessary to control the M&A 
type in the analysis of this research. The M&A type dummy includes conglomerate, vertical 
and horizontal M&A. Following Driffield et al. (2014), the upstream and downstream industries 
are defined in relation to the two-digit NACE industry code. Based on this category, vertical 
M&A is defined as target firms which belong to upstream industries and acquirer firms belong 
to downstream industries. Alternatively, target firms belong to downstream industries and 
acquirer firms belong to upstream industries. The M&A deals are categorised into horizontal 
takeovers if target and acquirer firms possess the same two-digit NACE industry code. Other 
M&A deals which are not categorised into either vertical or horizontal takeovers will be defined 
as conglomerate takeovers. 
  
86 
 
Table 4.1 The definitions of independent variables 
 
 
 
Source from Orbis 
4.3.3 Data Description 
The distribution of population which includes 19,6853 cross border M&A deals from 2002 to 
2011 is listed in table 4.1. In these ten years, conglomerate M&A 4  account for a large 
proportion of total cross border M&A deals. There are 1,044 rumoured conglomerate deals and 
11,095 completed conglomerate deals. The second largest number of M&A type is horizontal 
M&A which is consist of 798 rumoured deals and 6,155 completed deals. Vertical M&A is 
listed in the third place, which includes 52 rumoured deals and 541 completed deals. In terms 
of each M&A type, the volume of completed deals increases with years before 2007. Although 
the financial crisis made the volume of completed deals decrease in 2008 and 2009, the volume 
resumes increasing after 2009. It suggests that financial crisis in 2008 did influence the cross 
border M&A activities. 
  
                                                             
3 The number of completed cross border M&A deals is 17,791 which is account for 90.38%, whereas, that of uncompleted 
rumours is 1,894 with proportion of 9.62%. 
4 Conglomerate M&A is one form of M&A process which deals happened between two companies in irrelevant industries 
respectively. The objective may be diversification of capital investment (DePamphilis, 2009).  
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Table 4.2  The distributions of cross border M&A types and deal status from 2002 to 2011 
Cross border M&A 
types 
Deal status 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total % 
Vertical 
Uncompleted 3 5 1 3 7 4 10 7 7 5 52 8.8 
Completed 45 33 43 56 78 83 74 33 39 57 541 91.2 
Horizontal 
Uncompleted 41 62 66 94 78 92 92 93 88 92 798 11.5 
Completed 428 460 548 722 770 905 688 444 570 620 6155 88.5 
Conglomerate 
Uncompleted 44 86 74 103 77 91 127 136 157 149 1044 8.6 
Completed 660 742 909 1184 1373 1594 1390 842 1138 1263 11095 91.4 
Source: Author’s calculations from Orbis and Zephyr data set. 
From table 4.2 and figure 4.1, during this decade, there are 11,280 acquirers and 19,685 targets 
in total from 164 countries across the world. The US is the biggest cross border M&A home 
country which conducts 2,418 international M&A attempts and accounts for 21.44% of total 
international deals. The second biggest takeover home country is the UK (10.32%) followed by 
Germany (7.06%), Canada (5.73%), France (5.70%), Sweden (4.13%), Switzerland (3.25%), 
Italy (2.99%), Spain (2.84%) and Russia (1.89%). As for the target side, the UK becomes the 
biggest cross border M&A host country which receives 2,798 bids and accounts for 14.21% of 
total international deals. The US is ranked as the second host country (13.08%). It is followed 
by Germany (8.98%), France (6.15%), Canada (4.29%), Spain (3.84%), Sweden (3.37%), Italy 
(3.03%), Russia (2.51%) and Switzerland (2.48%). The majority of involving firms is located 
in the North American area and West European area. Another 154 countries contribute 34.66% 
of acquirers and 38.06% of targets respectively. These firms mainly come from OECD countries, 
the enlarged EU area, East Asian area and Oceania area. Generally, it shows that the developed 
countries consist of main outward and inward FDI countries. Less developed countries 
primarily import capital from more developed countries. Most of cross border M&A activities 
take place in North American and Western European countries. 
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Table 4.3  The distributions of acquirer and target across main countries 
  US UK Germany Canada France Sweden Switzerland Italy Spain Russia Others Total 
Acquirer 2,418 1,164 796 646 643 466 367 337 320 213 3910 11,280 
Proportion 21.44% 10.32% 7.06% 5.73% 5.70% 4.13% 3.25% 2.99% 2.84% 1.89% 34.66% 100% 
Target 2,575 2,798 1,768 844 1,210 663 489 596 755 495 7492 19,685 
Proportion 13.08% 14.21% 8.98% 4.29% 6.15% 3.37% 2.48% 3.03% 3.84% 2.51% 38.06% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculations from Orbis and Zephyr data set. 
 
Figure 4.1 The distributions of acquirer and target across main countries 
 
Source from Orbis and Zephyr 
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Furthermore, this research also uses a dataset of GDP growth rate for each country, which is 
extracted from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) historical database. This is a wide 
selection of data from specific tables as published monthly in International Country Risk 
Guide from 1984 until the present, including all countries or their predecessors monitored by 
ICRG. These data include Political, Economic, Financial and Composite Risk Ratings, which 
are sets of data with the risk components used to calculate each rating and other sets with the 
actual monthly data variable used to calculate either the Economic Risk Rating or the Financial 
Risk Rating, as recorded contemporaneously for every country monitored by ICRG in each 
particular month. 
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Specification  
4.4.1.1 The Likelihood Model in This Research 
In order to identify the determinants of cross border M&A, a probit model will be employed 
because there are two parts of observations in the dependent variable. Due to the existence of a 
binary dependent variable which includes the rumoured then completed deal and the rumoured 
but uncompleted deal, the dependent variable (the probit) represents relative probability of a 
cross border M&A deal in the sample being completed or just rumoured. The independent 
variables as the potential determinant factors will be examined in these probit estimation models. 
The five hypotheses are tested by using these independent variables respectively. The 
estimation models will be examined with using below equations. The equation 4.1 will include 
all independent variables and control variables except for relative size variable. The equation 
4.2 will examine all variables by replacing absolute size variables with relative size variable. 
They are listed as follow: 
y1(1/0)it = β0 + β1Tit + β2Ait + β3Listedit + β4GDPit + β5MAtypeit + vt + vc + εit   (4.1) 
where y1(1/0)it is a binary variable, capturing the M&A’s status, which takes value 1 if the 
M&A’s status of testing firm is rumoured and completed, and takes value 0 if its M&A’s status 
is rumoured but uncompleted. The main interest of this research is to identify what factors can 
make an M&A deal completed compared with the abundant analogous deal. The vector Tit 
captures a set of target’s characteristics that have been found in the literature to be important in 
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explaining the likelihood of cross border M&A in general. These variables include following 
target firm characteristics observed in the acquisition event period: characteristic variables to 
capture profitability, the intangible resource and firm size. Similarly, the vector Ait captures a 
set of acquirer’s characteristics such as profit margin, cash flow, gearing ratio, intangible asset 
and total asset. These variables are also observed in the acquisition event period to capture the 
acquirer’s profitability, liquidity, corporate financial leverage, intangible resource and firm size. 
Listedit includes another two control variables which capture whether targets or acquirers are 
listed companies or not. It is composed of the target’s listed status and the acquirer’s listed status. 
GDPit is the GDP growth rate of the host country where the target firm is located in the relevant 
year. MAtypeit is the control variable. It stands for the type of M&A which includes vertical, 
horizontal and conglomerate M&A. Finally, the error term is made up of a time-specific 
component (vt), an encoded 2-digit country-specific component (vc), and an idiosyncratic error 
term εit.  
y2(1/0)it = α0 + α1Tit + α2Ait + α3RSizeit + α4Listedit  
+ α5GDPit + α6MAtypeit + vt + vc + εit     (4.2) 
In the equation 4.2, the vector Tit and Ait will exclude the target’s and acquirer’s size variables. 
They are replaced with relative size variable (RSizeit). Other part of equation remains the same 
to the equation 4.1.  
4.4.1.2 The Probit Regression 
Proposed by Bliss (1934), in statistics, a probit model is a type of regression where the 
dependent variable can only take two values. Its name comes from probability + unit. The 
purpose of the model is to estimate the probability that an observation with particular 
characteristics will fall into a specific one of the categories. It is a popular specification for a 
binary response model. The probit model, which employs a probit link function, is often 
estimated by using the standard maximum likelihood procedure, such as estimation being call 
a probit regression.  
Suppose response variable Y is binary, that is it can have only two possible outcomes which we 
will denote as 1 and 0. For example Y may represent presence/absence of a certain condition, 
success/failure of some device, answer yes/no on a survey, etc. We also have a vector of 
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regressors X, which are assumed to influence the outcome Y. Specifically, we assume that the 
model takes the form: 
Pr (Y = 1 | X) = Φ(X’B),  (4.3) 
where Pr denotes probability, and Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the 
standard normal distribution. The parameters β are typically estimated by maximum likelihood. 
It is possible to motivate the probit model as a latent variable model. Suppose there is an 
auxiliary random variable 
Y* = X’β + ε,  (4.4) 
where ε ~ N(0, 1). Then Y can be viewed as an indicator for whether this latent variable is 
positive: 
Y =  {1  if Y
∗ > 0  i. e. −ε < X′β,
0  otherwise.
  (4.5) 
The use of the standard normal distribution causes no loss of generality compared with using 
an arbitrary mean and standard deviation because adding a fixed amount to the mean can be 
compensated by subtracting the same amount from the intercept, and multiplying the standard 
deviation by a fixed amount can be compensated by multiplying the weights by the same 
amount. To see that the two models are equivalent, note that: 
Pr (Y = 1 | X) = Pr (Y* > 0) = Pr (X’β + ε > 0) 
           = Pr (ε > - X’β) 
           = Pr (ε < X’β)   (by symmetry of the normal distribution) 
           = Φ(X’β)                                       (4.6) 
4.4.1.3 Maximum Likelihood Method 
Suppose data set {yi, xi}i=1
n  contains n independent statistical units corresponding to the model 
above. Then their joint log-likelihood function is 
ln ℒ(β) =  ∑ (yilnΦ(xi
′β) + (1 −  yi) ln(1 − Φ(xi
′β)))ni=1     (4.7) 
The estimator β̂ which maximizes this function will be consistent, asymptotically normal and 
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efficient provided that E[XX'] exists and is not singular. It can be shown that this log-likelihood 
function is globally concave in β, and therefore standard numerical algorithms for optimisation 
will converge rapidly to the unique maximum. Asymptotic distribution for β̂ is given by: 
√n(β̂ −  β)  
d
→  𝒩(0, Ω−1),      (4.8) 
Where 
Ω = E [
φ2(xi
′ β)
Φ(xi
′ β)(1−Φ(xi
′ β)
XX′],      (4.9) 
Ω̂ =
1
n
∑
φ2(xi
′ β̂)
Φ(xi
′ β̂)(1−Φ(xi
′ β̂)
xixi
′n
i=1      (4.10) 
and φ = Φ’ is the Probability Density Function (PDF) of standard normal distribution. 
4.4.2 The Use of M&A Rumour in Dependent Variable 
In this research, an M&A likelihood model is constructed to detect the determinants of a cross 
border M&A being completed, using the vector of the hypothesized influence factors. In order 
to understand the effect of determinants, it is necessary to collect a sample of reference group 
corresponding to M&A deals. The data from rumoured but uncompleted deals provides 
comparable sense in identifying the similarity of in range of completed deals characteristics. It 
is not predictable which firms will become targets or acquirers without considering the 
uncompleted M&A in the counterfactual situation. Therefore, it is important to construct a 
consistent estimate for the characteristics of firms had they not been involved in M&A. The 
characteristics of the non-acquirers or non-targets used in previous literature do not offer a good 
estimate of the counterfactual in non-experimental settings. This is because firms select 
themselves into the different groups based on characteristics that might also affect the measured 
variables.  
Whether or not the cross border M&A is completed comprises a comparison between the actual 
international takeover and the situation had the takeover not taken place after experiencing 
takeover rumours. As a potential international M&A, rumoured but uncompleted M&A deals 
naturally provide a feature of counterfactual population, which can overcome the potential 
selective bias. In addition, the characteristics of targets or acquirers under the rumour are 
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independent of that in the actual completed M&A, which is satisfied with the conditional 
independence assumption (ref. Chapter 3). Furthermore, the use of takeover rumour data 
overcomes the limitation of propensity matching techniques discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, 
this study employs directly rumoured data as control group rather than propensity matching 
techniques or other sample matching techniques. 
To my knowledge, the rumoured deals have not been found to apply to be a control group in 
the cross border M&A research. It is also not found that previous researchers choose firm’s 
information to compose the control group from rumoured M&A deals. Therefore, the use of 
firms from takeover rumours as a control group and the construction of takeover rumours and 
actual takeovers in the dependent variable will contribute to the literatures on M&A.  
4.5 Result 
4.5.1 Cross Border M&A Likelihood Probit Models with Absolute Size  
Based on the hypotheses discussed in section 2, this section reports the first version of the probit 
model with using the absolute firm size variables. The sample information for this probit model 
is summarised in the table below. From this table, all variables show positive mean value in the 
sample of 4,150 cross border M&A although some of them have negative values for specific 
observations. Amongst them, some variables such as target’s intangible assets and total assets, 
acquirer’s cash flow, intangible assets and total assets have the large standard deviations. This 
means that these variables spread out their observation values widely. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for the model with absolute firm size  
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
completed_MA 4150 0.8698795 0.3364765 0 1 
Target 
Profit Margin 4150 3.896728 21.36202 -98.25 100 
Intangible Asset 4150 10715.55 10365.67 29 31327 
Total Asset 4150 789732.9 6174343 0 2.18E+08 
Listed 4150 0.0946988 0.2928337 0 1 
Acquirer 
Profit Margin 4150 8.189822 14.54219 -97.99 95.06 
Cash Flow 4150 1143031 3524237 -2.10E+07 5.09E+07 
Gearing Ratio 4150 105.6957 118.2492 0 997.68 
Intangible Asset 4150 29524.83 19345.29 163 63487 
Total Asset 4150 1.21E+07 3.75E+07 113 7.96E+08 
Listed 4150 0.6855422 0.4643555 0 1 
  
GDP_growth 4150 7.339964 1.773262 0.5 10 
MAtype 4150 1.838554 0.9645227 1 3 
year 4150 2006.3 2.268562 2002 2011 
Tcountry_id 4150 71.94145 38.86765 8 162 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
The parameter estimates of two probit M&A likelihood models are presented in table 4.5. Model 
1 includes nine independent variables in addition to a constant term. These independent 
variables correspond to the five cross border M&A likelihood hypotheses discussed. Model 2 
is a re-estimation of model 1 with the inclusion of control variables. The control variables 
control acquirer’s listed status, target’s listed status, GDP growth for each host country, M&A 
types, year and country. Table 4.5 reports the associated marginal effects for independent 
variables, the Pseudo R-squared5 and log likelihood statistic for each version of the model. The 
numbers of observations for the two models are listed in table 4.5.  
  
                                                             
5 Pseudo R-squared provides an indication of the overall explanatory power of the model and the likelihood ratio statistic tests 
it statistical significance. The Pseudo R-squared index for the four models ranges between 5.98% and 20.29%. The associated 
likelihood ratio statistic, which is asymptotically chi-square distributed, is statistically significant for all four models. This 
suggests that the models offer a statistical explanation of a completed cross border M&A probability. 
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Table 4.5   Results of cross border M&A likelihood probit models with absolute size 
  
Variables Model 1 model 2 
 
Completed_MA 
Coef. Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. Sig. 
Target 
Profit Margin -1.04E-03 1.20E-03 -2.07E-04 2.40E-04   -7.02E-05 1.35E-03 -1.12E-05 2.17E-04   
Intangible Asset -8.03E-06 2.42E-06 -1.60E-06 0.00E+00 *** -6.54E-06 2.83E-06 -1.05E-06 4.54E-07 ** 
Total Asset -7.65E-09 1.81E-09 -1.52E-09 0.00E+00 *** -2.31E-08 6.34E-09 -3.70E-09 1.02E-09 *** 
Listed           -1.29E+00 9.30E-02 -2.07E-01 1.43E-02 *** 
Acquirer 
Profit Margin -6.96E-03 1.85E-03 -1.38E-03 3.70E-04 *** -5.07E-03 2.03E-03 -8.12E-04 3.25E-04 ** 
Cash Flow -6.83E-08 1.09E-08 -1.36E-08 0.00E+00 *** -3.99E-08 1.32E-08 -6.38E-09 2.11E-09 *** 
Gearing Ratio -3.27E-04 2.11E-04 -6.49E-05 4.00E-05   -2.51E-04 2.43E-04 -4.02E-05 3.90E-05   
Intangible Asset 9.69E-07 1.30E-06 1.92E-07 0.00E+00   3.22E-07 1.47E-06 5.15E-08 2.35E-07   
Total Asset 6.37E-10 9.03E-10 1.26E-10 0.00E+00   1.55E-10 1.19E-09 2.48E-11 1.91E-10   
Listed           -9.56E-02 6.67E-02 -1.53E-02 1.07E-02   
  
Relative Size                     
GDP Growth -8.35E-03 1.39E-02 -1.66E-03 2.75E-03   6.71E-02 3.45E-02 1.07E-02 5.53E-03 * 
Vertical           -9.85E-02 1.41E-01 -1.58E-02 2.36E-02   
Horizontal           -1.06E-01 5.98E-02 -1.71E-02 9.75E-03 * 
Year uncontrolled         controlled         
Country_id uncontrolled         controlled         
Constant term 1.47E+00 1.20E-01     *** 8.24E-01 4.06E-01     *** 
Pseudo R2 0.0632         0.2366         
LR chi2 204.45       *** 759.08       *** 
No. of Obs. 4224         4150         
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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In model 1, the target’s intangible asset, target’s total asset, acquirer’s profitability and 
acquirer’s cash flow are statistically significant and have negative signs. The coefficient sign of 
variable target’s intangible asset is significant and negative which is different from the previous 
evidence but is consistent with hypothesis 5a. This implies that the target with low level of 
intangible assets will increase the likelihood of cross border M&A completions. It could be 
explained that the competitive advantage based on a complex technology will reduce the 
likelihood of cross border M&A completions due to the high transfer cost. Additionally, high 
proportion of intangible assets, to some extent, brings in an overvalued firm’s value. Therefore, 
targets sometimes ask for higher takeover prices resulting in the deals not being completed. The 
coefficient sign of target’s total asset is consistent with hypothesis 1a, which means that a 
smaller firm will increase the chance of a cross border M&A being completed. Besides, smaller 
firms may be more likely to be chosen as targets. 
Moreover, the finding for other significant variables of the acquirer is also in line with 
hypotheses 2b and 3 but is different from the previous evidence. These significant variables 
means that the acquiring firm with high profitability and sufficient cash flow will reduce the 
chance of a cross border M&A completion after experiencing a takeover rumour. Although high 
cash flow is argued to increase the possibility of potential M&A deals because managers can 
afford to buy more firms, it doesn’t mean all of them become completed ones. The high amount 
of free cash flow gives managers more discretionary power and encourages management hubris. 
This results in the deals not easy to be completed successfully because acquirers carelessly 
choose the investment projects. This finding is different from the previous literature which 
argues that the more cash flow the more M&A. In addition, the result about the profitability 
from the acquirer side is also different from previous literature which argues that the acquirer 
with high profitability will be more likely to initiate the takeovers. The finding could be 
explained that acquirers with high earning ability will cautiously choose targets to acquire or 
merge. They prefer to maintain their existing superiority in profitability and try to avoid the risk 
of losing profit when acquiring a new firm. Besides, the large integration cost makes acquirers 
unprofitable to some extent. Thus, high profitability reduces the chance of an M&A deal 
completion.  
Nevertheless, the coefficient of variables target’s profit margin, acquirer’s gearing ratio, 
intangible asset and total asset are statistically insignificant although they are in line with the 
expected coefficient’s sign. The coefficient of variable GDP growth for host country is 
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statistically insignificant. These statistically insignificant variables indicate that the target’s 
profitability, acquirer’s leverage, intangible resource and absolute size measure, and the growth 
opportunity of the host country are lack of sufficient evidence in determining the cross border 
M&A likelihood. 
When re-estimating the same specification to model 1 with adding the control variables (i.e. 
Listed status, M&A type, year and country dummies), model 2 reports the similar results. The 
coefficients of variable target’s intangible asset and acquirer’s profit margin become less 
significant. Apart from these differences, the results from model 1 remain the same and robust. 
As for the control variables, the coefficient of target listed status is negative and statistically 
significant. This indicates that the unlisted firms in the sample will increase the likelihood of 
cross border M&A completions. In terms of listed status, the listed firm is usually a large 
corporation in market value and is under surveillance by the stock exchange regulators. Large 
firms are not easily integrated and usually involve complicated transaction procedures. 
Furthermore, the requirement of financial disclosure in the stock exchange institutes reduces 
the discretionary power of managers. Thus, listed firms are not easy to complete an M&A deal. 
Together with considering the control of country variable, the variable of GDP growth becomes 
a significant and positive sign. This means that the healthy economic environment and good 
market opportunity in the host country will encourage the completion of cross border M&A. 
The firm’s listed status variables and the control for host country interfere with the significance 
of a firm’s intangible resource, profitability and GDP growth in affecting the completion of 
cross border M&A after experiencing takeover rumours. 
As for the control variable of cross border M&A type, the coefficient of horizontal M&A is 
negative with significance at the 10 per cent level. It means that horizontal international M&A 
deals are less likely to be completed compared with the international vertical M&A. Horizontal 
M&A are usually consistent with diversification of corporate strategy under certain relatedness 
of corporate operation in order to seek for risk diversification and economy of scope. 
Furthermore, horizontal M&A is often involved in acquiring the firms with similar or 
homogeneous products. This provides the acquirer firm with new product markets or enlarged 
economy of scale, but this also makes the duplicated investments and resources redundant. 
Therefore, firms may more carefully consider horizontal takeovers. Especially, in consideration 
of the high cost due to job cut in the workforce and repeated construction, this kind of 
international M&A has less chance to be completed eventually. In model 2, year and country 
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variables are also controlled. These findings all imply that the intangible resources will 
discourage the international takeovers rather than motivate them, and the cross border M&A 
are oriented by efficiency seeking rather than technological sourcing. 
4.5.2 Cross border M&A likelihood probit models with relative size  
This section reports the probit model with using the relative firm size variables. The sample 
information for this probit model is summarised in the table below. Similar to the model with 
absolute firm size, all variables show positive mean value in the sample of 4,149 cross border 
M&A and some of them have negative values for specific observations. Amongst these, the 
wide spread exists in such variables as target’s intangible assets, acquirer’s cash flow and 
intangible assets. 
Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics for the model with relative firm size 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
completed_MA 4149 0.8698482 0.336511 0 1 
Target 
Profit Margin 4149 3.903492 21.36015 -98.25 100 
Intangible Asset 4149 10718.02 10365.69 29 31327 
Listed 4149 0.0947216 0.2928653 0 1 
Acquirer 
Profit Margin 4149 8.193666 14.54184 -97.99 95.06 
Cash Flow 4149 1143345 3524604 -2.10E+07 5.09E+07 
Gearing Ratio 4149 105.7131 118.2582 0 997.68 
Intangible Asset 4149 29531.14 19343.35 163 63487 
Listed 4149 0.6857074 0.4642895 0 1 
  
Relative Size 4149 3.853854 2.309013 -7.985165 16.48524 
GDP_growth 4149 7.340157 1.773432 0.5 10 
MAtype 4149 1.838756 0.964551 1 3 
year 4149 2006.302 2.267852 2002 2011 
Tcountry_id 4149 71.94095 38.87232 8 162 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
The parameter estimates of two probit M&A likelihood models are presented in table 4.7. Model 
1 includes eight independent variables in addition to a constant term. These independent 
variables correspond to the independent variables in table 4.5 except for the firm size measure. 
This model uses a relative size measure while the models in table 4.5 use an absolute size 
measure. Model 2 is a re-estimation of model 1 with including control variables such as 
acquirer’s listed status, target’s listed status, M&A types, year and country. Similar to table 4.5, 
table 4.7 reports the marginal effects for independent variables, Pseudo R-squared and log 
likelihood statistic for each model, and numbers of observations for the two models.  
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Table 4.7   Results of probit cross border M&A likelihood models with relative size 
  
Variables model 1 model 2 
  
Completed_MA 
Coef. Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. Sig. 
Target 
Profit Margin -8.06E-04 1.22E-03 -1.55E-04 2.30E-04   -2.14E-04 1.36E-03 -3.43E-05 2.17E-04   
Intangible Asset -5.19E-06 2.47E-06 -1.00E-06 0.00E+00 ** -5.31E-06 2.87E-06 -8.50E-07 4.59E-07 * 
Listed           -1.31E+00 9.19E-02 -2.09E-01 1.40E-02 *** 
Acquirer 
Profit Margin -7.42E-03 1.82E-03 -1.43E-03 3.50E-04 *** -5.40E-03 2.01E-03 -8.64E-04 3.23E-04 *** 
Cash Flow -7.89E-08 6.42E-09 -1.52E-08 0.00E+00 *** -5.24E-08 7.28E-09 -8.39E-09 1.16E-09 *** 
Gearing Ratio -4.19E-04 2.05E-04 -8.09E-05 4.00E-05 ** -3.62E-04 2.36E-04 -5.79E-05 3.78E-05   
Intangible Asset 4.95E-07 1.32E-06 9.56E-08 0.00E+00   6.57E-08 1.47E-06 1.05E-08 2.35E-07   
Listed           -1.74E-01 6.96E-02 -2.78E-02 1.12E-02 ** 
  
Relative Size 1.05E-01 1.14E-02 2.02E-02 2.18E-03 *** 5.49E-02 1.39E-02 8.79E-03 2.22E-03 *** 
GDP Growth -1.07E-02 1.41E-02 -2.06E-03 2.71E-03   7.03E-02 3.46E-02 1.13E-02 5.54E-03 ** 
Vertical           -9.02E-02 1.41E-01 -1.45E-02 2.35E-02   
Horizontal           -1.02E-01 5.99E-02 -1.65E-02 9.75E-03 * 
Year uncontrolled         controlled         
Country_id uncontrolled         controlled         
Constant term 1.12E+00 1.27E-01     *** 6.72E-01 4.10E-01       
Pseudo R2 0.0846         0.2362         
LR chi2 273.98       *** 758.03       *** 
No. of Obs. 4223         4149         
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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The models in table 4.5 use the absolute value of acquirer and target’s size measures, while the 
models in table 4.7 employ the logarithm of relative size measure between acquirer and target. 
In models 1 and 2 of table 4.7, excluding the absolute size measures, the relative size measure 
exhibits high significance and is consistent with the positive expected sign. The result shows 
that relative size of acquirer and target has more influential power than their absolute sizes in 
explaining the completion of a rumoured cross border M&A deal. It suggests that the larger the 
extent of relative difference between acquirer and target is, the more likely the cross border 
M&A deal will be completed. In other words, large firms usually acquire small ones. This is 
consistent with the expected sign of hypothesis.  
Another difference in the probit model of table 4.7 is the negative coefficient of acquirer’s 
gearing ratio becomes statistically significant in model 1, which is consistent with hypothesis 
4. It suggests that high level of corporate financial leverage will reduce the chance of cross 
border M&A being completed after experiencing takeover rumours. It is also suggested that 
when the firm size is compared, the acquirer’s financial leverage shows more significance in 
its debt default effect. It can be explained that high level of corporate operation risk makes the 
firm itself less confident in acquiring other firms. Moreover, the high level of debt issue reduces 
the managers’ discretionary power in conducting M&A. Thus, the potential insolvency effect 
may overweigh the function of LBOs.  
Additionally, the listed status of acquirer and target firms has a significant and negative sign in 
model 2. This has a similar explanation with the listed target firms in model 2 of table 4.5, 
which is that the potential deals involving listed target firms are less likely to complete due to 
sophisticated integration progress and strict surveillance of regulators. Moreover, the listed firm 
is usually required to disclose more M&A proposal information than unlisted ones. This 
requirement reduces the discretionary power of managers to attempt all possible M&A projects. 
Thus, listed acquirer firms also do not easily complete an M&A deal. Apart from these above 
differences, the coefficients of all other variables are consistent with those in models of table 
4.5 respectively, which retains robustness.  
4.5.3 The goodness of fit for both absolute size and relative size models 
The output of probit regression can be diagnosed by the log likelihood chi-squared (LR χ2) and 
pseudo R-squared (Pseudo R2) for the model. These measures provide a general gauge on how 
101 
 
the model fits the data. The log likelihood chi-squared (LR χ2) is to test whether the model as a 
whole is statistically significant. It is twice the difference between the log likelihood of the 
current model and the log likelihood of the intercept-only model. From tables 4.5 and 4.7, the 
models with controlling year and country reports higher and significant LR χ2 values than those 
of models without controlling year and country. A pseudo R-squared is in slightly different 
favour, but captures more or less the same thing in that it is the proportion of change in terms 
of likelihood. Similarly, the controlled models show higher Pseudo R2 than those of 
uncontrolled models. These all suggest that the controlled models are a better fit than 
uncontrolled models. 
However, when considering which model can explain better the likelihood of cross border 
M&A completion between the model with absolute firm size and that with relative size, LR χ2 
and Pseudo R2 are unable to show the comparison of model fit. The probit model with relative 
firm size reports lower values in LR χ2 (758.03) and Pseudo R2 (0.2362) than those (759.08 and 
0.2466 respectively) of absolute size model when controlling year and country, but the situation 
becomes opposite for uncontrolled models, which is that the relative size model has higher 
values in LR χ2 (273.98) and Pseudo R2 (0.0846) than those (204.45 and 0.0632) of absolute 
size model.  
To compare the goodness-of-fit for the both above models, this research uses AIC (Akaike 
Information Criterion) and BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) to test model fit. Tables 4.8 
and 4.9 report measures of fit for probit of ‘completed_MA’ without and with control variables 
respectively. In both tables, the saved probit model is the one with relative firm size, while the 
current probit model is the one with absolute firm size. 
Table 4.8 Measures of Fit for probit of ‘completed_MA’ without control variables 
  Current   Saved Difference 
Model: probit probit   
N: 4149 4149 0 
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -1604.316 -1604.316 0.000 
Log-Lik Full Model: -1224.88 -1225.302 0.422 
D: 2449.760(4068) 2450.605(4048) -0.844(20) 
LR: 758.871(77) 758.026(76) 0.844(1) 
Prob > LR: 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden's R2: 0.237 0.236 0.000 
McFadden's Adj R2: 0.186 0.173 0.013 
Maximum Likelihood R2 0.167 0.167 0.000 
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Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.310 0.310 0.000 
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2: 0.300 0.293 0.007 
Efron's R2: 0.250 0.245 0.006 
Variance of y*: 1.429 1.415 0.014 
Variance of error: 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Count R2: 0.892 0.890 0.002 
Adj Count R2: 0.169 0.156 0.013 
AIC: 0.629 0.639 -0.010 
AIC*n: 2611.760 2652.605 -40.844 
BIC:  -31439.212 -31271.756 -167.457 
BIC':  -117.413 -124.899 7.486 
Difference of 7.486 in BIC' provides strong support for saved model. 
By using the same sample of cross border M&A, table 4.8 provides strong support for saved 
model (relative size model) in those with controlling year and country.  
Table 4.9 Measures of Fit for probit of ‘completed_MA’ with control variables 
  Current   Saved Difference 
Model: probit probit   
N: 4223 4223 0 
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -1618.372 -1618.372 0.000 
Log-Lik Full Model: -1516.216 -1481.382 -34.834 
D: 3032.432(4213) 2962.764(4214) 69.668(-1) 
LR: 204.312(9) 273.980(8) -69.668(1) 
Prob > LR: 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden's R2: 0.063 0.085 -0.022 
McFadden's Adj R2: 0.057 0.079 -0.022 
Maximum Likelihood R2 0.047 0.063 -0.016 
Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.088 0.117 -0.029 
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2: 0.086 0.126 -0.040 
Efron's R2: 0.062 0.083 -0.021 
Variance of y*: 1.094 1.144 -0.050 
Variance of error: 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Count R2: 0.873 0.873 -0.000 
Adj Count R2: 0.009 0.013 -0.004 
AIC: 0.723 0.706 0.017 
AIC*n: 3052.432 2980.764 71.668 
BIC:  -32138.961 -32216.976 78.016 
BIC':  -129.178 -207.193 78.016 
Difference of 78.016 in BIC' provides very strong support for saved model. 
Table 4.9 reports very strong support for saved models (relative size models) in those without 
controlling year and country. Therefore, based on above diagnostics, the relative firm size 
model with controlling year and country has best explanatory power for the likelihood of 
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international takeover completion. Actually, table 4.5 shows that only small firms increase the 
likelihood of M&A completions. However, there is no unique criterion to define a small firm. 
Comparing with the absolute firm size measure, the relative firm size provides the 
comparability between acquirers and targets. It can facilitate researchers easily to identify 
effects of small firms or large firms. 
Generally, those market efficiency variables show significant and negative results and are 
associated with rumoured but not completed deals. This may suggest a bias in the previous 
results, in which the firms are strongly more likely to consider these market efficiency factors 
in considering international M&A attempts. However, these factors appear to be unrelated to 
the completion of M&A; the evidence from this research also suggests that strategic resources 
impede completion of takeovers rather than cause them. Therefore, overall results suggest that 
cross border M&A are the efficiency seeking activities. 
4.6 Conclusion 
A number of studies have developed statistical models to either predict takeover targets or 
investigate the influence factors of M&A. Some factors are identified due to their influence on 
M&A activity such as firm size, profitability, liquidity, corporate financial leverage level and 
intangible assets from the firm level. In the previous literature, some factors such as profitability, 
liquidity, corporate financial leverage level and intangible assets are mainly found to be 
positively related to M&A activities, while others such as firm size have a negative relationship. 
There is also mixed empirical evidence for these factors from the previous research. In spite of 
the mixed influence of these factors, previous research only focuses on the factors which induce 
the M&A activity. Nevertheless, it is unanswered that what factors determine an M&A deal 
carry out and complete finally.  
This study employs the rumoured but uncompleted and completed cross border M&A deals to 
create a binary probit model which is new to takeover prediction literature. The use of rumoured 
but uncompleted M&A deals will identify the deals which satisfy the conditions of M&A but 
do not exist in the end. This composes a comparison group which provides the similarity in 
range of completed deals characteristics. This control group will facilitate to test what factors 
may influence the completion of M&A. The firm characteristics of both target and acquirer are 
argued to be important in the M&A decisions research. Thus, with using both target’s and 
acquirer’s firm-level information from 2002 to 2011, the above mentioned factors have been 
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examined to investigate the determinants of making a rumoured cross border M&A deal 
completed.  
By using the above stated methods, this research extended the existing empirical evidence about 
rumoured deals in the field of cross border M&A and exploited the likelihood of M&A from a 
deal perspective rather than predicting a likely target. This leads to different conclusions from 
the previous literature in terms of target’s intangible resource, acquirer’s profitability and 
liquidity. In this research, the large amount of target’s intangible asset, sufficient acquirer’s cash 
flow, and high acquirer’s profitability are found to decrease the likelihood of completed 
takeover, which is inconsistent with the previous evidence. In other words, the acquirer’s 
liquidity, its profitability and target’s intangible asset are regarded as an obstruction to the 
completion of cross border M&A. More specifically, firstly, this research argues that the 
acquirers with high profitability are more likely to initiate the cross border M&A, but these 
deals are less likely to be completed successfully due to the potential managerial resistance. 
Secondly, according to free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis in the agency cost literature, sufficient 
cash flow makes managers attempt more potential M&A activities. However, these M&A deals 
are more likely to be opposed by shareholders and disapproved by boards because these deals 
may not be carefully selected due to managerial discretion. Accordingly, they are less likely to 
be completed in the end. Thirdly, based on the framework of TCE and RBV, acquirers are 
interested in acquiring intangible assets of targets, which will attract managements to attempt 
large number of cross border M&A. However, the information asymmetry between targets and 
acquirers will directly cause both managements to evaluate their assets differently, which 
indirectly increases transaction costs. Therefore, these deals may not complete ultimately in 
consideration of the high transaction costs in integration or the unachievable consensus between 
both firms on the transaction price. 
Further, this research identified not only the impacts of target firm’s information but also that 
of acquirer firm’s information on cross border M&A activities. The firm’s information from the 
acquirer side provided the takeover likelihood with a new insight. Some acquirer’s information 
such as profitability, liquidity and financial leverage showed significance in explaining the 
likelihood of completed deals. For example, the acquirer’s financial leverage is found to impede 
the completion of international takeovers because it is anticipated that the insolvency factor will 
weigh more than the influence of LBOs. 
Due to the mixed evidence in previous literature about the firm size, this research also utilised 
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the relative size measure to detect the determinants of completed M&A in order to check the 
robustness about firm size factor. It is found that the small target’s absolute size and the large 
relative size of acquirer are shown to increase the likelihood of completed M&A. Besides, the 
listed status is also proved to significantly influence the completion of a rumoured cross border 
M&A deal. Compared with the unlisted firms, listed firms are less likely to complete the cross 
border M&A due to the high integration cost and rigorous regulation in the stock exchange 
market. They are also consistent with the transaction cost theory. Based on the evidence found, 
that the rumoured cross border M&A are completed is not because of technology (e.g. intangible 
assets are a negative sign) or acquiring profitable firms. There might be a reason about market 
access, and the GDP growth for each target firm in the host country are found to capture the 
market opportunity and show the increase in completion rate of international M&A.  
This research found that acquirer’s cash flow, its profitability, target’s intangible asset and 
absolute size measure, the relative size of acquirer over target, the listed status of both involving 
firms and GDP growth for the host country are important determinants of international takeover 
completion, while the acquirer’s financial leverage is an unstable influence factor on 
international takeover likelihood. Furthermore, comparing with vertical M&A, horizontal deals 
will be less likely to complete in the overseas market in consideration of the job cut and 
duplicated construction. This is also in line with transaction cost theory. Therefore, overall 
findings suggest that the cross border M&A are the efficiency-seeking activity rather than 
resource-seeking ones. 
There are some implications to the future study. First, in discussing the influence of target 
profitability on the likelihood of cross border M&A, it has not found a significant result. It is 
worthy of investigating further whether multinational corporation would like to acquire high 
profit firms or low profit ones. Second, future researchers could exploit the impacts of target’s 
liquidity and leverage on likelihood of completed overseas takeovers. Further study could check 
the consistency of results with other indicators in measuring size and profitability such as 
employee numbers and return of capital employed. Third, a firm’s intangible asset is sometimes 
indistinct. The intangible asset can be specified as technological ability, good will, brand value, 
marketing channel, etc. These specific aspects could have different impacts on takeover 
productivity. The future studies may investigate the takeover productivity by differentiating 
intangible asset from these aspects.  
The aforementioned motives in the literature provide rationales to support cross border M&A 
106 
 
activities. However, given the implications from the findings in this chapter, it is suggested that 
the managerial discretion from agency problem, the incautiousness of managements and high 
level of intangible assets in the target will impede the completion of international M&A. Since 
it is understood what factors motivate the cross border M&A, the next step of research will 
focus on investigating the performance of international M&A. The performance in terms of 
firm’s productivity and profitability are examined as internal returns and external returns 
respectively. The next chapter will continue the empirical work to examine the market 
efficiency effect of cross border M&A from the aspect of firm’s productivity.  
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Chapter Five: The Impact of Cross Border M&A on Firm-Level 
Productivity 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the determinants of cross border M&A completions were examined. It 
employed a probit M&A likelihood model to identify the motives for international takeovers. 
Several factors such as firm’s profitability, liquidity, intangible resources, firm size and 
economic growth in the host country were identified which can significantly influence the 
completion of cross border M&A. The previous chapter concludes that the international M&A 
completions are underpinned by the efficiency-seeking motive. This chapter continues the 
empirical work to investigate the impact of cross border M&A on firm performance in terms of 
both TFP and labour productivity. As an indicator of firm performance, this chapter examines 
the post-acquisition productivity level for both targets and acquirers and the influence factors 
to productivity at the firm level.  
Productivity gaps between foreign-owned firms and domestic firms have been widely observed 
and extensively investigated in the international industrial organisation (IO) literature, and 
ample empirical evidence on the effects of M&A on performance from the aspect of 
productivity has been documented (Conyon et al., 2002; Harris and Robinson, 2002; Girma, 
2005; Girma et al., 2006; Fukao et al., 2006; Salis, 2008). Cross border M&A implying an 
ownership change from domestic to foreign owners offers an appropriate framework to isolate 
effects of foreign ownership (Bellak, 2004). However, existing empirical evidence on the causal 
link between international M&A and firm’s productivity is inconclusive. While a number of 
studies have found positive effects of cross border M&A on firm’s productivity (Lichtenberg 
and Siegel, 1987, for the US; Conyon et al, 2002, for the UK; Arnold and Javorcik, 2005, for 
Indonesia; Bertrand and Zitouna, 2008, in the case of France), other research has found that 
target firms do not gain any benefit from foreign ownership (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; 
Harris and Robinson, 2002, for the UK; Barba-Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Girma and Gorg, 
2007). Therefore, this chapter will investigate the impact of cross border M&A on firm’s 
productivity as well as the factors determining this effect. Furthermore, existing empirical 
evidence on the effects of cross-border M&A is mostly limited to target firms, while little is 
known about the effects on the acquiring firms. This research will assess the impacts of M&A 
from aspects of both acquirers and targets. 
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Dunning’s (1988) internalisation theory stresses that firms tend to expand themselves into other 
markets in order to enlarge the sales and market shares. The success of this type of expansion 
depends on firm’s advantages such as technology, organisational assets, and brand names. Large 
empirical evidence shows that foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestic firms 
(Doms and Jensen, 1998 for the US; Driffield, 1997; Girma and Gorg, 2007; Griffith and 
Simpson, 2001 for the UK; De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2002, in the case of Belgium; 
Pfaffermayer and Bellak, 2002, in the case of Austria; Ruane and Ugur, 2004, for Ireland). 
Economists and policy makers incline to presume that large endowments of intangible assets 
make foreign-owned firms possess an advantage over domestic firms, because they can 
compensate for a lack of local information and experience. Nevertheless, domestic production 
activities of either acquirers or targets may be substituted by similar investments abroad 
(Stiebale, 2013). Such substitution will affect the productivity of acquirers and targets. Thus, 
this study will examine the performance on the transfer of intangible advantages from acquirers 
to targets through the market-seeking M&A. 
From another aspect, due to the complexity and diversity of new high-technology products and 
processes, firms cannot merely depend on their internal R&D to maintain competitiveness 
(Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). Some desired technological capabilities and knowledge are 
possessed by other firms which are even located in different industries and countries. Hence, it 
is increasingly important for firms to exploit external technological opportunities and 
knowledge sources so that they can complement the shortage of internal R&D efforts 
(Veugelers, 1997; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Hargadon, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003; 
Nicholls-Nixon and Woo, 2003; Lane and Probert, 2007; Parmigiani, 2007). Besides, it is 
argued that obtaining the complementary assets and technology is one of objectives of cross 
border M&A (Norback and Persson, 2008). Therefore, M&A are increasingly regarded as a 
strategic instrument for obtaining the external intangible resource, e.g. technological knowledge 
(Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). With these external sources, incumbent firms could 
compensate for their technological productivity or expiring patents (Danzon et al., 2004; 
Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). From the home countries’ view, cross-border M&A enables the 
transfer of knowledge from abroad which may reinforce domestic technological capabilities. 
However, from the host countries’ view, domestic firms in knowledge-intensive industries may 
be protected from foreign acquisitions by policy makers (Stiebale, 2013). Thus, it is questioned 
for acquirers to effectively exploit the desired intangible assets. This study will assess the 
performance on the acquisition of complementary resources from targets through the strategic 
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asset-seeking M&A. 
In order to achieve the above objectives, this research will divide cross border M&A deals into 
two subsamples, which are deals where acquirers have more intangible assets than targets and 
deals where acquirers have less intangible assets than targets. The two subsamples represent 
the market-seeking expansion and the strategic asset-seeking expansion respectively. 
The use of the rumoured M&A as a control group can address the sample selection issue when 
considering pre-acquisition performance in the M&A. Some foreign firms will perform better 
than domestic firms in the takeovers due to their possession of some firm-specific advantages. 
As a potential takeover which has firms without ownership change, the abandoned M&A 
rumour will be used to construct a control group for assessing the post-M&A performance. This 
research will adopt the approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to generate the TFP for the 
firm’s productivity measure. It also exploits the potential channel function of M&A in shaping 
the post-acquisition productivity level. The labour productivity will be employed as the 
alternative firm’s productivity measure for the robustness check. 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 reviews previous theoretical literature and 
empirical evidence. Section 5.3 provides a description of the data and empirical model. Results 
of the empirical analysis and discussion are presented in section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Theoretical Background 
5.2.1 Cross Border M&A and Firm’s productivity 
The performance gap identified by foreign M&A (rather than foreign ownership in general) has 
received much attention. It is necessary to assess the effect of pre- and post-foreign M&A on 
firm performance. According to Harris (2009), it is suggested by studies that the international 
M&A are found to be affected by the pre-acquisition performance of firms, such as productivity, 
return on assets/shares, managerial performance, and growth potential, as well as industry-
specific characteristics. With respect to the pre-M&A productivity of the domestic target, 
foreign acquirers could select two alternative types of targets which are unproductive firms and 
productive firms. Furthermore, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) indicate that foreign targets are 
acquired by either the higher or the lower productive firms. Besides the association between 
pre- and post-acquisition performance by firms, either management discipline hypothesis or 
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corporate efficiency hypothesis also shows that other factors may influence post-acquisition 
productivity. First, the disciplining effect of takeovers makes the acquired firm’s management 
improve their efficiency. Second, both the acquired and acquiring firms benefit from the 
synergy/restructuring effect by exploiting the firm-specific assets and networks of new parents 
or subsidiary firms, thus achieve additional efficiency gains (Bellak and Pfaffermayr, 2002). 
According to Caves (1989), one explanation of maximising M&A’s value is based on 
managerial efficiency. Hiring managers to ensure they gain maximum value from the firm’s 
resources is regarded as an agency problem for corporate shareholders. The market for 
corporate control allows sufficient voting shares being obtained to expel the suboptimal 
managers and restore the optimality of firms. With these good intentions to improve firm 
performance, it is found that the low productive firms are inclined to be acquired and achieve 
productivity gains over time (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). This proposition also echoes 
Dunning’s (1988) internalisation theory which states an inputs transfer following a takeover 
such as technology, organisational assets, and brand names would expect an increase in the 
volume and/or value of outputs. Therefore, the ownership advantage possessed by MNEs will 
improve target’s productive efficiency in takeovers. Hypothesis 1 is deduced as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the ownership advantages that an MNE possesses, the higher the 
productivity effect on the target firm after the cross border M&A is completed. 
In above cases, there could be a selection bias when assessing the post-acquisition impact of 
foreign M&A, if one simply compares the time-profile of acquired and non-acquired firms. The 
selection bias occurred refers that the improvement of firm’s productivity may be explained not 
only by the impact of cross border M&A but also by the initial high productivity level of firm 
per se. In other words, if the multinational firm has a high productivity level prior to the 
takeovers, its high productivity may continue rather than be influenced by takeovers. This 
research will use the rumoured but uncompleted M&A to control the selectivity bias. 
When foreign firms acquire those targets with a low productivity, foreign acquirers intend to 
replace the poor management through overtaking inefficient managers who desire to maximise 
their own achievements rather than company profits. Then, surviving firms are expected to 
achieve a higher post-acquisition performance (Jensen, 1988). In contrast, other disparate 
literature such as the corporate efficiency hypothesis suggests that cross border deals are usually 
accompanied by a higher risk of failure (Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006; Harris and Ravenscraft, 
111 
 
1991). The reason for increased risk of failure in cross border M&A predominantly results from 
the information asymmetries between acquirers and targets. The large cultural distance and 
institutional differences bring firms with the information asymmetries which leads to high 
transaction costs (di Giovanni, 2002). Furthermore, the geographical distance makes it difficult 
to monitor (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) and transmit tacit knowledge (Blanc and Sierra, 1999).  
From other aspects, the asymmetry due to lack of political influence and knowledge networks 
will increase the difficulty in organisational integration and may mislead the takeover decisions 
(Harris, 2009). Therefore, caused by these factors, including the resource shortage due to the 
difficulty of coordination over distance, a higher return might be expected by acquirers in cross 
border M&A in order to compensate for the high costs and risk during these transactions. In 
general, because of information asymmetry, Grimpe and Hussinger (2008a) find that the cross 
border M&A are on average much larger than domestic deals. Moreover, foreign operations are 
suggested to experience higher costs compared with domestic firms from the transaction cost 
literature. These may bring a negative relationship between cross border M&A and firm’s 
productivity in spite of the good intention to improve firm performance. Thus, hypothesis 2 is 
generated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the transaction costs due to information asymmetry, the lower the 
productivity effect on both targets and acquirers after the cross border M&A is completed. 
5.2.2 Productivity in Market Seeking M&A  
Built into the IO literature, the operational efficiency theory asserts that highly productive firms 
will be inclined to change ownership leading to improved post-acquisition productivity (Elango 
and Sambharya, 2004). Drawing on this theory, Buckley and Casson (1998) argue that the 
foreign acquirer can achieve monopoly power through overtaking the domestic monopolist in 
order to reduce capacity and avoid a price war between the acquired target and itself. 
Although it is suggested that some multinational firms show higher productivity than domestic-
owned firms (Conyon et al., 2002; Girma et al., 2001), it does not mean that foreign ownership 
per se leads to higher productivity. Harris and Robinson (2002) argue that, to the extent that 
foreign investors acquire the best performing firms, the productivity advantage might not be 
associated with foreign ownership per se. They provide empirical evidence showing that 
foreign investors tend to acquire firms with higher productivity in comparison with other 
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manufacturing firms in the UK. Schiffbauer, et al. (2009) explains that foreign multinationals 
may also influence the market structure and the extent of competition in the host country. The 
industrial organization (IO) literature casts further complex lights on the impacts of M&A on 
firm’s productivity in the longer-run. On the one hand, the concentration of market power leads 
to a decline in competition (Borjas and Ramey, 1995). Less competition pressure provides firms 
with less incentive to improve their productivity, which potentially lowers the long-run 
productivity growth in that industry. On the other hand, the application of technological or 
organisational knowledge, economies of scale, or the remediation of managerial slack leads to 
long-run productivity gains. In the short-run, however, it is expected that the high short-run 
costs of reorganisation results in a negative impact of takeovers on firm’s productivity. This 
impact of reorganisation is expected to be larger after cross-border deals because of higher 
adaptation costs. Similarly, long-run productivity changes after foreign M&A are potentially 
more pronounced due to the larger scope for knowledge spill-over and adverse competition. 
(Schiffbauer et al., 2009) 
Since the modern internalisation and transaction cost theory (Dunning, 1980; Casson, 1995) is 
presented, Caves (1996) further indicates that the premier among proprietary assets of 
multinational enterprises is the firm-specific knowledge embodied in new products, processes 
and proprietary technology. Caves implies that the industries with high R&D and advertising 
intensities are the places where multinationals usually gather. The investing multinationals are 
usually argued to provide the domestic firms with their advantageous intangible assets such as 
innovativeness, technological and managerial knowledge, brand name capital and 
organisational capabilities (Dunning and Cantwell, 1991; Mason et al., 2009; Kirca et al., 2011). 
However, it is problematic to mobilise the technological knowledge and brand name 
recognition/reputation across markets. Especially, licensing brand name will share an intangible 
asset (reputation) at the risk of horizontal externalities. Similarly, some multinationals own 
competitive advantage such as superior organisational routines and practices which are uneasily 
mobilised between markets due to their intangibility (Bassett, 1986). Thus, it is assumed that 
the productivity improvement of acquired firms may not be reflected immediately after 
takeovers. This may suggest a low post-M&A productivity level for both acquirer and target 
firms. 
It is difficult to achieve the efficiency gains from results based on management interest 
hypothesis. Because some M&A are involved with public corporations in which the owners are 
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typically separated from the management, the ineffective corporate governance mechanism in 
the acquiring firms may lead the M&A to a result of failure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Budzinski and Kretschmer (2009) emphasise that productivity improvement might not be 
achieved after M&A if this investment comes from managers’ utility maximisation. Such utility 
may include intention for expansion and enlarged control for more employees. Similarly, Jensen 
(1986b) hypotheses that managers prefer reinvesting free cash to distributing it to investors. 
Hence, even with a good will to improve efficiency, managers might find difficult to achieve it 
if they cannot realise expected synergies in the post-acquisition integration process. 
Alternatively, if managers just abuse their discretion to initiate takeovers, such M&A are less 
likely to improve the productivity. Accordingly, there is a negative productivity effect after 
M&A based on above arguments. Hypothesis 3 is developed as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the difficulty in transfer of intangible advantages in cross border 
M&A, the lower the post-acquisition productivity level for both targets and acquirers in cases 
of market-seeking motives.  
5.2.3 Productivity in Strategic Asset-Seeking M&A  
In addition to the traditionally known arguments, other concepts also are developed from a 
resource based view in recent research, for instance the complementarities in assets between 
the acquirer and target (Norback and Persson, 2008). The resource based approaches assume 
that firms own heterogeneous factors which comprise the intangible resources, and these 
strategic resources possess the feature of immobility. The strategic composition of idiosyncratic 
resources such as knowledge, competences and capabilities eventually determines the 
competitiveness of a firm (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Grant, 1996). A competitive advantage 
is generated from the immobile, non-substitutable and imperfectly imitable strategic resources 
(Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf, 1993; Teece et al., 1997). 
In fact, the differences in performance across firms from the same industry can be interpreted 
by these different resources (Teece et al., 1997). Moreover, Barney (1991) implies that the 
competitive advantages would be strengthened through obtaining the underlying resource. 
Accordingly, these features of strategic resources allow M&A to be a premier strategy in 
outsourcing. M&A can maintain the whole batch of knowledge, competences and capabilities 
under integrated management (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Thus, the heterogeneous resource 
endowment and the superiority of certain resource bundles make a firm perform differently 
from other firms within the same industry, and they explain the intra-industrial M&A activity 
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and their success. The heterogeneity of resource endowment between acquirers and targets can 
be reallocated and adjusted via takeovers, which should explain the difference in post-M&A 
productivity level.  
The productivity of investing firms can be influenced by cross border M&A via a variety of 
channels, for instance the innovation activities. First, acquisitions may directly relocate 
innovation activities in order to improve productivity. Second, acquisitions may indirectly 
change productivity through affecting other determinants of productivity such as a firm size, 
market share, competition, technological opportunities, external knowledge sources, market 
demand, and financial factors (Cohen and Levine, 1989; Hall and Mairesse, 2006). As the 
competition in technology mainly occurs in the international market, the technological 
relatedness between acquirer and target is important in the cross border M&A (Frey and 
Hussinger, 2006). Furthermore, it is suggested that technology shocks drive the assets to be 
reallocated to more productive firms via M&A in recent theoretical and empirical contributions 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2008). Acquiring the main competitors is an attractive way to 
eliminate competition in the product markets (Kamien and Zang, 1990) or technology markets 
(Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008b). However, the elimination of the competition in technology 
markets due to takeovers may provide less incentive for firms to increase innovation activities 
which lead to a potential decrease in productivity after takeovers (Borjas and Ramey, 1995).  
A recent attempt to link intangible assets to productivity improvement has been conducted by 
Riley and Robinson (2011) and Dal Borgo et al. (2012). Their findings significantly evidence 
that firms with a higher proportion of intangible assets are more likely to be highly productive. 
Acquirers can exploit the production capabilities or intangible assets by acquiring target firms 
with these resources (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2008). The dissemination of knowledge within 
the combined entity (Roller et al., 2001) or reallocation of technology to more efficient uses 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2008) will generate productivity gains after an acquisition. The 
synergetic effect stemming from M&A might increase the efficiency of innovation activities 
which might improve productivity of firms. However, intangible assets include a wide range of 
contents and are more difficult to measure than R&D expenditure or innovation capabilities of 
firms. The various elements of intangible assets are also found to contribute to productivity in 
different ways (Riley and Robinson, 2011). Additionally, the firms may not gain productivity 
improvement after takeovers if the intangible resources such as knowledge, technology, and 
managerial capability are not exploited effectively (Stiebale, 2013). For example, due to the 
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intangibility of tacit knowledge, it is difficult to transmit such knowledge as managerial skills 
or manufacturing technique from target firms (Blanc and Sierra, 1999). Accordingly, it is 
inconclusive in evaluating the impacts of intangible assets on firm’s productivity, especially 
when such M&A are driven by a strategic assets seeking motive. Thus, based on above 
arguments, hypothesis 4 is listed as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: The lower the incentive for innovation and potential effective exploitation on 
intangible assets in cross border M&A, the lower the post-acquisition productivity level for both 
targets and acquirers in cases of strategic asset seeking motives. 
5.2.4 Empirical Evidence about Productivity 
5.2.4.1 The Contradictory Previous Evidence for International M&A 
There are still mixed results about the effects of acquisitions on firm’s productivity in foreign 
takeovers so far. It is suggested that foreign acquisition can bring positive productivity under 
the impact of various firm- and/or industry-level factors such as pre-acquisition productivity 
level (Girma, 2005), size (Bellak et al., 2006), nationality of ownership (Bellak et al., 2006), 
and domestic competition (Girma et al., 2006). Particularly, Girma et al. (2007) point out the 
positive productivity effects being associated with pre-acquisition level of productivity by using 
the UK manufacturing firms. Nevertheless, Girma (2005) suggests that the impact of 
technology transfer will be mostly centralised in the years immediately after the international 
takeover. Hence, the impact of M&A on firm’s productivity will be diminishing over time in 
the long term.  
Additionally, Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2002) imply that firm size will play a role in productivity 
gains, i.e. the smaller firms usually gain significant productivity improvement. They also 
differentiate the productivity pattern between firms taken over by European and the US 
investors. Hughes and Saleheen (2012) estimate average annual productivity growth of 4.3 per 
cent in the manufacturing sector and 2.3 per cent for the pre-crisis period of 1998-2004, whereas 
the productivity growth of 2.9 per cent and 0.4 per cent are reported for the 2009-2011 period 
for the manufacturing and service sector, respectively. Additionally, Girma et al. (2006) insist 
that the competition of the industry will enhance the potential productivity benefits in the cross 
border M&A by using data of the UK firms acquired by the US and European MNEs. Further, 
Girma et al. (2007) found the positive impact of foreign acquisition on the productivity level of 
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domestic exporters over time due to technology transfer.  
However, although positive productivity effects of M&A on the combined entity are reported 
in several empirical studies (e.g. Conyon et al., 2002; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001), this does 
not mean the acquiring firm can achieve productivity gains for certain, especially in diversifying 
acquisitions (Schoar, 2002). In a more disparate literature, it is also found that foreign takeover 
generates limited productivity gains in the acquired firms (e.g. Salis, 2008, for the Slovenian 
manufacturing sector; and Bellak et al., 2006, for a sample of Austrian firms). Meanwhile, 
foreign ownership is also found to have negative effects on the post-acquisition productivity of 
the acquired firm in various other studies. For instance, Harris and Robinson (2002) concluded 
that there was an overall slight decline in the productivity level following the takeover by using 
plant level data in the UK manufacturing sector for the period 1987-1992. Similarly, in Gioia 
and Thomsen’s (2002) study of Danish firms from 1990 to 1997, it is manifested that the 
performance of acquired firms had a negative intention following the international takeovers 
based on the estimates after selection adjustment. However, existing empirical studies that 
analyse the impact of cross-border acquisitions on the productivity at the firm level are mostly 
limited to the evidence on the impact on target firms. 
5.2.4.2 The Evidence about Productivity with Controlling the Selection Bias 
The early studies tended to ignore any sample selection issues surrounding the link between the 
pre-M&A characteristics of the firm that impact on post-M&A performance. Recent research 
has exploited the use of sample selection techniques to overcome this bias. For example, using 
data from the Swedish manufacturing sector for 1986–2002, Karpaty (2007) utilises a more 
sophisticated econometric approach to investigate such productivity gains. Built on the 
propensity score matching technique with a difference in-difference estimator, his results 
indicate that the productivity of the acquired Swedish firms raise by between 3 and 11 per cent 
after foreign acquisitions depending on the estimator chosen. Yet, such productivity change 
does not take place immediately but rather one to five years post acquisition.  
Furthermore, Fukao et al. (2005) identify a larger and quicker improvement in TFP using data 
from Japanese manufacturing firms (1994–2000). In a later study, Fukao et al. (2006) adopted 
the difference-in-difference approach in conjunction with propensity score matching to take 
account of the selection problem that had not been controlled for in the previous study. Results 
from both unmatched samples and matched samples implied that foreign acquisitions improve 
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the target firms’ productivity more significantly than domestic acquisitions. Neary (2007) 
argues that cross-border M&A reallocate production from less efficient acquisition targets to 
more efficient foreign investors. If efficiency differences between firms across countries are the 
main motives of international takeovers, the economic activity in acquiring firms would be 
expected to increase more than target firms. Similarly, Breinlich (2008) argue that the higher 
productive firms acquire the lower productive targets which experience the increased 
competition in the home market after trade liberalisation.  
5.2.5 TFP and Labour Productivity 
By comparing TFP with labour productivity, Schiffbauer et al. (2009) indicate that the use of 
labour productivity instead of TFP to measure the influence of M&A on the productivity of the 
UK target firms is misleading. Specifically, TFP reflects firm efficiency gains due to the 
diffusion of technological or organisational knowledge and economies of scale, with less focus 
on the transmission channels. Labour productivity, in contrast, is a broader measure that 
captures these TFP effects as well as changes in the firm's capital-labour ratio. The increase in 
labour productivity due to foreign ownership can result from an increase in the capital-labour 
ratio, i.e. capital deepening, instead of the theoretically suggested TFP effects, i.e. technological 
or organisational knowledge diffusion. Thus, in their research, foreign firms substantially 
restructure target firms in the UK by reducing the number of employees relative to capital stocks. 
This finding explains the difference between the results based on TFP and labour productivity. 
Therefore, Schiffbauer et al. (2009) concludes that TFP is the more appropriate measure to 
identify the causal impact of foreign acquisitions on firm performance. 
When considering the use of different measures for productivity, most research reports that 
foreign M&A exert a positive and significant impact on the acquired firm’s labour productivity 
(McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001, for the US; Conyon et al., 2002, for the UK; Piscitello and 
Rabbiosi, 2005, for Italy; Moden, 1998, for Sweden; Arnold and Javorcik, 2005, for Indonesia). 
However, labour productivity is determined by factor inputs and the determinants of TFP. 
Actually, it is the mixed influence of changes in factor inputs and TFP. This makes labour 
productivity a less useful measure of productivity (Harris, 2005). However, when using TFP as 
productivity measure, Harris and Robinson (2002) do not find aggregate TFP improvement due 
to foreign M&A in the UK. Their findings conflict with the findings of Conyon et al. (2002) 
who employs labour productivity. Therefore, it is worth detecting whether the impact of foreign 
M&A depends on the measure of firm’s productivity.  
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5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Data  
This research is based on firm-level data globally over the period from 2002 until 2011. It 
employs M&A data from the Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database which has information on 
over 19,685 cross border M&A all over the world between 2002 until 2011. This information 
is combined with the data from the Orbis database which provides detailed balance sheet data 
for all target and acquirer firms. The Orbis database also allows the construction of longitudinal 
panels as it collects firm-level information over a period of ten years. Also, many firms are 
observed for a shorter period of time, making the panel unbalanced. Regarding productivity 
analysis, Orbis offers the opportunity to measure TFP due to the availability of total fixed assets 
which is commonly used to proxy capital in the production function. The combination of both 
datasets allows the author to investigate the effects of cross border M&A on the short-run 
performance of target and acquirer firms respectively in different industries. 
This research divides the sample collected into two subsamples based on the difference of 
intangible assets volume prior to cross border M&A between acquirer and targets. The two 
subsamples comprise the deals that acquirers own more intangible assets than targets and the 
deals that acquirers own less intangible assets than targets. The purpose of this separation is to 
examine the effects of market seeking M&A and strategic asset seeking M&A respectively. 
The deals with high intangible assets of acquirers are categorised to the market seeking M&A, 
while the deals with low intangible assets of acquirers are categorised to the strategic asset 
seeking M&A. Table 5.1 lists the distribution of cross border M&A status in the deals with 
product market driven expansion and complementary resource driven expansion. In this dataset, 
there are 18,091 international deals in the former type expansions, which account for 91.9 per 
cent of all types of expansion. Furthermore, most cross border M&A are rumoured and 
completed, which accounts for 90.38 per cent of all international deals. More specifically, in 
the product market driven expansion, 16,401 international deals are rumoured and completed 
during 2002 to 2011, while 1,690 deals are rumoured and abandoned later. Although the number 
of complementary resource driven expansion is relatively smaller, 87.2 per cent in 1,594 
international deals are completed.  
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Table 5.1  The distributions of cross border M&A status and pre-M&A acquirer feature 
Pre-M&A acquirer Uncompleted M&A Completed M&A Total 
High intangible asset 
1,690 (9.34%) 16,401 (90.66%) 18,091 (100%) 
(89.23%)   (92.19%)   (91.90%)   
Low intangible asset 
204 (12.80%) 1,390 (87.20%) 1,594 (100%) 
(10.77%)   (7.81%)   (8.10%)   
Total 
1,894 (9.62%) 17,791 (90.38%) 19,685 (100%) 
(100%)   (100%)   (100%)   
Source: Author’s calculations from Orbis and Zephyr data set. 
5.3.2 Measuring Productivity 
The main productivity measure is TFP, since changes in TFP directly reflect the efficiency 
gains following acquisitions due to the diffusion of technological or organisational knowledge 
and economies of scale. The author initially derives TFP of firm j at time t as a residual from a 
Cobb-Douglas production function in logs: 
yjt = αkKjt + αlLjt + ηj + μt + εjt                                     (5.1) 
where yjt denotes a firm’s value added, Kjt and Ljt denote the physical capital and labour inputs, 
ηj is a vector of firm specific effects, μt is a vector of year specific effects, α = (αk; αl) a vector 
of average input elasticity, and εjt is an error term. 
From the above estimation, empirical measures of the average input elasticity αk and αl from 
firm level data. The heterogeneous marginal input effects are estimated across two-digit (NACE) 
industry levels separately. However, this estimation involves an endogeneity problem, i.e. 
firm’s demand for factor inputs is expected to depend on its productivity level simultaneously 
which is captured in the error term. That means that the independent variables are correlated 
with the error term. It is not observed by the econometrician, and it can impact the choices of 
inputs, resulting in the well-known simultaneity problem in production function estimation. 
Estimation ignoring the correlation between inputs and the unobservable factor will lead to 
inconsistent results. Appropriate instruments for this input that are uncorrelated with 
productivity are typically not available.  
Nevertheless, Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment as a proxy for the unobservable shocks. 
They develop a semi-parametric estimator to extract consistent estimates of the input elasticity 
in production function estimations. The method supposes that a firm’s investment decision is a 
function of its capital stock, age, and its unobserved productivity. Hence, the unobserved 
120 
 
productivity parameter can be modelled as some (inverse) function of investments, capital, and 
age given the assumption of a monotonic relationship between investment and productivity. 
However, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) indicate that the investment could be very lumpy due to 
substantial adjustment costs based on the evidence from firm-level datasets. This causes the 
investment proxy to maybe not smoothly respond to the productivity shock and may violate the 
consistency condition. Moreover, it is shown that the valid condition of investment proxy is the 
existence of the non-zero investment for firms. This will severely truncate all the zero 
investment firms in the sample of some countries’ data.  
Furthermore, based on the procedure of Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP), Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) (LP) advance the approach by addressing the lumpy investment problem with using an 
alternative variable, namely intermediate input (e.g. raw materials or electricity). These inputs 
are not used to generate value added by adjusting them from the gross output number, so this 
eliminates the additional cost in data or computation. If the intermediate input is less costly for 
adjustment, it may respond more fully to the entire productivity shock than investment. Besides, 
the intermediate input can avoid truncation in the sample because firms almost always report 
positive use of intermediate input such as raw materials or electricity. This alternative proxy 
makes the researchers easy to implement estimation and exploiting of more existing data. More 
importantly, the advantage of the LP approach also lies in controlling for the simultaneity 
between firm’s choice of input levels and unobserved productivity shocks. Therefore, this 
research follows approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to construct TFP.  
With adopting the LP approach, The Cobb-Douglas production function has been reformed as 
follows: 
yit = β0 + βllit + βkkit + ωit + εit ≡ βllit + φt (kit, mit) + εit                  (5.2) 
where φt ≡ φt (kit, mit) = β0 + βkkit + ωit (kit, mit) is an unknown function of capital and 
intermediate inputs. φt is a strictly increase in the productivity shock ωt, so that it can be inverted 
and one can write ωit = ωt (kit, mit) for some function ωt. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
approximate φt (kit, mit) by a third order polynomial in k and m, ∑ ∑ δjskit
j
mit
s3
s
3
j=0  and obtain 
the estimate of βl and φt via OLS. Follow the first stage of the estimation procedure above, the 
second stage defines the elasticity of capital βl as the solution tomin
βk
∗
∑ ∑ (yit − β̂llit − βk
∗ kit −ti
ω̅it)
2
, where ω̅it is a nonparametric approximation E [ωit | ωit-1]. All of the estimators in the 
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two stages make it vary to calculate the covariance matrix of the parameters, so the 
bootstrapping procedure is applied to estimate standard errors. Once obtaining consistent 
estimates, the log of productivity can be expressed as ω̂it = ŷit - β0 - β̂llit - β̂kkit. 
The computation of TFP requires information on output, physical capital, labour, and the 
corresponding inputs’ elasticity. The author measures output as firm’s economic value added. 
Capital and labour are measured as total assets and the number of employees, respectively. The 
author also includes intermediate inputs, measured by the material cost, which is included as an 
instrument to control the unobservable technology shock in the estimation procedure of 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The quality of the results depends crucially on the construction 
of a detailed and unbiased productivity measure. Thus, this research also uses the labour 
productivity to check for the robustness of the main results. 
5.3.3 Method and Variables 
As mentioned in the literature review section of this chapter, although there are some benefits 
for using propensity score matching approach to overcome the sample selection bias, this 
research will not use this technique. The author has a more direct way to simulate the 
counterfactual cases which is mainly concerned by a matching approach. This direct way is the 
control group of the rumoured but abandoned M&A which will represent those deals that have 
some potential to occur but actually are not conducted. The detailed advantages of this use have 
been discussed in the previous chapter.  
This research will examine respectively the effects of cross border M&A on target firm’s 
productivity and acquirer firm’s productivity. The firm-level information for both sides will be 
employed in the baseline estimation model respectively. The baseline model in this research 
takes the following form: 
TFPit+1 = β0 + β1Completed_MAit + β2Xit-1 +β3MAtypeit + vt + vj + εi        (5.3) 
where TFP it+1 is the value in one year after the M&A deal completed or rumoured. Sometimes, 
the firm’s financial information is incomplete during the year of M&A announcement or 
completion because an M&A event may occur in the middle of the firm’s financial year. This 
ensures that the firm’s financial information is complete for a whole financial year. Particularly, 
in terms of the rumoured but uncompleted deals, the TFPit+1 refers to the productivity level of 
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potential target or acquirer whoever was involved in the uncompleted international M&A.  
The Completed_MAit is a binary variable, capturing the cross border M&A’s status, which 
takes value 1 if the M&A’s status of testing firm is rumoured and completed, and takes value 0 
if its M&A’s status is rumoured but uncompleted. Testing if this dummy is statistically 
significant in affecting TFP level will show us evidence for the role of completion of M&A 
deals, controlling for other factors and firm unobserved heterogeneity. The main interest of this 
research is whether a firm’s productivity is influenced after the completion of an M&A deal 
compared with the abandoned potential deal which is the deal only experiencing the takeover 
rumour. The vector Xit-1 captures a set of control variables that have been found in the literature 
to be important in explaining firm’s productivity level in general. According to Bellak et al. 
(2006), the pre-acquisition characteristics could affect performance in the future, so pre-
performance is linked to explanations of possible productivity gains after an M&A activity. 
These variables include following firm characteristics observed in the pre-acquisition period: 
firm size, the intangible resource, and characteristic variables to capture financial leverage and 
liquidity. 
Firm size is measured by firm’s total fixed assets. In the empirical literature, intangible assets 
are often used as an input indicator of innovation and as an alternative to R&D spending or 
innovation success (Riley and Robinson, 2011; Dal Borgo et al., 2012). It includes goodwill, 
intellectual property rights, patents, trademarks, R&D investment, website domain names and 
typically long-term investment which may relate to a firm’s innovative efforts. The intangible 
asset’s advantage of being a variable is presented to be continuous and derived from 
administrative data sources rather than from surveys (Bartoloni, 2010), but the exact 
composition of this variable is unknown because of the discretion of what firms decide to report 
as intangible assets. 
The financial leverage and liquidity are measured by the firm’s gearing ratio and cash flow 
respectively. The gain in productivity may benefit from aggressive use of leverage, which can 
use tax-deductible debt to evade the tax payment. The managers’ under exploitation of their 
borrowing ability gives firms more chance to be overtaken. Furthermore, holding large cash 
flow is expected to impact a firm negatively in the finance literature. Especially, the separation 
of enterprise operation and ownership make interests and incentives of managers and 
shareholders conflict over the optimal size of the firm and the payment of dividends to 
shareholders. Holding large cash flow is accepted that managers are less competent to exploit 
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profitable investment opportunities and at the same time not distributing these to shareholders 
(Jensen, 1987). It is also argued that managers hold large amounts of cash to buffer the 
emergency situation in the current uncertain economic climate. 
It is suggested that firm characteristics affect its productivity. However, some firm 
characteristics can also accumulate from the preceding period due to the effect of firm’s 
productivity such as technological advantage or cash holdings, etc. In other words, the firm 
characteristics are also influenced by its productivity. Similarly, there is simultaneity between 
M&A activities and firm’s productivity. These two variables affect each other as well. Hence, 
there is potential endogeneity in the estimation model. However, the predetermined variable is 
usually employed to diminish the potential endogenous problem. Therefore, the firm’s 
productivity level is led by one year for the dependent variable in the estimation model. 
Additionally, the baseline investigation uses pooled static models in which all explanatory 
variables, except for Completed_MA and MAtype, are lagged by one year to diminish the 
potential endogeneity and correct heteroskedastic standard errors by clustering at the individual 
firm level.  
Another control variable is MAtypeit. It stands for the type of M&A which includes vertical, 
horizontal and conglomerate M&A. Finally, the error term is made up of a time-specific 
component (vt), a two-digit industry-specific component (vj), and an idiosyncratic error term εi.  
This research also looks at the subsample of deals with acquirers having more intangible assets 
than targets and deals with targets having more intangible assets than acquirers. This separation 
will answer the effect of M&A event on firms’ productivity in the deals where an acquirer 
firm’s advantage in intangible resources e.g. advanced technology can compensate for its 
disadvantage in information asymmetry and in the deals where a target firm’s intangible 
resource is the main aim of M&A. This baseline model is equal to allow for intercept 
heterogeneity. The estimation corrects heteroskedastic standard errors first by clustering at the 
individual firm level in the baseline least squares estimation, and then by using labour 
productivity as a robustness check. The labour productivity is defined as total revenue per 
employee. The working assumption is that a good measure of TFP should exhibit a reasonable 
high correlation with labour productivity. 
Conditional on effects of M&A completions on the productivity level, the research further 
search for potential channels through which completion of M&A may shape post-acquisition 
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TFP. To this end, we modify equation 5.3 by allowing parameter heterogeneity in M&A 
completions:  
TFPit+1 = β0 + β1Completed_MAit + β2Xit-1+ β3Xit-1* Completed_MAit +β4MAtypeit + vt + vj + 
εi                      (5.4) 
By interacting Completed_MAit with firm characteristics, equation 5.4 examines the TFP 
effects due to completion of M&A indirectly through various firm characteristics differences. 
The similar estimation will be also conducted for labour productivity.  
In order to assess whether there is a difference in ownership advantage between MNEs and non-
MNEs, this research will also estimate the impact of firm MNE status on target’s post-M&A 
productivity level by modelling four groups of completed cross border M&A deals. They are 
four types of deals with MNE acquirer, non-MNE acquirer, MNE target and non-MNE target 
respectively. The specifications are constructed as follows: 
TFPit+1 = β0 + β1 T_mne + β2Xit-1 +β3MAtypeit + vt + vj + εi        (5.5) 
TFPit+1 = β0 + β1 A_mne + β2Xit-1 +β3MAtypeit + vt + vj + εi        (5.6) 
T_mne stands for the target’s MNE status dummy, while A_mne stands for the acquirer’s MNE 
status dummy. Value of 1 denotes MNE firm and value of 0 denotes non-MNE firm. Other 
variables keep the same. The four types of deals are constructed by dividing A_mne = 1 or 0 in 
the equation 5.5 and T_mne = 1 or 0 in the equation 5.6. 
5.4 Results and Discussion 
5.4.1 The Impact of MNE Status on Target’s Productivity 
The impact of MNE status on a target’s post-acquisition productivity is reported in table 5.2. 
All these models include the pre-M&A target’s characteristics such as cash flow, corporate 
financial leverage, intangible assets and firm size. Four models also include the target MNE 
status dummy and acquirer MNE status dummy respectively. The year and industry dummies 
are controlled in all the four models. 
In model (1), when the acquirer is an MNE in the international M&A, target’s MNE status 
shows a significant and positive sign. This means MNE target’s TFP level will be improved 
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when it is acquired by another MNE firm. The MNE status in model (2), (3) and (4) is not found 
significant. This means that only the cross border M&A between multinational corporations 
can bring target firms with the improvement of productive efficiency. It is not found the 
significant evidence for the transfer of ownership advantage from MNEs to non-MNEs in the 
international takeovers. It can be implied that the increase in productivity due to technological 
shock can only take place in the integration between MNEs.  
The significant and negative coefficients of the target’s gearing ratio in columns (1), (3) and (4) 
suggest that a high level of the target’s leverage will reduce its TFP level when it is acquired by 
an MNE and no matter whether it is an MNE. This can be explained that a high debt burden 
forces the firm to reduce its spending on technological innovation, which is not beneficial to 
the TFP improvement. In terms of the target’s cash flow, the significant and positive coefficients 
in columns (1), (2) and (4) imply that the large cash holdings of targets improve their TFP levels 
no matter whether they are acquired by MNEs or when they are non-MNEs per se. This could 
be explained that the large cash holdings enable targets to increase expenditure on R&D, which 
results in the TFP improvement. In addition, the target’s size measure reports a significant and 
positive sign for all columns in table 5.2. This suggests that large firms incline to have high TFP 
levels no matter whether they are MNEs. This echoes the results for MNE status. 
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Table 5.2  The impact of MNE status on target's post-M&A TFP  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 MNE acquirer Non-MNE acquirer MNE target Non-MNE target 
TTFPt+1 Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. 
T_mne 4.03E-01 9.99E-02 *** 2.77E-01 1.87E-01               
A_mne             1.52E-01 1.79E-01   1.14E-01 9.03E-02   
TGearingRatiot-1 -1.09E-03 2.72E-04 *** -6.25E-04 4.85E-04   -2.68E-03 6.54E-04 *** -7.86E-04 2.55E-04 *** 
TCashFlowt-1 5.37E-06 2.28E-06 ** 1.22E-05 4.11E-06 *** -9.41E-07 4.98E-06   6.48E-06 2.17E-06 *** 
TIntangibleAssett-1 1.30E-06 3.87E-06   2.63E-06 6.92E-06   1.01E-06 7.56E-06   1.41E-06 3.84E-06   
TTotalAssett-1 5.88E-08 1.43E-08 *** 7.13E-07 3.51E-07 ** 9.26E-08 1.85E-08 *** 1.58E-07 4.16E-08 *** 
MAtype   
Vertical_MA 9.41E-02 1.97E-01   4.53E-01 4.51E-01   -1.01E-01 4.46E-01   2.77E-01 1.98E-01   
Horizontal_MA -4.47E-02 8.96E-02   -2.54E-02 1.59E-01   1.08E-01 1.81E-01   2.59E-02 8.69E-02   
Constant term 5.85E+00 9.93E-01 *** 5.03E+00 1.49E+00 *** 6.64E+00 1.46E+00 *** 4.78E+00 1.37E+00 *** 
Adj R-squared 0.0959    0.1052    0.1423    0.059    
No. of obs. 1167     391     307     1251     
Note:    1. All regressions include year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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5.4.2 Effects of Cross Border M&A on Target’s TFP 
The sample information for the model of M&A’s impact on target’s post-acquisition TFP is 
summarised in the below table. From this table, all variables show positive mean value in the 
sample of 2,110 cross border M&A, while the dependent variable of target’s post-acquisition 
TFP has negative values for some observations. This means that some targets have not achieved 
technological improvement. The wide spread exists in such variables as target’s cash flow, 
intangible assets and total assets. 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics for the impact of M&A on target’s TFP 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TTFPt+1 2110 5.34147 1.388856 -1.700142 8.797506 
Completed_MAt 2110 0.8611374 0.345885 0 1 
TGearingRatiot-1 2110 89.23298 149.0312 0 981.54 
TCashFlowt-1 2110 36431.39 17057.82 1 64793 
TIntangibleAssett-1 2110 11131.99 10287.72 12 31304 
TTotalAsset t-1 2110 1132148 8024461 27 2.02E+08 
MAtype 2110 1.764455 0.9506391 1 3 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
Table 5.4 reports the effect of cross border M&A on target’s productivity measured by TFP 
over the examined period, 2002-2011. One of the research tasks is to seek an understanding of 
possible TFP change channels through which a completion of an M&A may influence firm’s 
productivity. This is done by interacting the M&A completions dummy and key firm 
characteristics. Thus, two sets of static model estimation results are discussed below, which are 
a baseline model and a model with interaction terms. The samples are split into high amount of 
intangible resource in acquirer and high amount of that in target according to the difference of 
intangible assets between target and acquirer firms. These two subsamples can be regarded as 
the deal that an acquirer with high technology and managerial advantage acquires other targets 
and the deal that a target with complementary resource is acquired by other acquirers. The 
results of estimates for two samples are also reported in Table 5.4. The year and industry effects 
are controlled for both baseline model and interaction model. 
Across model specifications, the key variable Complete_M&A shows significant and negative 
coefficients in column (1) of table 5.4. This suggests that the completion of cross border M&A 
will reduce target’s TFP level comparing with the abandoned takeover rumours. Furthermore, 
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controlling for other factors, column (3) in table 5.4 shows a significant and negative 
relationship between the target’s TFP level and the completion of cross border M&A when the 
acquirer has more intangible assets than the target. This implies that acquirers fail to transfer 
their intangible advantages to targets and the completion of cross border M&A provides targets 
with a low TFP level in the deals with market seeking motive. Targets have not benefited from 
the acquirer’s intangible advantages in M&A. This finding is supported by Bertrand and Zuniga 
(2006) who argue that the high transaction costs due to information asymmetry will reduce the 
performance of technology transfer and exploitation on strategic resources in cross border 
M&A, leading to a low post-acquisition TFP level in the short term.  
In column (1) and (2) of table 5.4, there are significant and negative coefficients of gearing ratio 
for targets. This means that high operational risk will reduce the target’s TFP level in 
international M&A and this effect will be strengthened if the deal is completed. The detrimental 
impact on target’s productivity is confirmed in both subsamples of high (in column 3) and low 
(in column 5) acquirer’s intangible assets. The anxiety to high insolvency rate makes 
managements fail to apply the parent firm’s intangible advantage or is unable to allocate the 
target’s resource efficiently in the short term after cross border M&A. 
In column (1) of table 5.4, the significant and positive sign of target’s cash flow demonstrates 
that the high liquidity of a firm can improve their productivity in international takeovers. Being 
consistent with the previous findings (Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008, Du et al., 2014), more 
cash holding could also release restrictions on hiring more skilled labour and developing more 
innovation and hence boost higher productivity. Column (3) of table 5.4 suggests that sufficient 
funds will improve the target’s TFP if its acquirer has high intangible assets. This can be 
explained that target can only benefit from its acquirer’s technology or managerial advantages 
in cross border M&A.  
From column (1) and (2) of table 5.4, the coefficients of target’s intangible assets are significant 
and positive in cross border M&A. The finding suggests that the more intangible assets the 
target possesses, the more likely the target’s TFP level is to be improved. The result from 
column (3) of table 5.4 also confirms this effect if acquirers have high intangible assets. This 
implies that acquirer’s managerial skill may reallocate the target’s intangible resource more 
effectively to improve the target’s TFP level. This also mirrors that the imitation and 
exploitation of advances in technology can increase productivity in terms of TFP (Archibugi 
and Michie, 1995; Hart and McGuinness, 2003; Du et al. 2014). These results are consistent 
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with Sohal et al. (2001) who finds that service industries employ IT to enhance the value of 
products and services to a greater extent than manufacturing, which can then lead to a higher 
TFP level. However, the negative interaction term in column (4) of table 5.4 suggests that the 
completion of M&A may weaken the positive effect on target’s TFP level.  
From column (1) and (2) of table 5.4, the total assets measure the size of firm and provide 
significant and positive signs for targets in cross border M&A. This means that big 
multinational firms incline to improve their productivity levels. Besides, the completion of 
M&A will reinforce this effect. Columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) in table 5.4 all confirm this positive 
relationship. It suggests that both the technological advantage oriented deals and the 
complementary resources oriented deals can increase target’s productivity level in international 
M&A. These results are in line with the literature which finds positive size and productivity 
relationships (Rao and Tang, 2000; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; Leung et al. 2008; Du and Girma, 
2012 and Du et al. 2014). 
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Table 5.4  The impact of cross border M&A on target’s TFP 
  All international deals High intangible assets in acquirers Low intangible assets in acquirers 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Dep: TTFPt+1 Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. 
Completed_MAT -1.71E-01 9.11E-02 ** -1.33E-01 2.27E-01   -1.83E-01 1.05E-01 * -2.11E-01 2.60E-01   6.35E-02 2.03E-01   5.58E-01 5.87E-01   
TGearingRatiot-1 -6.99E-04 2.03E-04 *** 3.41E-04 5.64E-04   -7.83E-04 2.30E-04 *** 8.72E-05 6.70E-04   -1.18E-03 4.90E-04 ** -7.38E-04 1.58E-03   
TGearingRatio_MAt-1       -1.21E-03 6.03E-04 **       -9.98E-04 7.11E-04         -7.39E-04 1.66E-03   
TCashFlowt-1 4.92E-06 1.74E-06 *** 5.51E-07 5.05E-06   5.07E-06 1.97E-06 *** -2.02E-06 5.93E-06   2.74E-06 4.12E-06   7.65E-06 1.15E-05   
TCashFlow_MAt-1       4.59E-06 5.37E-06         7.53E-06 6.28E-06         -7.25E-06 1.24E-05   
TIntangibleAssett-1 7.91E-06 2.90E-06 *** 1.69E-05 7.72E-06 ** 6.27E-06 3.41E-06 * 2.32E-05 9.42E-06 ** 1.16E-05 8.29E-06   2.31E-05 2.05E-05   
TIntangibleAsset_MAt-1       -1.10E-05 8.33E-06         -1.99E-05 1.01E-05 **       -1.46E-05 2.23E-05   
TTotalAssett-1 2.90E-08 3.89E-09 *** 2.30E-08 4.18E-09 *** 3.29E-08 5.17E-09 *** 2.35E-08 5.95E-09 *** 2.77E-08 5.87E-09 *** 2.64E-08 5.90E-09 *** 
TTotalAsset_MAt-1       3.63E-08 1.10E-08 ***       3.19E-08 1.20E-08 ***       2.48E-07 7.55E-08 *** 
M&A type   
Vertical_MA 1.55E-01 1.64E-01   1.41E-01 1.63E-01   2.16E-01 1.82E-01   1.95E-01 1.82E-01   6.29E-02 3.99E-01   9.32E-02 3.95E-01   
Horizontal_MA -1.76E-02 6.73E-02   -2.49E-02 6.71E-02   -2.35E-02 7.58E-02   -2.51E-02 7.57E-02   5.06E-02 1.66E-01   6.01E-02 1.66E-01   
constant term 6.08E+00 8.34E-01 *** 6.06E+00 8.42E-01 *** 6.03E+00 8.63E-01 *** 6.04E+00 8.74E-01 *** 5.07E+00 1.49E+00 *** 4.42E+00 1.55E+00 *** 
Adj. R-squaredd 0.0906     0.0963     0.0985     0.1039     0.0886     0.109     
Number of obs. 2110     2110     1697     1697     413     413     
Note:    1. All regressions have controlled year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
        2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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This research uses the likelihood ratio test (LR test)6 to compare differences among nested 
models because the baseline model can be regarded to be nested within the interaction model. 
The LR chi-squared value between column (1) and (2) of table 5.4 is 17.36 (p-value is 0.0016) 
based on the same observation numbers of the two models. Similarly, the LR chi-squared value 
between column (3) and (4) of table 5.4 is 14.27 (p-value is 0.0065), and the LR chi-squared 
value between column (5) and (6) of table 5.4 is 14.40 (p-value is 0.0061). They suggest that 
the three baseline models are nested well in the three interaction models for the whole cross 
border M&A sample and two subsamples of high and low intangible assets in acquirers. This 
can also be confirmed by greater adjusted R-squared values of interaction models than those of 
baseline models for three samples. 
5.4.3 Effects of Cross Border M&A on Target’s Labour Productivity 
The sample information for the model of M&A’s impact on target’s post-acquisition labour 
productivity is summarised in the below table. From this table, all variables show positive mean 
value and positive values for all observations in the sample of 3,086 cross border M&A. 
Amongst, the wide spread exists in such variables as target’s cash flow, intangible assets and 
total assets. The dependent variable of target’s post-acquisition labour productivity also has a 
wide distribution on its observation values. 
Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics for the impact of M&A on target’s labour productivity 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TLPt+1 3086 3646.318 1986.661 1 7222 
Completed_MAt 3086 0.8684381 0.3380686 0 1 
TGearingRatiot-1 3086 98.85437 158.8537 0 992.41 
TCashFlowt-1 3086 34864.27 17951.72 1 64793 
TIntangibleAssett-1 3086 11078.96 10268.31 12 31306 
TTotalAsset t-1 3086 857967.4 6688640 51 2.02E+08 
MAtype 3086 1.745301 0.9454843 1 3 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
                                                             
6 The likelihood ratio test is performed by estimating two models and comparing the fit of one model to the fit of 
the other. Removing predictor variables from a model will almost make the model fit less well (i.e. a model will 
have a lower log likelihood), but it is necessary to test whether the observed difference in model fit is statistically 
significant. The null hypothesis for the test is that the smaller model is the "true" model. The likelihood ratio test 
does this by comparing the log likelihoods of the two models. The null hypothesis is false if this difference is 
statistically significant. Thus, the less restrictive model (the one with more variables) is said to fit the data 
significantly better than the more restrictive model.  
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By comparing TFP with labour productivity, Schiffbauer et al., (2009) indicates that TFP gains 
results from the diffusion of technological or organisational knowledge and economies of scale, 
while the increase in labour productivity results from capital deepening. Due to the controversy 
about different productivity measures in the literature, it is worthy of detection whether the 
impact of foreign M&A depends on the measure of the firm’s productivity. The alternative 
productivity measure, which is the target’s labour productivity, has been tested and reported in 
table 5.6. Table 5.6 reports the same formats as table 5.4, but it replaces the dependent variables 
with the target’s labour productivity. It also considers the effect of cross border M&A and uses 
the cross border M&A completions dummy to interact with key firm characteristics. Similarly, 
two sets of static model estimation results and two subsamples estimations are discussed below. 
The year and industry effects are also controlled for both baseline model and interaction model. 
Across the specifications in table 5.6, the coefficient on Completed_MA is negative for targets 
in the cross border M&A. This means that the completion of M&A results in lower productivity 
than for firms who abandoned rumoured takeover. Controlling for other factors, columns (4) 
and (5) in table 5.6 confirm the significant and negative relationship between the target’s labour 
productivity level and the completion of international M&A in the deals with both market 
seeking intention and strategic asset seeking intention. This implies that neither the acquirer’s 
technological and managerial advantages nor the reallocation of target intangible resources can 
bring targets with the high labour productivity level after completing international M&A in the 
short term. This can be explained that the acquirers with high technology and managerial 
capabilities fail to allocate and use well the target’s complementary resource.  
In terms of the effect of financial leverage on the labour productivity level, the gearing ratio 
and its interaction term report significant positive coefficients for the target firms in column (1) 
and (2) of table 5.6. It suggests that high liability rate can improve the target’s labour 
productivity and the completion of takeover can reinforce this positive effect. This finding is 
not consistent with the aforementioned impact of gearing ratio on the target’s TFP level. One 
reason could be that more capital stock is invested into the production due to wider outside 
fundraising channels in cross border M&A comparing with domestic investments. Some 
duplicated departments of targets could be shut down after takeovers’ completion, which 
reduces the number of employees in targets. Both effects prompt the ratio of capital over labour, 
hence increase the target’s labour productivity. More specifically, column (5) of table 5.6 
reports a positive coefficient for gearing ratio variable, and column (6) reports a positive 
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coefficient for its interaction term. This suggests that the higher the target’s financial leverage 
is, the higher the target’s labour productivity level is. In addition, the completion of M&A will 
facilitate targets to improve their labour efficiency in the strategic asset seeking takeovers. The 
aggressive use of debt provides targets with a tax shield to avoid the tax payment, which 
increases the capital from the inside of targets. Hence, the post-acquisition labour productivity 
level benefits from the combined effects from both the increased capital stock and sufficient 
intangible resources.  
In columns (2) and (4) of table 5.6, the interaction terms of target’s cash flow shows a significant 
and positive sign, which shows the reinforcement of high target’s liquidity on its labour 
productivity through the completion of international M&A. This effect can be explained by the 
capital deepening through overseas markets. Specifically, this effect of reinforcement remains 
the same when the targets are acquired by those multinational firms with advantages in 
technological or managerial capabilities. This suggests that the combined effect on the target’s 
labour productivity from the acquirer’s technological advantages and the target’s financial 
advantages will be reflected significantly. 
From column (4) of table 5.6, the coefficients of interaction term between the target’s total asset 
and completion of international M&A is a significant and negative sign, which means that the 
completion of international M&A will weaken the positive impact of the target’s size on its 
labour productivity in the technologically advantage-oriented deals.  
In contrast to no significant influence of international M&A type on firm’s TFP level, horizontal 
cross border M&A shows a significant and positive sign for target firms in table 5.6, which 
means that the target’s labour productivity in post-acquisition periods will be a high level in 
horizontal international M&A. This positive effect is confirmed in those deals where the 
acquirer expands its product market by relying on its technological or managerial advantages. 
This is because acquirers invest into the overseas markets in the same industry, and they will 
reallocate the resource of its target. Acquirers often cut the redundancy of departments or 
employees with same functions in target firms. This is supported by Harris (2009) who argues 
that when considering a substitution effect on domestic export activity, domestic production is 
more likely to be substituted at the intensive margin after horizontal M&A due to easy mobility 
of production across similar firms. Therefore, the ratio of capital over labour increases and the 
target’s labour productivity is improved. 
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Table 5.6  The impact of cross border M&A on target's labour productivity 
  All international deals High intangible assets in acquirers Low intangible assets in acquirers 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Dep: TLabourProt+1 Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. 
Completed_MAt -2.27E+02 1.13E+02 ** -6.77E+02 2.70E+02 ** -1.68E+02 1.28E+02   -6.47E+02 3.01E+02 ** -4.87E+02 2.62E+02 * -1.19E+03 7.65E+02   
TGearingRatiot-1 5.62E-01 2.30E-01 ** -6.40E-01 6.26E-01   3.91E-01 2.58E-01   -3.32E-01 7.08E-01   1.13E+00 5.65E-01 ** -1.96E+00 1.83E+00   
TGearingRatio_MAt-1       1.39E+00 6.72E-01 **       8.28E-01 7.57E-01         3.43E+00 1.92E+00 * 
TCashFlowt-1 2.39E-03 2.02E-03   -7.27E-03 5.65E-03   2.97E-03 2.25E-03   -7.41E-03 6.51E-03   1.51E-03 5.01E-03   -1.25E-02 1.34E-02   
TCashFlow_MAt-1       1.11E-02 6.05E-03 *       1.19E-02 6.93E-03 *       1.67E-02 1.48E-02   
TIntangibleAssett-1 2.78E-03 3.55E-03   5.73E-03 9.61E-03   4.70E-03 4.10E-03   2.87E-03 1.12E-02   -4.08E-03 1.07E-02   1.32E-03 2.80E-02   
TIntangibleAsset_MAt-1       -3.02E-03 1.03E-02         2.68E-03 1.20E-02         -6.95E-03 3.03E-02   
TTotalAssett-1 -2.96E-06 5.64E-06   7.17E-07 6.07E-06   2.06E-06 7.38E-06   1.04E-05 8.46E-06   -1.39E-05 9.17E-06   -1.29E-05 9.26E-06   
TTotalAsset_MAt-1       -2.40E-05 1.60E-05         -3.24E-05 1.73E-05 *       -2.21E-05 8.39E-05   
M&A type   
Vertical_MA -2.22E+01 2.03E+02   -2.44E+01 2.03E+02   1.88E+00 2.20E+02   5.54E+00 2.20E+02   -7.73E+01 5.40E+02   -1.14E+02 5.42E+02   
Horizontal_MA 1.81E+02 8.20E+01 ** 1.83E+02 8.19E+01 ** 2.19E+02 9.05E+01 ** 2.19E+02 9.04E+01 ** 1.02E+02 2.11E+02   8.24E+01 2.12E+02   
Constant term 3.76E+03 7.76E+02 *** 4.10E+03 7.97E+02 *** 4.04E+03 8.43E+02 *** 4.41E+03 8.68E+02 *** 1.86E+03 2.21E+03   2.62E+03 2.31E+03   
Adj R-squaredd 0.0154     0.0171     0.0152     0.0166     0.0398     0.041     
Number of obs 3086     3086     2500     2500     586     586     
Note:    1. All regressions have controlled year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
        2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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The LR chi-squared value between column (1) and (2) of table 5.6 is 9.67 (p-value is 0.0464) 
based on the same observation numbers of the two models. This suggests that the baseline 
model is nested well in the interaction model for the whole cross border M&A sample. However, 
the LR chi-squared value between column (3) and (4) of table 5.6 is 7.61 (p-value is 0.1071), 
and the LR chi-squared value between column (5) and (6) of table 5.6 is 5.49 (p-value is 0.2402). 
They imply that the baseline models are not nested well in the interaction models for the two 
subsamples of high and low intangible assets in acquirers, although their adjusted R-squared 
values of interaction models show more explanatory power than those of baseline models for 
the two subsamples. 
5.4.4 Effects of Cross Border M&A on Acquirer’s TFP 
The sample information for the model of M&A’s impact on acquirer’s post-acquisition TFP is 
summarised in the table below. From this table, all variables show positive mean values in the 
sample of 2,436 cross border M&A, while the variable of acquirer’s cash flow has negative 
values for specific observations. Amongst these, the wide spread exists in such variables as 
acquirer’s cash flow, intangible assets and total assets. 
Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics for the impact of M&A on acquirer’s TFP 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ATFPt+1 2436 9.753105 1.714787 1.530208 13.95589 
Completed_MAt 2436 0.910509 0.2855097 0 1 
AGearingRatiot-1 2436 85.86794 113.2086 0 989.3 
ACashFlowt-1 2436 423760.3 2135241 -5.43E+07 3.35E+07 
AIntangibleAssett-1 2436 28479.58 19972.61 228 63487 
ATotalAsset t-1 2436 5321627 2.36E+07 122 7.96E+08 
MAtype 2436 1.748358 0.9467861 1 3 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
Table 5.8 reports the effects of cross border M&A on acquirer’s productivity measured by TFP 
over the examined period, 2002-2011. In order to examine possible TFP change channels 
through which a completion of an M&A may influence firm’s productivity, this research 
interacts the M&A completions dummy with key firm characteristics. Thus, two sets of static 
model estimation results are discussed below, which are a baseline model and a model with 
interaction terms. By calculating the difference of intangible assets between target and acquirer 
firms, the samples are also split into two subsamples that capture the deal where an acquirer 
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with high technology and managerial advantage acquires other targets and the deal that a target 
with complementary resource is acquired by other acquirers. The results of estimates for two 
samples are also reported in Table 5.8. The year and industry effects are controlled for both 
baseline model and interaction model. 
Across model specifications, the key variable Complete_M&A shows significant and negative 
coefficients in column (1) and (2) of table 5.8. This suggests that the completion of cross border 
M&A will reduce the acquirer’s TFP level comparing with the abandoned takeover rumours. 
Furthermore, controlling for other factors, column (3) and (4) of table 5.8 confirm significant 
and negative relationship between their TFP level and the completion of cross border M&A for 
the deals with high acquirer’s intangible assets. This implies that acquirer cannot achieve the 
high TFP level after completing cross border M&A in the short term. This can be explained 
that the high technology and managerial skills of acquirers fail to exert their advantage in 
diversifying the international investment risk in overseas markets due to being unfamiliar with 
local information.  
In column (1) and (2) of table 5.8, the significant positive signs of acquirer’s cash flow 
demonstrate that the high liquidity of a firm can improve their productivity in international 
takeovers. This is consistent with the previous findings that less financial restrictions facilitate 
innovation development and hence boost higher productivity. Columns (3), (4) and (6) of table 
5.8 suggest that cash flow shows positive impact on its TFP no matter that acquirer has high or 
low intangible assets. This can be explained that more cash holding could boost higher 
acquirer’s productivity together with its intangible resources. Moreover, the financial advantage 
in liquidity can compensate for the disadvantage in lack of technological resource. Thus, 
acquirer can achieve TFP improvement from high liquidity. 
In terms of acquirer’s intangible assets in cross border M&A, column (1) and (2) of table 5.8 
show that the acquirer’s TFP improvement can benefit from its technology or managerial 
advantage and the completion of international M&A will reinforce this effect. Column (3) of 
table 5.8 also verifies this positive effect in the deals of product market oriented expansion. 
However, from column (6) of table 5.8, if an acquirer has no advantage in intangible resource, 
it will fail to reallocate target’s complementary resource well and damage acquirer’s 
productivity level itself. The completion of M&A will make that situation worse in the deals of 
complementary resource oriented expansion. This can be explained by Syverson (2011) and Du, 
et al. (2014) that the acquirer takes time to digest or establish intangible assets, especially when 
137 
 
it involves aspects such as research and development, brand development, good-will and other 
expenses with a long term effect. In general, the above findings are supported by the theoretical 
model of Nocke and Yeaple (2007). They suggests that the scope for productivity spill-over 
from the acquirer to the target firm is most pronounced if the acquirer operates in an technology-
intensive industry, while productivity spill-over might even be negative if it operates in a 
marketing-intensive industry. 
The total assets measure the size of a firm and provide significant positive signs for acquirers 
in cross border M&A. This means that big multinational firms are more likely to have high 
productivity levels. From columns (3) and (4) in table 5.8, firm size is positively related to 
acquirer’s TFP level in the deals with intangible advantages oriented expansions, and the 
completion of M&A will reinforce the positive effect of big multinational firm’s high 
technological and managerial advantage on acquirer’s TFP level. One reason might be that, 
those more efficient or productive multinational firms are able to overcome the entry barriers 
to enter foreign markets and to be competitive in the host markets (Melitz, 2003). By contrast, 
columns (5) and (6) in table 5.8 show that large size of a firm will help increase the acquirer’s 
TFP level in the expansions by seeking strategic assets, but the completion of M&A will impair 
this positive effect of large firm size in the takeovers where acquirers have a disadvantage in 
intangible assets. Therefore, although large multinational firms can penetrate into the host 
market to explore the strategic assets, their dependences on the strategic assets make the 
acquirers passive in their operations and the integration of intangible assets may be difficult, 
which leads to the decrease in acquirer’s post-acquisition TFP level.  
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Table 5.8  The impact of cross border M&A on acquirer’s TFP 
  All international deals High intangible assets in acquirers Low intangible assets in acquirers 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Dep: ATFPt+1 Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. 
Completed_MAt -2.04E-01 1.17E-01 * -4.99E-01 2.11E-01 ** -2.19E-01 1.26E-01 * -4.67E-01 2.43E-01 ** -1.64E-01 3.74E-01   -4.90E-01 6.66E-01   
AGearingRatiot-1 -2.18E-04 2.99E-04   -5.22E-05 1.14E-03   -1.86E-04 3.15E-04   4.68E-04 1.23E-03   -5.24E-05 1.06E-03   1.48E-03 4.42E-03   
AGearingRatio_MAt-1       -1.75E-04 1.17E-03         -6.77E-04 1.26E-03         -1.64E-03 4.52E-03   
ACashFlowt-1 1.09E-07 2.10E-08 *** 1.16E-07 5.22E-08 ** 1.08E-07 2.19E-08 *** 2.37E-07 8.66E-08 *** 1.42E-07 9.46E-08   2.02E-07 1.06E-07 * 
ACashFlow_MAt-1       -2.26E-09 5.61E-08         -1.30E-07 8.91E-08         5.44E-07 3.72E-07   
AIntangibleAssett-1 7.04E-06 1.63E-06 *** -2.10E-06 5.38E-06   8.31E-06 1.79E-06 *** 9.29E-07 5.91E-06   -7.68E-06 1.55E-05   -8.74E-05 5.12E-05 * 
AIntangibleAsset_MAt-1       1.01E-05 5.63E-06 *       8.22E-06 6.19E-06         9.65E-05 5.44E-05 * 
ATotalAssett-1 9.24E-09 1.87E-09 *** 5.59E-09 5.97E-09   8.20E-09 1.92E-09 *** -8.13E-09 9.26E-09   3.08E-08 1.12E-08 *** 4.20E-08 2.54E-08 * 
ATotalAsset_MAt-1       4.04E-09 6.21E-09         1.72E-08 9.43E-09 *       -6.98E-08 4.13E-08 * 
M&A type   
Vertical_MA 1.56E-02 1.80E-01   1.32E-02 1.80E-01   3.58E-02 1.87E-01   3.51E-02 1.87E-01   -9.92E-01 7.33E-01   -1.14E+00 7.43E-01   
Horizontal_MA 9.80E-02 7.13E-02   9.65E-02 7.14E-02   1.07E-01 7.62E-02   1.04E-01 7.62E-02   2.20E-01 2.34E-01   2.43E-01 2.33E-01   
Constant term 9.33E+00 9.62E-01 *** 9.62E+00 9.79E-01 *** 8.71E+00 1.16E+00 *** 8.95E+00 1.17E+00 *** 1.13E+01 2.15E+00 *** 1.21E+01 2.23E+00 *** 
Adj. R-squaredd 0.1565     0.1567     0.1485     0.1493     0.2147     0.2256     
Number of obs. 2436     2436     2145     2145     291     291     
Note:    1. All regressions have controlled year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
        2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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The LR chi-squared value between column (1) and (2) of table 5.8 is 4.72 (p-value is 0.3177), 
and the LR chi-squared value between column (3) and (4) of table 5.8 is 6.23 (p-value is 0.1825). 
They imply that the baseline models are not nested well in the interaction models for the whole 
cross border M&A sample and the subsample of high intangible assets in acquirers, although 
their adjusted R-squared values of interaction models show more explanatory power than those 
of baseline models for the two subsamples. However, the LR chi-squared value between column 
(5) and (6) of table 5.8 is 9.50 (p-value is 0.0498). This suggests that the baseline model is 
nested well in the interaction model for the subsample of low intangible assets in acquirers. 
5.4.5 Effects of Cross Border M&A on Acquirer’s Labour Productivity 
The sample information for the model of M&A’s impact on acquirer’s post-acquisition labour 
productivity is summarised in the table below. From this table, all variables show positive mean 
value in the sample of 3,285 cross border M&A, while the variable of acquirer’s cash flow has 
negative values for some specific observations. Amongst these, the wide spread exists in such 
variables as acquirer’s cash flow, intangible assets and total assets. The dependent variable of 
acquirer’s post-acquisition labour productivity also has a wide distribution on its observation 
values. 
Table 5.9 Descriptive statistics for impact of M&A on acquirer’s labour productivity 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALPt+1 3285 3377.546 1743.169 1 6837 
Completed_MAt 3285 0.9071537 0.2902611 0 1 
AGearingRatiot-1 3285 86.45544 120.8756 0 989.3 
ACashFlowt-1 3285 414127.8 2278171 -5.43E+07 4.64E+07 
AIntangibleAssett-1 3285 28273.37 20093.1 228 63487 
ATotalAsset t-1 3285 4811573 2.21E+07 89 7.96E+08 
MAtype 3285 1.724505 0.9406371 1 3 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
The acquirer’s labour productivity has been tested and reported in table 5.10. Table 5.10 reports 
the same formats to table 5.8, but it replaces the dependent variables with acquirer’s labour 
productivity. It also considers the effect of cross border M&A and uses the cross border M&A 
completions dummy to interact with key firm characteristics. Similarly, two sets of static model 
estimation results and two subsamples estimations are discussed below. The year and industry 
effects are also controlled for both baseline model and interaction model. 
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Across the specifications in table 5.10, the variable Completed_MA shows significant and 
negative coefficients for acquirers in the cross border M&A. This means that the completion of 
M&A make acquirer’s labour productivities low compared with the abandoned takeover 
rumours. This finding supports the aforementioned negative relationship between cross border 
M&A and acquirer’s TFP level. Columns (3) and (4) in table 5.10 show that acquirer cannot 
achieve the high labour productivity level after completing international M&A in the deals with 
market-seeking intention. This means that the acquirers with advantages in technology and 
managerial capabilities have not performed well after the completion of M&A. According to 
the learning curve, Syverson (2011) also argues that firm needs to take a longer time to 
accumulate knowledge, experience and the capability to obtain productivity improvements. 
Although Lambert and Frenz (2008) conclude that there are substantial positive impacts of 
product innovation on productivity, Hall (2011) argues that the impact of innovation process is 
more ambiguous because, for instance, most innovations are process-related in the service 
sector. 
From column (6) of table 5.10, the coefficient of interaction term between the acquirer’s 
intangible assets and completion of international M&A is significant and negative. It means 
that the high intangible assets could not facilitate the acquirer to achieve high post-acquisition 
labour productivity with the channel of international M&A completions in the complementary 
resource oriented expansion. This could result from the difficulty in acclimatisation of the 
target’s complementary resource in the new parent firms in the short term after the takeovers. 
No significant evidence is found to prove the effect of intangible assets on labour productivity 
for the target side. 
In column (1) of table 5.10, the variable acquirer’s total assets gives a significant and positive 
sign in cross border M&A, which suggests that the bigger the acquirer is, the higher its labour 
productivity level is in overseas takeovers. This finding confirms the effect of firm size on the 
acquirer’s productivity in TFP measure. This can be easily explained that the large total asset 
means a high amount of firm’s capital stock invested. This increases the ratio of capital over 
labour, which leads to high level of acquirer’s labour productivity. Especially, the positive 
coefficients in columns (5) and (6) of table 5.10 with respect to the total asset show that bigger 
multinational firms incline to achieve higher labour productivity levels in the complementary 
resources-oriented deals. It can be explained that the ability and skill of bigger acquirer firms 
are more mature than smaller firms in integrating the complementary resources acquired from 
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the targets. They can allocate and apply the assets effectively to enlarge the total output volume, 
which improves their labour productivity levels after cross border M&A. 
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Table 5.10  The impact of cross border M&A on acquirer's labour productivity 
  All international deals High intangible assets in acquirers Low intangible assets in acquirers 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Dep: ALabourProt+1 Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. 
Completed_MAt -2.26E+02 1.07E+02 ** -3.05E+02 1.92E+02   -2.05E+02 1.16E+02 * -3.70E+02 2.23E+02 * -2.60E+02 3.18E+02   7.36E+02 5.47E+02   
AGearingRatiot-1 3.27E-01 2.58E-01   7.37E-01 8.84E-01   3.59E-01 2.68E-01   6.47E-01 9.39E-01   3.05E-01 1.04E+00   4.13E+00 3.25E+00   
AGearingRatio_MAt-1       -4.49E-01 9.23E-01         -3.15E-01 9.78E-01         -4.07E+00 3.44E+00   
ACashFlowt-1 3.71E-06 1.98E-05   -4.07E-05 4.55E-05   6.99E-06 2.17E-05   -1.26E-05 9.83E-05   -1.10E-04 7.43E-05   -1.10E-04 7.98E-05   
ACashFlow_MAt-1       5.52E-05 4.96E-05         2.19E-05 1.01E-04         2.45E-04 2.62E-04   
AIntangibleAssett-1 -4.47E-04 1.51E-03   -5.00E-03 5.00E-03   -1.13E-03 1.64E-03   -7.11E-03 5.56E-03   -8.20E-03 1.44E-02   6.12E-02 3.97E-02   
AIntangibleAsset_MAt-1       5.02E-03 5.25E-03         6.55E-03 5.82E-03         -7.96E-02 4.29E-02 * 
ATotalAssett-1 3.30E-06 1.96E-06 * 8.67E-06 6.40E-06   2.72E-06 2.02E-06   4.55E-06 1.14E-05   1.82E-05 1.03E-05 * 2.47E-05 1.38E-05 * 
ATotalAsset_MAt-1       -5.97E-06 6.67E-06         -1.84E-06 1.16E-05         -2.90E-05 3.07E-05   
M&A type   
Vertical_MA -9.88E+01 1.69E+02   -1.02E+02 1.69E+02   -1.03E+02 1.79E+02   -1.04E+02 1.79E+02   -6.19E+01 6.03E+02   -3.32E+01 6.14E+02   
Horizontal_MA 5.91E+01 6.70E+01   6.05E+01 6.71E+01   8.31E+01 7.12E+01   8.41E+01 7.13E+01   -1.63E+02 2.26E+02   -1.69E+02 2.25E+02   
Constant term 3.82E+03 7.54E+02 *** 3.86E+03 7.71E+02 *** 4.02E+03 8.19E+02 *** 4.17E+03 8.40E+02 *** 1.19E+03 2.17E+03   5.39E+02 2.23E+03   
Adj R-squaredd 0.035     0.0345     0.0324     0.0315     0.0316     0.0395     
Number of obs 3285     3285     2903     2903     382     382     
Note:    1. All regressions have controlled year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
        2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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The LR chi-squared value between column (1) and (2) of table 5.10 is 2.45 (p-value is 0.6536), 
and the LR chi-squared value between column (3) and (4) of table 5.10 is 1.47 (p-value is 
0.8326). They imply that the baseline models are not nested well in the interaction models for 
the whole cross border M&A sample and the subsample of high intangible assets in acquirers. 
This can be confirmed that their adjusted R-squared values of interaction models show less 
explanatory power than those of baseline models for the two subsamples. However, the LR chi-
squared value between column (5) and (6) of table 5.10 is 8.25 (p-value is 0.0828). This 
suggests that the baseline model is nested well in the interaction model for the subsample of 
low intangible assets in acquirers. This can also be confirmed by greater adjusted R-squared 
values of interaction models than those of baseline models for three samples. 
5.4.6 Comparison in Goodness of Fit for Labour Productivity and TFP Models 
The LR test is performed by estimating the log likelihoods of two models and comparing the 
fit of one model to the fit of the other. This research has used the LR test to compare differences 
among nested models. The diagnostics used by LR chi-squared and adjusted R-squared show 
whether the baseline models are nested in the interaction models. However, when considering 
which model can explain better the impact of cross border M&A completion on firm’s 
productivity between the models with using TFP and those with using labour productivity, LR 
chi-squared and adjusted R-squared are unable to show the comparison of model fit because 
these two models are not nested each other. This research uses the AIC (Akaike Information 
Criterion) and the BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) to test model fit and compare the 
goodness-of-fit for the both above models. The AIC is a measure of the relative quality 
of statistical models for a given set of data (Akaike, 1974). Hence, AIC provides a means 
for model selection. The BIC is closely related to the AIC. In statistics, the BIC is a criterion 
for model selection among a finite set of models; the model with the lowest BIC is preferred 
(Schwarz, 1978). When fitting models, it is possible to increase the likelihood by adding 
parameters, but doing so may result in over-fitting. Both BIC and AIC resolve this problem by 
introducing a penalty term for the number of parameters in the model; the penalty term is larger 
in BIC than in AIC (Aho et al., 2014). Therefore, both BIC and AIC statistics should be 
considered more carefully in the selection of specification. 
Table 5.11 reports measures of model fit for effects of cross border M&A on target’s labour 
productivity and TFP. The results from the likelihood ratio test from above several sections 
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have already indicated the more appropriate model from comparisons of corresponding baseline 
and interaction models. This section compares labour productivity interaction model (1) with 
TFP interaction model (2) for targets within the whole sample of international M&A. This 
section continues to compare labour productivity baseline models (3 and 5) with TFP interaction 
models (4 and 6) for targets within the two subsamples of high and low acquirer’s intangible 
assets respectively. By using the same numbers of observations within the three samples, table 
5.11 shows three positive values (176.875, 133.535 and 16.649) of BIC’ difference between 
labour productivity and TFP models respectively. These results provide strong supports for the 
target’s TFP models for the three samples.  
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Table 5.11 Comparisons of fit for regresses of target’s post-M&A labour productivity and TFP 
  All international M&A High intangible assets for acquirers High intangible assets for acquirers 
Dependent variable Labour productivity TFP   Labour productivity TFP   Labour productivity TFP   
Model: (1) Interaction (2) Interaction Difference (3) Baseline (4) Interaction Difference (5) Baseline (6) Interaction Difference 
N: 2012 2012 0 1616 1616 0 396 396 0 
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -18127.653 -3525.611 -1.46E+04 -14547.177 -2851.542 -1.17E+04 -3579.806 -671.024 -2908.782 
Log-Lik Full Model: -18060.509 -3370.03 -1.47E+04 -14487.385 -2710.207 -1.18E+04 -3526.942 -597.872 -2929.069 
D: 36121.018(1907) 6740.059(1907) 29380.959(0) 28974.769(1516) 5420.414(1512) 23554.355(4) 7053.883(311) 1195.744(307) 5858.139(4) 
LR: 134.288(101) 311.163(101) -176.875(0) 119.584(96) 282.670(100) -163.085(-4) 105.730(81) 146.304(85) -40.575(-4) 
Prob > LR: 0.015 0 0.015 0.052 0 0.052 0.034 0 0.034 
R2: 0.065 0.143 -0.079 0.071 0.16 -0.089 0.234 0.309 -0.075 
Adjusted R2: 0.015 0.098 -0.083 0.013 0.105 -0.092 0.037 0.119 -0.083 
AIC: 18.057 3.454 14.603 18.054 3.483 14.571 18.242 3.469 14.773 
AIC*n: 36331.018 6950.059 29380.959 29174.769 5628.414 23546.355 7223.883 1373.744 5850.139 
BIC: 21614.689 -7766.269 29380.959 17775.002 -5749.803 23524.805 5193.663 -640.55 5834.213 
BIC’: 634.008 457.133 176.875 589.636 456.101 133.535 378.765 362.116 16.649 
Source from the analysis by using the command of ‘fitstat’ in Stata package. 
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Table 5.12 reports measures of model fit for effects of cross border M&A on acquirer’s labour 
productivity and TFP. Similar to target side, the results from likelihood ratio test from above 
several sections have also indicates the more appropriate model from comparisons of 
corresponding baseline and interaction models. This section compares labour productivity 
baseline models (1 and 3) with TFP baseline models (2 and 4) for targets within the whole 
sample of international M&A and the subsample of high acquirer’s intangible assets 
respectively. This section continues to compare labour productivity interaction model (5) with 
TFP interaction model (6) for targets within the subsample of high acquirer’s intangible assets. 
By using the same numbers of observations within the three samples, table 5.12 shows three 
positive values (309.436, 264.18 and 53.247) of BIC’ difference between labour productivity 
and TFP models respectively. These results provide strong supports for the acquirer’s TFP 
models for the three samples.  
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Table 5.12 Comparisons of fit for regresses of acquirer’s post-M&A labour productivity and TFP 
  All international M&A High intangible assets for acquirers High intangible assets for acquirers 
Dependent variable Labour productivity TFP   Labour productivity TFP   Labour productivity TFP   
Model: (1) Baseline (2) Baseline Difference (3) Baseline (4) Baseline Difference (5) Interaction (6) Interaction Difference 
N: 2289 2289 0 2018 2018 0 271 271 0 
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -20295.678 -4471.153 -1.58E+04 -17876.329 -3927.599 -1.39E+04 -2418.049 -542.719 -1875.33 
Log-Lik Full Model: -20202.786 -4223.543 -1.60E+04 -17794.858 -3714.038 -1.41E+04 -2362.819 -460.866 -1901.953 
D: 40405.573(2191) 8447.087(2191) 31958.486(0) 35589.716(1922) 7428.075(1922) 28161.641(0) 4725.637(190) 921.731(190) 3803.906(0) 
LR: 185.783(94) 495.219(94) -309.436(0) 162.942(92) 427.123(92) -264.180(0) 110.460(77) 163.707(77) -53.247(0) 
Prob > LR: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0 0.007 
R2: 0.078 0.195 -0.117 0.078 0.191 -0.113 0.335 0.453 -0.119 
Adjusted R2: 0.038 0.16 -0.122 0.033 0.152 -0.119 0.069 0.235 -0.166 
AIC: 17.738 3.776 13.962 17.731 3.776 13.955 18.036 3.999 14.037 
AIC*n: 40601.573 8643.087 31958.486 35781.716 7620.075 28161.641 4887.637 1083.731 3803.906 
BIC: 23456.281 -8502.205 31958.486 20963.561 -7198.08 28161.641 3661.235 -142.671 3803.906 
BIC': 541.389 231.953 309.436 537.165 272.985 264.18 320.903 267.656 53.247 
Source from the analysis by using the command of ‘fitstat’ in Stata package. 
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Generally, the TFP model shows a better fit for both targets and acquirers based on the 
diagnostic analysis for goodness of model fit. Furthermore, TFP models show more significant 
variables compared with labour productivity models. There is no clear evidence to argue that 
the impact of foreign M&A depends on the different measure of firm’s productivity according 
to the results of regressions. Nevertheless, TFP, as the result of diffusion in technological or 
organisational knowledge and economies of scale, can be the more direct measure to identify 
the causal impact of international acquisitions on firm’s productivity performance. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the causal relationship between cross border M&A and firm’s 
productivity using a rich micro dataset across the global market over the period 2002-2011. The 
effects of cross border M&A and firm-level characteristics on firm’s productivity are assessed 
from the aspects of target side and acquirer side respectively. This research also employs two 
kinds of firm’s efficiency measure, i.e. TFP and labour productivity, to compare the influence 
of choosing different productivity measures. The rumoured but uncompleted M&A are used as 
a control group to compose the dummy of M&A completions together with rumoured and 
completed deals. By using an M&A deal-level variable, the comparison of the impact on firm’s 
productivity between the completed M&A and rumoured but abandoned M&A contributes to 
the above debate and the literature on the performance of cross border M&A. 
The literature on firm’s productivity after M&A wrestles with the unresolved debate, 
concerning whether M&A will improve firm performance. The effects of cross border M&A 
are assessed for both target and acquirer firms. From the view of acquirers, those firms who 
possess certain intangible advantages would like to attempt to expand their product markets via 
international takeovers. However, those firms who lack some intangible advantages would like 
to obtain the strategic assets from acquired firms via international takeovers. Based on these 
two points, cross border M&A are motivated by market seeking or strategic assets seeking 
incentives. This chapter separates cross border M&A into two subsamples, which include deals 
with high acquirer’s intangible assets relative to the target’s assets and deals with low acquirer’s 
intangible assets relative to the target’s respectively. The analysis is conducted with the two 
subsamples to test the impact of cross border M&A on firm’s post-acquisition productivity The 
first subsample is used to examine whether the intangible advantages successfully transfers 
from acquirer to target in the product market-driven expansion. The second subsample is used 
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to examine whether acquirers effectively exploits the target’s intangible assets in the strategic 
assets driven expansion.  
Furthermore, this chapter will investigate the impacts of cross border M&A on firm 
performance by using the determinants of cross border M&A completions. Previous literature 
conducts such performance analysis by employing the characteristics of a likely target firm. 
However, the determinants of M&A completions can identify a firm in M&A, while the 
determinants of a likely target do not necessarily determine the completion of M&A. This is 
because other potential uncertain factors, e.g. the regulatory factor will affect M&A, but they 
do not influence whether a firm is chosen as a likely target. Therefore, the factors from previous 
research may be biased. The determinants of M&A completions should have different impacts 
on the firm performance compared with the characteristics of a likely target. 
In this chapter, it tests the multinational status of firms on target’s productivity to isolate firm’s 
ownership advantages on its performance. The result from Chapter 5 shows that the increase in 
a target’s productivity only takes place in the integration between MNEs in the completed cross 
border M&A. Compared with small domestic firms, large MNEs have more advantages 
especially in finance to get access to the advanced technology or resource across the world. 
Such updated technology or intangible capability enables MNEs to achieve high productivity. 
However, this chapter reports that the completion of a cross border M&A decreases the post-
acquisition productivity level of targets and acquirers compared with the productivity of similar 
firms in takeover rumours. The information asymmetry across markets causes the difficulty in 
integration between targets and acquirers. This results in high transaction costs and accordingly 
low firm’s productivity. This chapter compares two kinds of firm’s efficiency measure, i.e. TFP 
and labour productivity. Its objective is to answer whether the performance of takeovers will 
depend on different productivity measures. The results about TFP measure reports are more 
significant coefficients than those about labour productivity measure. It is found that the 
increase in a firm’s labour productivity is mainly caused by capital deepening rather than 
diffusion in technological or organisational knowledge and economies of scale. Therefore, TFP 
is regarded as more appropriate measure for a firm’s productivity.  
In particular, with the market seeking motive, this chapter proves that the completion of 
international takeovers will reduce the productivity for both targets and acquirers in terms of 
TFP level and labour productivity level. The foreign acquirers tend to expand their markets 
abroad based on their firm-specific advantages or successful operational experience. However, 
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some intangible assets such as advanced technology and brand name are not easy to transfer 
successfully. For example, the adaptation of technology in the host country will affect the 
knowledge transfer. Are there enough skilled workers in the job markets or are the standards of 
their skills enough to satisfy the requirement of using the new technology? Another example is 
the success of introducing a brand into the host country which depends on the reputation of 
such a brand or its investing firm. The perceptions of customers on the brand will gradually 
constitute the brand or firm reputation. From other aspects, if takeovers are initiated by 
irresponsible managers who only intend to enlarge their power or self-interest, such M&A are 
less likely to achieve productivity gains. Therefore, Cross border M&A are attempted with a 
potentially good intention in market expansion, but the difficulty in transfer of intangible 
advantages and the abuse of managerial discretionary power will lead to a low firm’s 
productivity when takeovers are completed.   
Apart from seeking markets, certain strategic assets including intangible resources are also 
important for firms because they can be used to formulate the firm’s competitive advantages. 
This is especially true when strategic assets from outsides of firms show resource 
complementarities with firm’s own assets; most firms will attempt all channels to obtain such 
assets including takeovers. Hence, the strategic asset seeking becomes another motive to 
support takeovers. However, the evidence from this chapter shows that the completion of 
international takeovers will reduce the target’s labour productivity level in strategic assets 
seeking M&A. It is explained that M&A leads to the low competition in markets. This offers 
less incentive for firms to improve organisational innovation and internal efficiency, and 
accordingly leads to a low firm’s labour productivity. Besides this, the ineffective reallocation 
of acquired complementary intangible resources decreases the target’s productivity level after 
completing international M&A in the short term. The above results suggest that neither of these 
two motives behind cross border M&A could make firm’s productivity level improve in the 
short term.  
As for the effects of a firm’s characteristics, a firm’s high leverage level has been found to have 
a negative effect on its post-M&A efficiency. High leverage level means that firms have to 
make large amounts of payment due to the high proportion of debt. The limited disposable 
capital can be used in innovation to improve firm’s productivity. Nevertheless, the results of 
this chapter show that firm’s high liquidity, high level of intangible asset and large size will 
improve its post-M&A efficiency. These factors provide firms themselves with sufficient 
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capital, advantages in technology or brand, and the possibility of access to available resources. 
They facilitate firms to improve their productivity in the short term. Furthermore, horizontal 
international M&A shows positive target’s labour productivity. It is explained that the 
expansion into the same industry often leads to substitution of domestic production in the host 
country. This will reduce the workforce in target firms and bring a capital deepening effect 
which increases firm’s labour productivity. 
It is argued that productivity and profitability are closely related. The productivity refers to the 
returns achieved by internal stakeholders. The increases in productivity may be beneficial to 
both the internal stakeholders (e.g. employees and managements) and the external stakeholders 
(e.g. shareholders and creditors). In contrast, the profitability refers to those returns available 
for external shareholders after subtracting the returns by internal stakeholders. The performance 
of involving firms in the cross border M&A is manifested either by the productivity 
improvement internally due to reinvestment or advanced management, or by the profitability 
improvement externally due to enlarged market share or reduced production costs. Therefore, 
after investigating the impact of cross border M&A on productivity, the author will continue to 
assess the impact on profitability in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six: The Impact of Cross Border M&A on Firm-Level Profitability 
6.1 Introduction 
The findings from chapter five show a lower firm’s productivity due to information asymmetry 
and reduced pressure of competition. It is argued that productivity and profitability are closely 
related. Driffield et al. (2013) indicate that a foreign firm’s productivity may be affected to 
some extent by its operation scale rather than local conditions compared to domestic firms. 
However, profitability differences may have a different pattern in consideration of various 
market conditions and the institutional environments. Some of improved productivity will result 
in higher profitability in M&A activity, yet at the same time international takeovers may have 
an adverse effect on profitability.  
According to Girma et al. (2006), productivity refers to the returns achieved by internal 
stakeholders. The change in productivity will affect both the internal stakeholders (e.g. 
employees and management) and the external stakeholders (e.g. shareholders and creditors). In 
contrast, profitability refers to those returns available for external stakeholders after subtracting 
the returns by internal stakeholders. They believe that the impact of takeovers on internal and 
external returns may differ. Foreign acquisitions sometimes will lower the extent of competition 
in the host market (Schiffbauer et al., 2009). The less pressure in competition from markets will 
reduce firm’s productivity. At the same time however, due to the reduced competition, some 
firms will obtain strong monopoly power to reap the abnormal return which means they achieve 
a high profitability. In contrast, for some firms, efficiency loss is related to access to narrow 
markets and less resources, which generates temporary profitability loss (Driffield et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, the relationship between foreign takeovers and firm financial performance is 
complex. The impact of international takeover on profitability is more varied compared with its 
impact on productivity. 
Further, Driffield and Du (2007) argue that foreign takeover has a significant impact on 
productivity, but a smaller effect on profitability. Based on the findings in the previous chapter, 
the drop in internal efficiency due to information asymmetry will increase transaction and 
agency costs. Thus, it is questioned whether the weakened internal productivity will be 
transformed into lower profitability. Following the conclusion in chapter 4 about the efficiency 
seeking motive behind the international M&A completions, this chapter continues the empirical 
work to explore the external returns of M&A by investigating the impact of M&A on firm 
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performance in terms of profitability. In order to do so, the aim of this chapter is set to examine 
the profitability performance after M&A for both targets and acquirers and the influence factors 
to profitability at the firm level. The use of the rumoured M&A as a control group can address 
the sample selection issue when consider pre-acquisition profitability in the M&A. Some 
foreign firms will perform better than domestic firms in the takeovers due to their possession 
of some firm-specific advantages. The author compares the effects of cross border M&A with 
inclusion of pre-acquisition profitability and exclusion of it respectively. This will be discussed 
specifically in the later section.  
Most profitability studies developed hypotheses from managerial theories of the firm. It might 
be expected that the profitability of merged firms would be more likely greater than the sum of 
the firms involved as independent entities under an efficient market for M&A, ceteris paribus 
(Meeks, 1977). However, such a research method can only indirectly test the disciplinary 
hypothesis for corporate control, because profit improvements could result from enhanced 
market power rather than improved management. It is unanswered whether the takeover 
improved the profitability of involving firms through replacing the management. Furthermore, 
the synergetic effects may be attributed to the apparent performance superiority of the 
multinational firms. Thus, it is worthy of investigating whether acquiring a profitable firm will 
enhance the profitability for the involving firms. To achieve the above two objectives, the 
research divides the M&A deals into two subsamples, which are deals with high profitable 
targets and deals with low profitable targets. This study uses the former subsample to examine 
the synergy effect of M&A, while it uses the latter subsample to examine the function of M&A 
in managerial discipline. 
There are several contributions in this study. Firstly, both completed cross border M&A deals 
and rumoured but abandoned deals are incorporated into the analysis for assessing the post-
M&A performance. The abandoned M&A rumour will be used to provide a control group in 
which firms experience a potential takeover but without ownership change. Further, the use of 
rumour data directly offers a merit in constructing the comparison group compared with the 
propensity matching techniques. This will be addressed in the later section. Secondly, this 
research will detect the post-takeover profitability by differentiating the pre-takeover 
profitability of targets. This division is to examine the synergy effect and disciplinary effect of 
M&A respectively. Thirdly, most previous literature assesses the post-M&A performance from 
either acquirer side or target side. This study exploits explanations from both sides. Fourthly, 
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the pre-acquisition profitability information will be employed to explain profitability change 
due to its impact on post-M&A performance. A panel design allows for the inclusion of year 
dummies to control for cyclical factors. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the theories and ex-post M&A 
profitability studies and discusses the role of international M&A in the growth of multinational 
enterprises. Section 6.3 describes the data statistics, presents some sample characteristics and 
the econometric methodology. Section 6.4 generates some analysis of the data, and then 
discusses the results. A brief conclusion follows in section 6.5. 
6.2 Theory and Profitability Studies 
6.2.1 Post-M&A Profitability of Targets and Acquirers in International Takeovers 
From a theoretical perspective, there are various reasons for expecting enhanced profits in 
combined firms. Above all, the traditional international business or finance literature suggests 
that market power and risk diversification will result in a positive relationship between 
international takeovers and profitability. That is, the global diversification of business and 
increased market power of the MNEs stemming from M&A, tend to reduce business operational 
costs (Eiteman et al., 2006). Likewise, developed from corporate control theory, the managerial 
discipline hypothesis also produces the prediction of enhanced profit prospects for acquired 
firms. It is assumed that M&A are motivated to reinforce managerial control over entrenched 
managers who are more interested in their own benefit.  
In contrast, there are some explanations provided in the literature to support a negative 
relationship between international M&A and profitability. To start with, Bellak (2004) reviews 
a number of studies and summarises that a major objective of multinational enterprises is to 
curtail their tax burden. This provides the reason why foreign owners are often willing to accept 
lower profit margins in their overseas subsidiaries. From the other aspect, the capital costs of 
internal funds generated within firms are relatively low compared with those of the external 
funds raised outsides the business. Accordingly, foreign affiliates tend to exploit re-invested 
profits, resulting in a decline in their profitability. Although the literature with respect to foreign 
M&A and productivity is relatively well-established, the relationship between the international 
M&A and post-takeover profitability has been less extensively examined. 
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In the research of Norback and Persson (2008), they also develop the market risk argument to 
explain why the lower profitability is expected to associate with international M&A. That is 
because the investment via M&A may be riskier than that via green-field start-up. In addition 
to the traditional theories, Norback and Persson have also introduced importance of other 
concepts in facilitating international M&A. For instance, they propose the complementarities 
in assets between the foreign acquirer and the domestic target will affect the M&A performance. 
In their theoretical model, it is illustrated that a high level of complementarities in assets 
between the foreign acquirer and the domestic target will increase the likelihood of M&A. 
However, there might be a decrease in the acquirer’s expected profits, and thus foreign acquirers 
may not benefit from improvement in post-M&A profitability level when acquiring the most 
suitable takeover targets. This is because the complementarities between domestic and foreign 
assets provide an incentive to lift upward the equilibrium acquisition price (measured as a non-
acquiring firm’s willingness to pay in M&A). Beside, the complementary assets are usually 
intangible, which are difficult to be accurately valued. Therefore, in equilibrium, high 
acquisition price compress the acquirer’s product market profit margin especially when 
domestic assets become more strategically valuable for the acquirer. 
An alternative argument might be that these ex-post profitability studies have been concentrated 
on a simplistic view of the disciplinary mechanism and ignore the influence of takeover rumour. 
A rumour on taking over another firm can be regarded as a kind of threat to the management of 
the targeted firm. In order to discipline the managements effectively, the takeover rumour 
sometimes has an enough credible potency. It does not necessarily have to be realised in the 
form of actual takeovers. For example, Pickering (1983) and Holl and Pickering (1988) suggest 
that although completed M&A might exhibit a tendency to have adverse impacts on profitability, 
unsuccessful bids can have positive impacts on the performance of both targets and acquirers 
following abandonment of a bid. Thus the threat of takeover can be concluded as a stimulus to 
managerial performance, even if completed M&A deal has a general tendency to decline in 
performance. 
More recent research on the issues raised by rumoured M&A tend to have been conducted with 
event study methodology and share price data (Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2006; 
Lachapelle, 2011; Wortche and Nguyen, 2011). Their results show abandoned targets making 
and sustaining positive returns, with rather more mixed results for acquirers after a rumour. 
Clarkson et al. (2006) conclude that these results are in line with market efficiency hypothesis, 
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where the stock market re-evaluates the targets based on the new information released by 
acquirers. Bradley et al. (1983), however, support a synergy explanation for the potential of 
target gains in abandoned mergers. Regardless of the source of gains, overall, these results offer 
support for the potency of takeover rumour and thus for the beneficial effect of the market for 
corporate control. Although the encouraging role of potential takeover may improve a firm’s 
profitability, the complexity of M&A operation could make the firm’s profitability decline 
during the implementation of actual acquisition.  
Empirically, Manson et al. (1993) compare target and acquirer firms’ operating cash flows 
between five years prior to M&A and five years after M&A. They study the impact of pre-
M&A cash flow on post-M&A cash flow and report significant and positive gains. Similar 
findings of post-M&A improvements in cash flow and operating profits are supported by the 
US studies of Weston and Masinghka (1971), Switzer (1996), Linn and Switzer (2001) and 
Ghosh (2001). Powell and Stark (2005) also report positive increase in cash flow with the UK 
evidence. Additionally, Fukao et al. (2006) examine firm level sample in 1994-2002 and 
conclude that foreign M&A bring more significant improvement on target firms’ profitability 
than domestic M&A. 
However, Singh (1971) employs a measure of profitability corrected for the average industrial 
rate of return and tests a sample of 77 mergers over the period 1955-60. Using this measure, he 
identifies that the post-merger profitability declines in around half combined firms. Utton (1974) 
mentions that firms which intensively merge with others have achieved significantly lower 
profitability compared with the internally grown firms. Meeks (1977) enlarges the population 
of sample (233 mergers from 1964 to 1972) and demonstrates similar results that more than a 
half of acquiring firms suffered a significant post-merger decline in profitability for a period of 
up to seven years. Mueller (1980) illustrates that merged firms experience a profits decline in 
three year after M&A with a sample for the period 1962-79 in the US. By concentrating on 354 
UK listed firms for the period 1967-74, Kumar (1984) suggests that firm’s post-merger 
profitability has a generally declined tendency for a period up to seven years after merger. His 
results are in line with those earlier studies. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987a) report the decline 
in the profitability after M&A with the US data from 1975 to 1977. Similar evidence is also 
found in the research of Clark and Ofek (1994), Dickerson et al. (1997), Gugler et al. (2003) 
and Martynova et al. (2007). 
From the empirical evidence, most positive findings about profitability are supported by using 
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cash flow measure, while other profitability measures such as ROE, ROA, sales and profit 
margin almost always show the tendency of decline after M&A. Nevertheless, it is doubtful 
that the profitability of post-M&A could be reflected truly hidden by cash flows due to the 
drawback of accounting data (Chatterjee and Meeks, 1996). It is also believed that the increase 
in cash flow may not result from the improvement of profit. It could be caused by the disposal 
of some unwanted assets within the company or written off on the previous non-receivable 
credit. Based on the arguments and evidence above, the increased transaction price due to the 
overestimated complementary assets compresses the profit generated from a takeover and 
makes the both target and acquirer unprofitable after the M&A. Besides, the market for 
corporate control suggests a takeover threat may spur management to improve the profitability 
through takeover rumours. Thus, hypothesis 1 can be derived as follow. 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of a cross border M&A is to decrease the post-acquisition profitability 
of targets and acquirers compared with the profitability of similar firms in takeover rumours. 
6.2.2 The Synergy Effect on Post-acquisition Profitability  
There are also two competing theories predicting the characteristics of the likely target firms in 
international M&A. The characteristics of the likely target firms include profitable firms and 
unprofitable firms, which are motivated by synergy effect and disciplinary effect. The takeovers 
with the motive of disciplinary effect will be addressed in the next section. The takeovers with 
the motive of synergy effect will be discussed below. 
In general, the first argument postulates that profitable firms are more likely to be acquired, 
which is consistent with a synergy hypothesis. It means the combined value of the new venture 
created by M&A exceeds the sum of the values of the individual firms. Thus, when well 
performing firms are being acquired, the newly merged ventures are expected to benefit from a 
further improvement in post-M&A performance due to the synergy effect. There is some recent 
evidence that foreign acquirers take over more profitable domestic targets. For example, by 
analysing the differences between domestic and foreign takeovers in Korea during the post-
liberalisation period, Freund and Djankov (2000) show that target firms are usually larger, more 
profitable, with lower debt, belonging to high value‐added sectors. Similarly, Lipsey and 
Feliciano (2002) study foreign acquisitions in the US during a ten‐year period, and find that 
more profitable firms attract foreign acquisitions. 
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It is assumed that foreign acquirers introduce their certain largely intangible assets which can 
offset any advantages possessed by domestic firms. The technological knowledge, brand name 
capital and organisational capabilities are frequently listed as advanced intangible assets in the 
literature on multinational firms. According to Dunning’s (1988) internalisation theory of 
multinational expansion, an inward transfer of inputs in these intangible assets is expected to 
increase the volume or value of outputs following takeovers. However, it is viewed to be 
problematic in transferring the technological knowledge and brand name recognition or 
reputation across markets. The transfer of technological knowledge has suffered from lots forms 
of failure. The licensing of brand name exposes a danger of externalities due to sharing an 
intangible asset (reputation) (Geroski and Gregg, 1997). All above negative relationships 
appear to be connected with international M&A. For example, Caves (1996) implies that high 
R&D and advertising intensities involving in foreign acquisitions suffer from some difficulties 
when surveying Japanese firms entering the US. 
Empirically, based on domestic and foreign M&A in Japanese manufacturing firms from 1994 
to 2000, Fukao et al. (2005) imply that buying firms with higher profit rates can bring a larger 
and quicker growth of post-acquisition profitability. In the results of Chari et al. (2009), 
profitable targets are found to be larger in size (measured as sales, total assets and employment), 
and their profitability increase averagely by 16 per cent in the five years following M&A.  
On the contrary, Herman and Lowenstein (1987) provide negative evidence with examining 56 
hostile takeovers during the period 1975-83. They point out that target firms are more profitable 
prior to acquisition and smaller than acquiring firms on average. Moreover, Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1989) analyse the Federal Trade Commission line-of-business data on 251 mergers in 
the US during the period 1968-74. They find that target firms are more profitable prior to 
mergers and most mergers impair profitability. Furthermore, they indicate a bias exists that the 
smaller targets relative to acquirers the more profitable targets are. It is potentially important 
evidence that the line-of-business data captures takeovers of large listed firms acquiring unlisted 
ones. Listed firms are included in most studies’ samples of targets and acquirers, thus there is 
a sample selection bias. 
Based on the arguments and evidence above, foreign firms invest into the profitable local firms 
in other countries via M&A with the intention to achieve synergy effect. However, the transfer 
of firm-specific advantages may be problematic and it is difficult to integrate such advantages 
as brand name recognition and technological knowledge. Thus, the second hypotheses can be 
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derived as follow. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of a cross border M&A is to decrease the post-acquisition profitability 
of targets and acquirers compared with the profitability of similar firms in takeover rumours 
in cases of acquiring profitable targets. 
6.2.3 The Disciplinary Effect on Post-acquisition Profitability 
Countering the first view in the previous section, the second argument suggests that foreign 
firms are more likely to buy unprofitable or poorly-run target firms to replace the poor 
management. In accordance with the managerial discipline hypothesis, this view argues that 
foreign M&A happen because managers desire to maximise their own achievements rather than 
company profits. Therefore, unprofitable firms are more likely to be overtaken, poor 
management is replaced, and surviving firms will achieve a higher post-acquisition 
performance (Jensen, 1988).  
However, according to Tichy (2001), the industrial economists cannot appreciate the role of 
M&A in the effectiveness of allocating spare resources via best management after examining 
the data from balance sheet. Similarly, it is assumed that some foreign acquirers would like to 
bring to domestic targets with competitive advantage such as superior organisational routines 
and practices. Transferring these intangible resources makes the success rate of international 
M&A lower. For instance, Bassett (1986) indicates that Japanese manufacturers have developed 
superior logistical systems such as ‘just-in-time’ inventory planning, work practices including 
team working and task flexibility, and industrial relations arrangements including single-union 
bargaining and no-strike agreements. These intangible resources show advantages in particular 
Japanese industries such as motor vehicles. Nevertheless, the inadaptability is revealed when 
Japanese intangible resources are applied in other countries especially under distant culture 
context (Carmichael, 1992). 
Empirically, more positive results are supported by Cosh et al. (1980). They stress that 
acquiring firms improve significantly post-M&A profit. They also report that target firms are 
distinctly less profitable than their matched control group prior to M&A. This result accords 
with the view of corporate control hypothesis, in which the strong acquire the weak. In contrast, 
Herman and Lowenstein (1987) report over half the targets underperform their eventual 
acquirers prior to acquisition when using matched acquirers and targets. Particularly, in their 
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results, the hostile takeovers occurring in the late 1970s generally improve performance while 
the profitability declines after merger in the early 1980s. They attribute determinants of 
successful takeovers to the institutional factors and time-specific phenomena. 
In addition, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) also show an overall decline in post-merger 
profitability. They explain that the complex organisational structures and lessened managerial 
competence lead to high incidence of divestiture following acquisition. The negative operating 
income after acquisition results in the tendency of sold-off units. They do not support the 
management discipline hypothesis that target firms are underperformed prior to acquisitions. 
However, in an earlier study, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987a) find that target firms are slightly 
lower than average in performance and an insignificant post-acquisition performance by 
examining 96 tender offers during the period 1950-76. In another study of the same year, 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987b) report a statistically significant decline on post-merger 
profitability with using a non-acquiring control group and 471 mergers over the same period. 
Based on the arguments and evidence above, foreign firms often attempt to discipline the poorly 
performed managements through the market for corporate control. However, such M&A may 
not improve involving firm’s profitability because some competitive advantages such as 
superior organisational routines and practices may not be suitable for the acquired targets. 
Meanwhile, M&A has already generated significant purchasing costs to the acquirers when 
M&A is completed. Thus, the third hypotheses can be derived as follow. 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of a cross border M&A is to decrease the post-acquisition profitability 
of targets and acquirers compared with the profitability of similar firms in takeover rumours 
in cases of acquiring unprofitable targets. 
6.2.4 The Impact of Pre-M&A Profitability on Post-M&A Profitability 
In terms of the impact of cross border M&A on post-acquisition profitability, some literature 
finds that foreign acquirers choose more profitable domestic targets (Freund and Djankov, 2000, 
for Korea in the post-liberalisation period; Lipsey and Feliciano, 2002, for the US; Fukao, et 
al., 2005, for the Japanese manufacturing sector; Chari, et al., 2009, for the US with emerging 
markets investors). Given such evidence, most research adopts the difference-in-difference 
matching approach to control the potential selectivity bias. For example, after controlling for 
the sample selection problem, Fukao et al. (2006) show more significant improvement in 
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target’s profitability in international takeovers than that in domestic takeovers. Similar evidence 
is also identified by Chari et al. (2009) who finds that investors from emerging markets acquire 
large the US target firms and improve their profitability by, on average, 16 per cent. Whilst, 
Bellak et al. (2006) argue that the growth in profitability is more significant for buying 
unprofitable targets than buying profitable ones. 
Harris (2009) suggests that the international M&A are found to be affected by the pre-
acquisition performance of firms. According to Bellak et al. (2006), the pre-acquisition 
characteristics could affect performance in the future, so pre-performance is linked to 
explanations of possible profitability after an M&A is completed. They find that the level of 
initial pre-acquisition profitability has positive impact on post-acquisition profitability level. 
The pre-acquisition profitability can represent the earning ability of firms prior to the takeovers. 
It is argued that the previous earning ability of firms will carry on in the post-acquisition stage. 
Besides, from the perspective of learning curve, managements will accumulate their ability in 
earning based on their prior successful experience (Very and Schweiger, 2001).  
In the large scale the UK study, Dickerson et al. (1997) examined the sample of 613 acquirers 
from 1948 to 1977. They utilise the profitability ‘persistence’ approach from Geroski (1988), 
which involved using a lagged profitability measure of the dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable, together with measures for business cycle effects, leverage, industry, size and growth. 
Their results are robust to a variety of changes in specification, and suggest that acquirers 
experience lower performance. However, their study has not provided any interpretation for the 
poor performance. Based on German data, Köke (2000) indicates that there is little ex post 
improvement in financial performance in acquired firms. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis can 
be derived as follows: 
Hypothesis 4:  The higher the pre-M&A profitability level of targets and acquirers, the higher 
their post-M&A profitability level. 
MNEs are generally found to show superior performance than their domestic counterparts. This 
performance advantage stems from MNE theory which defines that MNEs are endowed with 
specific comparative advantages such as a superior production technology or organisational 
superiority (e.g., Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1988; and Casson, 1987). Foreign multinational 
corporations also often bring with their ownership advantages such as higher capital intensity, 
which results in a rise in post-M&A profit margins via growth in (labour) productivity (Bellak, 
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2004). Therefore, the argument could bring the fifth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: MNEs transfer their ownership advantages to domestic targets, which increases 
post-M&A profitability level in target firms. 
6.3 Data and Method 
6.3.1 The Construction of Control Group 
It is important to construct a consistent estimate for the average performance of firms had they 
not been involved in M&A. The performance of the non-acquirers or non-targets does not offer 
a good estimate of the counterfactual case in non-experimental settings because of sample 
selection problems. The selectivity bias exists because firms select themselves into the different 
groups based on characteristics that might also affect the measured performance. To solve the 
problems in the counterfactual situation, researchers use propensity score matching techniques 
to construct a comparison group. The goal of the matching procedure is to match non-involving 
firms with involving firms in a similar range of observable characteristics. The expected 
outcome of this comparison group produces a valid construction of the counterfactual outcome 
under the conditional independence assumption. The conditional independence assumption 
requires the potential outcome to be independent of the treatment assignment given the set of 
observable control variables that are not influenced by the treatment. It is assumed that selection 
into treatment is on observable characteristics only and that unobservable variables do not 
influence simultaneously the treatment assignment and the outcome determination. This 
assumption is not testable, but the inclusion of a wide range of covariates that are suggested by 
theory helps to justify the validity of the approach (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
In terms of impact of foreign M&A on the post-acquisition profitability, and given the evidence 
generally found on buying profitable targets, most recent studies have taken into account 
(potential) selectivity bias by adopting a difference-in-difference approach in conjunction with 
propensity score matching techniques. For instance, Fukao et al. (2006) employs both 
unmatched and matched samples to analyse the target firms’ profitability in foreign and 
domestic acquisitions. However, one potential concern with propensity matching estimation is 
that the decisions of firms in the comparison group might be influenced by the involving firms’ 
decision to conduct M&A. The approach is valid only if the stable unit treatment assumption 
holds, which means if the there is no significant general equilibrium effects. If the involving 
163 
 
firms affect performance of competitors in the comparison group thanks to strategic interaction, 
the results might overestimate or underestimate the effect of cross border M&A.  
A further limitation of matching approach is that the control group of non-target population 
generated by matching approach just provides the suspected targets. These suspected targets 
are plausible but fallacious cases because they only have certain similar range of observable 
characteristics with the actual target firms. They are even irrelevant firms who are never 
selected into the consideration of the M&A. However, the control group from rumoured but 
uncompleted M&A in this study provides the potential involved firms. Not only do they have 
the similar range of observable characteristics with the actual involving firms, but also they are 
even potential involving firms who just did not complete the deals due to some reasons. 
As a potential but abandoned international M&A, the rumoured but uncompleted M&A deals 
naturally provide a feature of counterfactual population, which can overcome the potential 
selective bias. In this study, rumoured but uncompleted M&A deals compose a comparison 
group. They provide the similarity of in-range of completed deals characteristics. The 
profitability change after an uncompleted rumour offers a valid construction of the 
counterfactual outcome. The profitability of targets or acquirers under the rumour is 
independent of that in the actual completed M&A. Thus, the control group of rumoured data 
satisfies with the conditional independence assumption mentioned above. Therefore, there is no 
necessity to use the propensity score matching techniques in this study. This study employs 
directly rumoured data as comparison group rather than propensity matching techniques.  
6.3.2 Variable Description 
The firm’s information was picked to proxy a number of attributes or dimensions of economic 
performance, financial position and deal status, including: profitability, cash flow, corporate 
financial leverage, intangible asset, firm size, multinational status and completion of M&A. In 
this research, gearing ratio is used to measure corporate financial leverage. The profitability is 
measured by profit margin. Total assets of firms are employed to measure firm size. In this 
research, several control variables will be used such as cross border M&A type, year and 
industry. Firm’s multinational status is denoted to be 1 is a firm is MNE and to be 0 if it is non-
MNE. The profit margin of targets and acquirers in one year after M&A or rumour (t+1) is used 
for the dependent variables. Other independent variables use the firm information in one year 
before the M&A or rumour (t-1) is recorded. The reason of that is to obtain all complete 
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information on firms for a whole financial year. The key independent variable is the dummy of 
whether an M&A is completed or just rumoured and abandoned later. The descriptions for all 
variables are listed in table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1  The definitions of independent and dependent variables 
 Variable description Variable name Note 
Target 
ProfitMargint+1 TPM 
(Profit before tax / Operating revenue) * 100% 
in one year after M&A or rumour 
ProfitMargint-1 TPM 
(Profit before tax / Operating revenue) * 100% 
in one year prior to M&A 
Cashflow t-1 TCF Profit for period + Depreciation prior to M&A 
GearingRatio t-1 TGEAR 
((Non-current liabilities + Loans) / Shareholders 
funds) * 100% prior to M&A 
TotalAsset t-1 TTA Fixed assets+ Current assets prior to M&A 
IntangibleAsset t-1 TIA 
All intangible assets such as formation 
expenses, research expenses, goodwill, 
development expenses and all other expenses 
with a long term effect prior to M&A 
MNE status T_mne Whether target firm is MNE or not 
Acquirer 
ProfitMargin t+1 APM 
(Profit before tax / Operating revenue) * 100% 
in one year after M&A or rumour 
ProfitMargin t-1 APM 
(Profit before tax / Operating revenue) * 100% 
in one year prior to M&A 
GearingRatio t-1 ACF 
((Non-current liabilities + Loans) / Shareholders 
funds) * 100% prior to M&A 
Cashflow t-1 AGEAR Profit for period + Depreciation prior to M&A 
TotalAsset t-1 ATA Fixed assets+ Current assets prior to M&A 
IntangibleAsset t-1 AIA 
All intangible assets such as formation 
expenses, research expenses, goodwill, 
development expenses and all other expenses 
with a long term effect prior to M&A 
MNE status A_mne Whether acquirer firm is MNE or not 
 MAit MA 
Dummy of whether the M&A is completed or 
just rumoured but uncompleted. 
 MAtypeit  
Vertical 
Horizontal 
Dummy of horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate M&A 
 Year Dummies  Year from 2002 to 2011 
 Industry Dummies  2-digit NACE Code 
Source from Orbis and Zephyr 
6.3.3 Estimation Model 
The baseline model is used for assessing impacts of cross border M&A on target’s and 
acquirer’s profitability, respectively, takes the following form: 
165 
 
PMit+1 = β0 + β1MAit + β2PMit-1 + β3Xit-1 +β4MAtypeit + vt + vj + εit        (6.1) 
where PM it+1 refers to the profit margin of targets or acquirers one year after cross border M&A 
being completed or rumoured. This ensures that the firm’s financial information is complete for 
a whole financial year. The key variable is MAit which refers to the dummy of cross border 
M&A completions or not. It is a binary variable, capturing the M&A’s status, which takes value 
1 if the M&A’s status of testing firm is rumoured and completed, and takes value 0 if its M&A’s 
status is rumoured but uncompleted. Testing if this dummy is statistically significant in 
affecting firm’s profitability will show the evidence for the role of cross border M&A 
completions, controlling for other factors and firm unobserved heterogeneity. The main interest 
of this research is whether firm’s profitability will be influenced after the completion of a cross 
border M&A deal comparing with the rumoured but uncompleted deal.  
PM it-1 refers to the profit margin of targets or acquirers one year before M&A being completed 
or rumoured. If a firm is ever in a profitable position, it is likely that it possesses firm specificity 
that is related to the factors of high profitability, and hence may help the firm become profitable 
again in the future. This lagged profit margin variable in the model captures the firm’s 
profitability situation prior to the M&A. It makes the estimation become a dynamic model 
controlling for the past position of firm’s earning ability. Furthermore, Xit-1 is the vector of 
target’s characteristics or acquirer’s characteristics in terms of leverage, liquidity, intangible 
resources and size measure. Sometimes, the firm’s financial information is incomplete during 
the year of M&A announcement or completion because the M&A event may occur in the middle 
of the firm’s financial year. Thus, all variables in this vector are lagged by one year in order to 
obtain the firm’s complete information for a whole financial year. The control variable is 
MAtypeit. It stands for the type of M&A which includes vertical, horizontal and conglomerate 
M&A. Finally, the error term is made up of a time-specific component (vt), a two-digit industry-
specific component (vj), and an idiosyncratic error term εit. These terms control for year and 
industry respectively. 
Conditional on effects of M&A completions on the post-M&A profitability level, the research 
further searches for the potential moderating roles of M&A completions dummy on other 
explanatory variables in shaping the firm’s profitability level. To this end, equation 6.1 is 
modified by allowing parameter heterogeneity in M&A completions:  
PMit+1 = β0 + β1MAit + β2PMit-1 + β3Xit-1 + β4PMit-1* MAit + β5Xit-1* MAit +β6MAtypeit + vt + 
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vj + εit       (6.2) 
By interacting MAit with firm characteristics, equation 6.2 examines the profitability effects 
due to completion of M&A indirectly through various firm characteristics differences. This 
research also looks at the subsample of deals with acquirers having high profit targets and deals 
with acquirers having low profit targets. This separation will answer the effect of M&A event 
on firms’ profitability in the deals where an acquirer firm wishes to acquire a profitable target 
for synergetic gains and in the deals where an acquirer firm wishes to acquire an unprofitable 
target for the discipline of bad management. 
The regressions are estimated separately with inclusion of pre-acquisition firm’s profitability 
and exclusion of that for the cross border M&A deals. The latter estimations which are static 
models are used to construct a comparison with the former dynamic ones. This can illustrate 
whether the pre-acquisition firm’s profitability controls for the past status about the firm’s 
earning ability prior to takeovers. Although the static model does not incorporate the dynamic 
nature of the continuity on firm’s earning ability, it can lends robustness to the previous results 
in this study. Therefore, the estimations are conducted with the same specifications to equation 
6.1 except for the term of PMit-1 for targets and acquirers respectively as follows:  
PMit+1 = β0 + β1MAit + β2Xit-1 + β3MAtypeit + vt + vj + εit        (6.3) 
The similar specification to equation 6.2 is also conducted with interaction terms as follows: 
PMit+1 = β0 + β1MAit + β2Xit-1 + β3Xit-1* MAit +β4MAtypeit + vt + vj + εit       (6.4) 
In order to assess whether there is a difference in ownership advantage between MNEs and non-
MNEs, this research will also estimate the impact of firm MNE status on target’s post-M&A 
profitability level by modelling four groups of completed cross border M&A deals. They are 
four types of deals with MNE acquirer, non-MNE acquirer, MNE target and non-MNE target 
respectively. The specifications are constructed as follow: 
PMit+1 = β0 + β1T_mne + β2PMit-1 + β3Xit-1 +β4MAtypeit + vt + vj + εit        (6.5) 
PMit+1 = β0 + β1A_mne + β2PMit-1 + β3Xit-1 +β4MAtypeit + vt + vj + εit        (6.6) 
T_mne stands for the target’s MNE status dummy, while A_mne stands for the acquirer’s MNE 
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status dummy. Value of 1 denotes MNE firm and value of 0 denotes non-MNE firm. Other 
variables keep the same. The four types of deals are constructed by dividing A_mne = 1 or 0 in 
equation 6.5 and T_mne = 1 or 0 in equation 6.6. 
6.3.4 Data Source and Data Description 
This research has utilised two large databases which are Zephyr and Orbis. Zephyr contains 
widely domestic and cross border M&A deals. Orbis contains comprehensive and rich firm-
level information. Both databases are provided by Bureau van Dijk, a leading electronic 
publisher of annual account information on private and public firms. The cross border M&A 
deals are selected to compose a large dataset spanning the period 2002-2011. The firms’ 
information of both targets and acquirers has been incorporated into the dataset of cross border 
M&A deals. This research applies the dataset with pooling cross-section firms within a time 
period. In order to detect the synergetic and disciplinary effects, this study will investigate the 
post-M&A performance by differentiating the deals between acquiring high and low profit 
targets. This research adopts the methods used by Waring (1996) and Pedro and Pedro (2007) 
to set the bench mark and to stratify the high profitable and low profitable targets. The bench 
mark of pre-M&A target profitability level is set to be the average value (4.99%) of target’s 
profit margin in the one year prior to the takeovers. Therefore, this study will divide the main 
sample into two subsamples based on the bench mark of pre-M&A target profitability level, 
which are high pre-profit target subsample and low pre-profit target subsample. Table 6.2 below 
will show the distributions of deals in the cross border M&A. 
Table 6.2 shows the distributions of frequency and percentage about cross border M&A status 
in the deals across the pre-M&A target subsamples. From table 6.2, there are total 19,685 cross 
border M&A deals, in which 11,187 (56.83%) deals do not have the target’s profitability value. 
Among of all international deals, 9.62% (1,894) of these deals are rumoured but uncompleted, 
90.38% (17,791) of them are rumoured and completed finally. Most international deals were 
rumoured and then followed with completion. More specifically, in the deals with high profit 
or low profit targets, both completed international M&A (87.44% and 87.40%) also overwhelm 
the uncompleted ones (12.56% and 12.60%) in numbers of deals. Whilst, the number of deals 
with high profit targets (4,157) are slightly less than those with low profit firms (4,341), which 
are account for 21.12% and 22.05% respectively. Similarly, the numbers of high profit targeted 
international M&A (27.56% and 20.43%) are slightly less than that of low profit targeted ones 
(28.88% and 21.33%) respectively in terms of both uncompleted deals and completed ones.  
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Table 6.2  The distributions of cross border M&A and pre-M&A target feature 
Pre-M&A target Uncompleted MA Completed MA Total 
No profit value  
825 7.37% 10362 92.63% 11187 100% 
43.56%   58.24%   56.83%   
High profit 
522 12.56% 3635 87.44% 4157 100% 
27.56%   20.43%   21.12%   
Low profit 
547 12.60% 3794 87.40% 4341 100% 
28.88%   21.33%   22.05%   
Total 
1894 9.62% 17791 90.38% 19685 100% 
100%   100%   100%   
Source: Author’s calculations from Orbis and Zephyr data set. 
6.4 Results and Discussion 
6.4.1 Effects of Cross Border M&A on Target’s Profitability in the Static Model 
The sample information for the static model of M&A’s impact on target’s post-acquisition 
profitability is summarised in the below table. From this table, all variables show positive mean 
value in the sample of 3,644 cross border M&A, while the dependent variable of target’s post-
M&A profit margin has negative values for specific observations. Amongst, the wide spread 
exists in such variables as target’s cash flow, intangible assets and total assets. 
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics for the static model of target’s profitability 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TProfitMargint+1 3644 4.196531 21.67837 -99.83 99.5 
Completed_MAt 3644 0.8619649 0.3449842 0 1 
TGearingRatiot-1 3644 97.49805 157.088 0 992.41 
TCashFlowt-1 3644 35239.26 17716.61 1 64793 
TIntangibleAssett-1 3644 11115.22 10301.67 12 31312 
TTotalAsset t-1 3644 823654.6 6247576 6 2.02E+08 
MAtype 3644 1.761526 0.949705 1 3 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
The impacts of cross border M&A on target firms’ post-acquisition profitability are presented 
in table 6.4. All these models include the key independent variables and pre-M&A target’s 
characteristics such as cash flow, corporate leverage, intangible assets and firm size. One of the 
research tasks is to seek an understanding of potential profit margin level channels through 
which a completion of an M&A may influence target’s profitability. This is done by interaction 
between the cross border M&A completion dummy and key target’s characteristics. Thus, two 
sets of model estimation results are discussed in columns (1) and (2) of table 6.4, which are a 
baseline model and a model with interaction terms. 
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The sample of all international M&A is split into international deals with high previous profit 
target in columns (3) and (4) and ones with low profit target in columns (5) and (6) by 
differentiating the benchmark of target’s pre-M&A profitability level. The former subsample 
aims to examine whether profitable targets can achieve the synergistic effect through 
international takeovers. The latter subsample aims to assess whether unprofitable targets can 
benefit from the disciplinary effect to improve its profitability by replacing the poor 
management. The results of estimates for two subsamples are also reported in table 6.4. The 
M&A types, year and industry effects are controlled for both the baseline model and interaction 
model. The table presents adjusted R-squared values and the numbers of observations in the 
specifications after eliminating the missing data.  
From columns (1) and (2) of table 6.4, there are significant and negative coefficients of gearing 
ratio for targets. This means that high financial risk will reduce the target’s profitability in 
international M&A and this effect will not be influenced significantly no matter whether the 
deal is completed or not. A target is less likely to gain profit after the M&A with the risk of debt 
default increasing prior to the takeover.  
Column (1) of table 6.4 reports a significant and positive sign for the target’s cash flow. This 
suggests that firms who have sufficient funds can achieve high profit after takeovers. This is 
because more strategic resources can be purchased to expand the outputs by targets. Consistent 
with the previous findings (Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008, Du et al., 2014), more cash holding 
could also release restrictions on obtaining various strategic resources and hence boost the 
profitability. This supports the managerial discipline hypothesis. More specifically, column (5) 
of table 6.4 reports the significant and positive sign of target’s cash flow. It demonstrates that 
the high liquidity of target firm can contribute to its post-acquisition profitability level in 
international takeovers if it is in low profit position. This can be explained that the advantage 
of sufficient funds in targets can compensate for the disadvantage in low competency in 
expansion. However, columns (3) and (4) of table 6.4 with respect to the target’s cash flow 
variable report the significant and negative signs. It suggests the negative relation between cash 
holding and post-acquisition profitability due to pursuit of management self-interests. 
As for the firm size, according to columns (1) and (2) of table 6.4, the coefficients of target’s 
total assets are significant and positive. This means that bigger target firms incline to achieve 
higher profitability levels because large firms are able to allocate more resource to achieve the 
profit. Moreover, the ability and skill of bigger firms are more mature in integrating resources 
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than those of smaller firms. Hence, they are more likely to survive in the markets and make a 
profit after experiencing takeovers.  
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Table 6.4  The impact of cross border M&A on target’s profitability with static model 
  All international deals high profitable targets low profitable targets 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
TPMt+1 Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. 
MAt -1.44E+00 1.10E+00   -4.11E+00 2.74E+00   -1.65E+00 1.54E+00   -8.25E+00 4.56E+00 * -1.86E+00 1.46E+00   -4.38E+00 3.48E+00   
TGEAR t-1 -1.03E-02 2.31E-03 *** -1.32E-02 6.29E-03 ** -4.96E-03 4.13E-03   3.94E-03 1.01E-02   -3.40E-03 2.72E-03   -1.16E-02 7.87E-03   
TGEAR_MA t-1       3.29E-03 6.75E-03         -1.07E-02 1.11E-02         9.34E-03 8.37E-03   
TCF t-1 8.65E-05 2.03E-05 *** 5.91E-05 5.68E-05   -5.70E-05 3.29E-05 * -1.97E-04 9.30E-05 ** 6.23E-05 2.53E-05 ** 5.25E-05 7.23E-05   
TCF_MA t-1       3.14E-05 6.07E-05         1.59E-04 9.93E-05         1.12E-05 7.71E-05   
TIA t-1 -2.21E-05 3.51E-05   -9.93E-05 9.40E-05   -2.33E-05 4.88E-05   -9.80E-05 1.35E-04   8.82E-06 4.72E-05   -5.41E-05 1.22E-04   
TIA_MA t-1       8.89E-05 1.01E-04         8.29E-05 1.45E-04         7.38E-05 1.32E-04   
TTA t-1 1.43E-07 5.97E-08 ** 1.26E-07 6.43E-08 ** 3.38E-08 6.69E-08   5.70E-09 7.24E-08   1.58E-07 1.13E-07   1.50E-07 1.20E-07   
TTA_MA t-1       1.78E-07 1.71E-07         1.46E-07 1.81E-07         2.86E-07 4.00E-07   
Vertical_MA 3.64E-01 2.04E+00   3.78E-01 2.04E+00   1.89E+00 2.88E+00   1.83E+00 2.88E+00   -2.31E+00 2.70E+00   -2.19E+00 2.70E+00   
Horizontal_MA -9.02E-02 8.13E-01   -7.53E-02 8.14E-01   -1.51E-02 1.13E+00   -3.64E-02 1.13E+00   -1.46E+00 1.09E+00   -1.40E+00 1.09E+00   
Constant term 3.45E+00 7.30E+00   5.25E+00 7.55E+00   7.28E+00 1.12E+01   1.21E+01 1.17E+01   9.94E+00 8.90E+00   1.09E+01 9.24E+00   
Adj. R-squared 0.0314    0.0311    0.0363    0.0364    0.0449    0.0438    
No. of obs. 3644     3644     1786     1786     1663     1663     
Note:    1. All regressions have controlled year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
   2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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This research uses the likelihood ratio test (LR test) to compare differences among nested 
models because the baseline model can be regarded to be nested within the interaction model. 
The LR chi-square value between column (1) and (2) of table 6.4 is 2.68 (p-value is 0.6121) 
based on the same observation numbers of the two models. Similarly, the LR chi-square value 
between column (3) and (4) of table 6.4 is 4.38 (p-value is 0.3569), and the LR chi-square value 
between column (5) and (6) of table 6.4 is 2.44 (p-value is 0.6558). They suggest that the three 
baseline models are not nested well in the three interaction models for the whole cross border 
M&A sample and two subsamples with high and low profitable targets. This can also be 
confirmed by greater adjusted R-square values of baseline models than those of interaction 
models for three samples. 
6.4.2 Effects of Cross Border M&A on Target’s Profitability in the Dynamic Model 
The sample information for the dynamic model of M&A’s impact on target’s post-acquisition 
profitability is summarised in the below table. From this table, all variables show positive mean 
value in the sample of 3,449 cross border M&A, while the variables of target’s post-M&A and 
pre-M&A profit margins have negative values for specific observations. Amongst, the wide 
spread exists in such variables as target’s cash flow, intangible assets and total assets. 
Table 6.5 Descriptive statistics for the dynamic model of target’s profitability 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TProfitMargint+1 3449 4.442111 21.00123 -99.83 99.5 
Completed_MAt 3449 0.8596695 0.34738 0 1 
TProfitMargint-1 3449 6.870803 16.34717 -94.98 99.56 
TGearingRatiot-1 3449 97.72866 157.1727 0 992.41 
TCashFlowt-1 3449 35755.87 17502.19 1 64793 
TIntangibleAssett-1 3449 11298.66 10309.24 12 31312 
TTotalAsset t-1 3449 862850.5 6417488 6 2.02E+08 
MAtype 3449 1.776457 0.9534782 1 3 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
Table 6.6 reports the same formats to table 6.4 except for including the lagged target’s 
profitability and its interaction terms. They consider the effects of cross border M&A and use 
the cross border M&A completions dummy interacted with key target’s characteristics in the 
dynamic models. The effects of international M&A with the dynamic models are exploited to 
make comparison with static models. This aims to examine whether the pre-acquisition target’s 
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profitability controls for the past status about the target’s earning ability prior to takeovers and 
to offer robustness check to the static models. Similarly, two sets of model estimation results 
and two subsamples estimations are discussed in table 6.6. The M&A types, year and industry 
effects are also controlled for both baseline model and interaction model. The table presents 
adjusted R-squared values and the numbers of observations in the specifications after 
eliminating the missing data.  
Across model specifications in column (1) and (2) of table 6.6, the key variable M&A 
completions dummy shows significant and negative coefficients for targets. This suggests that 
the completion of international M&A will reduce the target’s post-M&A profitability level 
compared with the abandoned takeover rumours, which is consistent with hypothesis 1. 
Furthermore, column (4) of table 6.6 reports a significant and negative relationship between 
target’s post-M&A profit margin level and the completion of cross border M&A in the deals 
which have high profit targets. This implies that targets cannot achieve high profitability level 
after cross border M&A completing in the short term, even though the firm acquires a profitable 
target. This can be explained by the fact that the uncertainty and information asymmetry in 
overseas markets increase the risk of international investment, which reduces target’s 
profitability. Furthermore, the synergy effects are less likely to be achieved in the short term 
due to the complexity during the process of implementing the practical integrations in actual 
takeovers. Thus, the advantage of target’s previous profitability is eliminated in the actual M&A.  
In columns (1) and (2) of table 6.6, the variable of target’s pre-acquisition profitability shows 
positive and significant coefficients. This implies that the target’s post-acquisition profit level 
extends from its pre-acquisition profitability levels after takeovers. This finding is consistent 
with hypothesis 4. More specifically, the pre-acquisition profitability level for targets shows 
significant and positive sign in columns (3) and (4) of table 6.6. This implies that profitable 
targets will benefit from their previous earning abilities and achieve the high post-acquisition 
profitability through M&A. This is consistent with previous literature in hypothesis 4 and 
confirms the synergetic effect. Furthermore, the significant and positive coefficients for the 
previous level of target’s profit margin in columns (5) and (6) of table 6.6 suggest that the 
previous target’s profitability is positively related to its post-M&A profitability in the deals 
which have low profit targets.\ Therefore, there is no firm evidence to prove the improvement 
of targets’ profitability through replacing management in cross border M&A. These positive 
relationships between ex-ante and ex-post firm’s profitability are consistent with the 
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explanation of Bellak et al. (2006) who argues firm’s post-acquisition performance is related to 
its pre-acquisition level.  
In columns (1) and (2) of table 6.6, the significant and negative sign of target’s cash flow 
demonstrates that the previous high liquidity of target firm reduces its post-acquisition 
profitability level in international takeovers. This is because the managements in target firms 
intend to abandon the priority of profit-maximising objective for shareholders. The 
management will exploit their farthest self-interests because they know they may lose control 
of the firms due to their firms being targeted in takeovers. The sufficient funds aggravate 
managerial discretion and the large cash holding is squandered during takeovers, which leads 
to low profit position after acquisition. The significant and positive sign of the interaction term 
between target’s cash flow and completion of M&A shows that the negative impact of cash 
flow is reinforced if the international deals are completed. This implies that the managements 
will exacerbate their behaviours of squandering if they know the acquisition would definitely 
complete. This actually reflects the existence of principal-agency problem. From columns (3) 
and (4) of table 6.6, the results confirm this kind of detrimental effect for the subsample of deals 
with high profit targets. In previously profitable firms, managers have more cash resource to 
spend lavishly and leave firms at a low profitability level when takeovers are completed. Target 
firms cannot benefit from their previously high profitability position.  
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Table 6.6  The impact of cross border M&A on target’s profitability with dynamic model 
  
All cross border deals High profitable targets Low profitable targets 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
TPMt+1 Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. 
MAt -1.91E+00 1.02E+00 * -7.54E+00 2.67E+00 *** -1.12E+00 1.47E+00   -8.08E+00 4.69E+00 * -1.74E+00 1.44E+00   -4.98E+00 3.81E+00   
TPMt-1 4.57E-01 2.25E-02 *** 4.82E-01 5.72E-02 *** 5.04E-01 3.96E-02 *** 6.01E-01 1.02E-01 *** 3.01E-01 4.35E-02 *** 3.46E-01 1.18E-01 *** 
TPM_MA t-1       -2.78E-02 6.18E-02         -1.10E-01 1.09E-01         -5.21E-02 1.26E-01   
TGEAR t-1 -1.87E-03 2.20E-03   -3.41E-03 5.98E-03   1.11E-03 3.97E-03   8.65E-03 9.70E-03   -2.46E-03 2.69E-03   -1.16E-02 7.76E-03   
TGEAR_MA t-1       1.78E-03 6.42E-03         -9.14E-03 1.06E-02         1.04E-02 8.25E-03   
TCF t-1 -5.60E-05 2.03E-05 *** -1.54E-04 5.73E-05 *** -6.85E-05 3.15E-05 ** -2.41E-04 8.91E-05 *** -1.98E-05 2.76E-05   -4.52E-05 7.96E-05   
TCF_MA t-1       1.12E-04 6.12E-05 *       1.96E-04 9.52E-05 **       2.91E-05 8.50E-05   
TIA t-1 6.24E-06 3.29E-05   -1.00E-04 8.76E-05   2.40E-05 4.67E-05   -1.16E-04 1.29E-04   6.06E-06 4.65E-05   -4.58E-05 1.21E-04   
TIA_MA t-1       1.23E-04 9.44E-05         1.57E-04 1.38E-04         6.15E-05 1.31E-04   
TTA t-1 7.95E-08 5.48E-08   6.84E-08 5.91E-08   4.16E-08 6.39E-08   2.66E-08 6.92E-08   1.21E-07 1.12E-07   1.18E-07 1.19E-07   
TTA_MA t-1       1.13E-07 1.56E-07         7.76E-08 1.73E-07         1.87E-07 3.95E-07   
Vertical_MA 6.75E-01 1.92E+00   6.50E-01 1.92E+00   2.47E+00 2.75E+00   2.38E+00 2.75E+00   -2.26E+00 2.66E+00   -2.16E+00 2.66E+00   
Horizontal_MA -4.14E-01 7.60E-01   -4.20E-01 7.61E-01   3.42E-01 1.08E+00   2.79E-01 1.08E+00   -1.45E+00 1.07E+00   -1.41E+00 1.08E+00   
Constant term 9.19E+00 6.86E+00   1.34E+01 7.12E+00 * 9.54E-01 1.08E+01   5.75E+00 1.13E+01   1.45E+01 8.80E+00 * 1.65E+01 9.38E+00 * 
Adj. R-squared 0.1391     0.1394     0.12     0.1209     0.0725     0.071     
No. of obs. 3449     3449     1786     1786     1663     1663     
Note:    1. All regressions have controlled year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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The LR chi-square value between columns (1) and (2) of table 6.6 is 6.03 (p-value is 0.3033) 
based on the same observation numbers of the two models. Similarly, the LR chi-square value 
between columns (3) and (4) of table 6.6 is 7.17 (p-value is 0.2083), and the LR chi-square 
value between columns (5) and (6) of table 6.6 is 2.55 (p-value is 0.7684). They suggest that 
the three baseline models are not nested well in the three interaction models for the whole cross 
border M&A sample and two subsamples with high and low profitable targets. This cannot be 
confirmed by adjusted R-square values because the adjusted R-square values of interaction 
models show more explanatory power than those of baseline models for the first two samples. 
6.4.3 Effects of Cross Border M&A on Acquirer’s Profitability in the Static Model 
The sample information for the static model of M&A’s impact on acquirer’s post-acquisition 
profitability is summarised in the below table. From this table, all variables show positive mean 
value in the sample of 4,012 cross border M&A, while the variables of acquirer’s post-M&A 
profit margins and pre-M&A cash flow have negative values for specific observations. Amongst 
them, the wide spread exists in such variables as acquirer’s cash flow, intangible assets and total 
assets. 
Table 6.7 Descriptive statistics for the static model of acquirer’s profitability 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AProfitMargint+1 4012 5.609564 19.16852 -99.27 99.38 
Completed_MAt 4012 0.9070289 0.2904281 0 1 
AGearingRatiot-1 4012 85.00418 118.1442 0 994.36 
ACashFlowt-1 4012 415542.6 2034567 -3231600 4.64E+07 
AIntangibleAssett-1 4012 27886.95 20043.98 16 63480 
ATotalAsset t-1 4012 4258767 1.87E+07 94 5.75E+08 
MAtype 4012 1.722832 0.9407515 1 3 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
The impacts of cross border M&A on acquirer firms’ post-acquisition profitability are presented 
in table 6.8. Similar to section 6.4.1, two sets of model estimation results are discussed in 
columns (1) and (2) of table 6.8, which are a baseline model and a model with interaction terms. 
The sample of all international M&A is split into international deals with high previous profit 
target in columns (3) and (4) and ones with low profit target in columns (5) and (6) by 
differentiating the benchmark of target’s pre-M&A profitability level. The former subsample 
aims to examine whether acquirers can achieve the synergistic effect through acquiring a 
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profitable target. The latter subsample aims to assess whether acquirers can exert the 
disciplinary effect to replace the poor management in unprofitable targets. The results of 
estimates for two subsamples with controlling M&A types, year and industry effects are also 
reported in table 6.8. The table presents adjusted R-squared values and the numbers of 
observations in the specifications after eliminating the missing data.  
From columns (1) and (2) of table 6.8, the dummy of completed cross border M&A reports 
significant and negative coefficients. This result indicates that the completed M&A will reduce 
acquirer’s profitability level compared with the only rumoured but uncompleted deal. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis 1. The significant and negative coefficient sign is found in 
column (5). This can be explained by the fact that, with the cross border M&A completions, the 
complexity and uncertainty in the integrating process of actual takeovers make the acquirer’s 
profit low. Especially when a firm acquires an unprofitable target, acquirers have to invest to 
improve the poor operation of targets in the short run after takeovers. Moreover, it takes time 
to exert the managerial disciplinary effect. Thus, because of both integration costs and time 
costs, the acquirer’s profit is reduced in the short run if the M&A are completed. The finding 
indicates that acquirers become less likely to exert the disciplinary effect well when not 
controlling for the previous earning ability. 
In column (1) of table 6.8, there is a significant and negative coefficient of gearing ratio for 
acquirers. This means that high financial risk will reduce the acquirer’s profitability in 
international M&A and this effect will not be influenced significantly no matter whether the 
deal is completed or not. Further, the negative impact of leverage on acquirer’s profitability is 
shown in column (3) of table 6.8. From one aspect, an acquirer is less likely to achieve high 
profit itself after cross border M&A if it conducts a hostile acquisition on a profitable overseas 
target especially equipped with high level of debt. From another aspect, the acquirer’s high 
operational and financial risk may decline its profitability after takeovers if it per se is under 
bad performance without considering its previous earning ability. 
Column (1) of table 6.8 reports a significant and positive sign for the acquirer’s cash flow. This 
suggests that acquirers who have sufficient funds can achieve high profit after takeovers. This 
is because more strategic resources can be purchased to expand the outputs by acquirers. 
Consistent with the previous findings (Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008, Du et al., 2014), more 
cash holding could also release restrictions on obtaining various strategic resources and hence 
boost the profitability. This supports the managerial discipline hypothesis.  
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Columns (3) and (4) in table 6.8 report that horizontal international M&A has a positive impact 
on acquirer’s profit margin in those deals where the acquirer purchases a more profitable target. 
This suggests that the acquirers are more likely to benefit from the integration of profitable 
targets due to synergy effect. The target’s resources and advantages can be quickly digested and 
incorporated into the acquirers after the international takeovers because they are located in a 
similar or even the same industry. Without considering the acquirer’s previous earning ability 
per se, acquirers show a strong ability in integrating target’s profitability advantages. Moreover, 
it is assumed that foreign acquisitions tend to lower the extent of competition in the host market 
(Schiffbauer, et al., 2009). With less competition in the host market, acquirers can obtain strong 
monopoly power to reap the abnormal profit. The host market in the same industry makes the 
acquirer achieve the economy of scale and scope of product. The fast increase in sales leads to 
the acquirer’s high profitability level after takeovers.  
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Table 6.8  The impact of cross border M&A on acquirer’s profitability with static model 
  All international deals high profitable targets low profitable targets 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
APMt+1 Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. 
MAt -3.38E+00 1.06E+00 *** -3.85E+00 1.89E+00 ** -2.14E+00 2.15E+00   1.96E+00 3.78E+00   -3.58E+00 1.82E+00 ** -3.28E+00 3.71E+00   
AGEAR t-1 -8.41E-03 2.63E-03 *** -1.49E-02 1.02E-02   -2.07E-02 5.76E-03 *** 5.42E-03 2.29E-02   -5.93E-03 5.06E-03   -1.53E-02 1.39E-02   
AGEAR_MA t-1       6.82E-03 1.05E-02         -2.77E-02 2.37E-02         1.09E-02 1.48E-02   
ACF t-1 6.44E-07 2.95E-07 ** 2.57E-07 3.83E-07   7.06E-07 1.05E-06   2.47E-06 1.86E-06   5.43E-07 5.05E-07   7.56E-07 8.70E-07   
ACF_MA t-1       9.45E-07 5.78E-07         -2.36E-06 2.25E-06         5.31E-07 1.15E-06   
AIA t-1 -1.66E-05 1.51E-05   3.03E-06 4.89E-05   -3.85E-05 3.42E-05   3.08E-05 9.78E-05   -1.03E-05 2.89E-05   4.90E-05 8.48E-05   
AIA_MA t-1       -2.27E-05 5.13E-05         -7.95E-05 1.04E-04         -7.21E-05 9.05E-05   
ATA t-1 -3.35E-08 3.09E-08   -1.76E-08 4.23E-08   -5.81E-08 1.27E-07   -2.71E-07 2.20E-07   -6.38E-08 6.21E-08   -1.22E-07 1.36E-07   
ATA_MA t-1       -3.66E-08 6.33E-08         2.90E-07 2.74E-07         2.49E-08 1.54E-07   
Vertical_MA 1.87E-01 1.68E+00   2.28E-01 1.68E+00   4.16E+00 3.85E+00   4.01E+00 3.86E+00   1.17E+00 2.79E+00   1.31E+00 2.79E+00   
Horizontal_MA 9.14E-01 6.59E-01   9.28E-01 6.60E-01   2.63E+00 1.51E+00 * 2.64E+00 1.51E+00 * 2.04E+00 1.29E+00   2.06E+00 1.30E+00   
Constant term 1.07E+01 6.05E+00 * 1.09E+01 6.22E+00 * -2.46E+01 2.05E+01   -2.89E+01 2.07E+01   6.74E+00 1.77E+01   3.89E+00 1.80E+01   
Adj. R-squared 0.0387    0.0391    0.0526    0.0509    0.0746    0.0735    
No. of obs. 4012     4012     806     806     977     977     
Note:    1. All regressions have controlled year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
   2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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The LR chi-square value between columns (1) and (2) of table 6.8 is 5.73 (p-value is 0.2203) 
based on the same observation numbers of the two models. Similarly, the LR chi-square value 
between columns (3) and (4) of table 6.8 is 3.07 (p-value is 0.5457), and the LR chi-square 
value between columns (5) and (6) of table 6.8 is 3.30 (p-value is 0.5094). They suggest that 
the three baseline models are not nested well in the three interaction models for the whole cross 
border M&A sample and two subsamples with high and low profitable targets. This can be 
confirmed by greater adjusted R-square values of baseline models than those of interaction 
models for the last two samples. However, the adjusted R-square values of interaction models 
show more explanatory power than those of baseline models in the first sample.  
6.4.4 Effects of Cross Border M&A on Acquirer’s Profitability in the Dynamic Model 
The sample information for the dynamic model of M&A’s impact on acquirer’s post-acquisition 
profitability is summarised in the below table. From this table, all variables show positive mean 
value in the sample of 3,862 cross border M&A, while the variables of acquirer’s post-M&A 
and pre-M&A profit margins and its pre-M&A cash flow have negative values for specific 
observations. Amongst them, the wide spread exists in such variables as acquirer’s cash flow, 
intangible assets and total assets. 
Table 6.9 Descriptive statistics for the dynamic model of acquirer’s profitability 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AProfitMargint+1 3862 6.119834 17.52875 -99.27 99.38 
Completed_MAt 3862 0.9085966 0.2882193 0 1 
AProfitMargint-1 3862 8.725741 16.25094 -94.46 99.05 
AGearingRatiot-1 3862 85.98095 118.0419 0 994.36 
ACashFlowt-1 3862 429745.8 2070744 -3231600 4.64E+07 
AIntangibleAssett-1 3862 28210.64 19945.24 16 63480 
ATotalAsset t-1 3862 4404697 1.91E+07 94 5.75E+08 
MAtype 3862 1.733817 0.9434082 1 3 
The descriptive statistics is analysed by using the full model with control variables. 
Table 6.10 reports the same formats to table 6.8 except for including the lagged acquirer’s 
profitability and its interaction terms. They consider the effects of cross border M&A and use 
the cross border M&A completions dummy interacted with key acquirer’s characteristics in the 
dynamic models. The acquirer’s dynamic model aims to examine whether the pre-acquisition 
acquirer’s profitability controls for the past status about the acquirer’s earning ability prior to 
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takeovers and to offer robustness check to the static models. Similarly, two sets of model 
estimation results and two subsamples estimations with controlling the M&A types, year and 
industry effects are discussed in table 6.10. The table presents adjusted R-squared values and 
the numbers of observations in the specifications after eliminating the missing data.  
Across model specifications in column (1) of table 6.10, the key variable M&A completions 
dummy shows significant and negative coefficients. This suggests that the completion of M&A 
will reduce the acquirer’s post-M&A profitability level compared within the abandoned 
takeover rumours, which is consistent with hypothesis 1. Furthermore, controlling for other 
factors, column (3) of table 6.6 confirms that acquirers cannot achieve high profitability level 
after cross border M&A completing in the short term, even though they acquires profitable 
targets. The uncertainty and information asymmetry in overseas markets weaken the acquirer’s 
ability of exploiting target’s previous profitability in the actual M&A.  
In columns from (1) to (6) of table 6.10, the variable of acquirer’s pre-acquisition profitability 
shows positive and significant coefficients. This implies that the acquirer’s post-acquisition 
profit level extends from its pre-acquisition profitability levels after takeovers. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis 4. More specifically, in columns (3) and (4) of table 6.6, acquirers 
will benefit from their previous earning abilities and achieve high post-acquisition profitability 
when they acquire the more profitable targets. This confirms the synergetic effect. Furthermore, 
the significant and positive coefficients for the previous level of acquirer’s profit margin in 
columns (5) and (6) of table 6.10 suggest that the previous acquirer’s profitability is positively 
related to its post-M&A profitability in the deals which have low profit targets. Therefore, there 
is no firm evidence to prove the effect of managerial discipline. 
In column (3) of table 6.10, there is a significant and negative coefficient of gearing ratio for 
acquirers. This means that the acquirer who has previous high financial risk will reduce its 
profitability after takeovers when it acquires a profitable target. It can be explained that a firm 
is less likely to achieve high profit itself if it conducts a hostile acquisition on a profitable 
overseas targets with especially being financed by debts (Lemmon et al., 2009). The low post-
acquisition profitability of acquirers could result from excessive debt financing. This leads to 
large interest payments that exceeded the company’s operating cash flow, which results in the 
operating loss (Balcaen, et al., 2012).  
In columns (1) and (3) of table 6.10, the coefficients of acquirer’s intangible assets show 
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significant and negative sign in both all cross border M&A sample and the high profit targets 
subsample. The evidence demonstrates that an acquirer with a high volume of intangible asset 
will make itself less profitable after M&A. This can be explained by the fact that the transfers 
of technological and managerial advantages from acquirers to overseas targets will increase the 
operational costs for acquirers. It takes time to make a profit before acquirers can gain positive 
returns from the initial investment in international takeovers (Syverson, 2011), e.g. training the 
employees in newly acquired firms, or establishing brand reputation in the host country. Du et 
al. (2014) argue that some advantages of acquirer’s intangible resources are unable to exert 
properly in the short term after takeovers because such advantages as research and development 
brand reputation may be damaged due to the M&A process. Even if the acquirer purchases a 
high profit target, the synergy effect may not be explicit in the short run. It needs time to restore 
these advantages and generate synergistic gains. Additionally, acquirers sometimes write off 
the value of certain intangible assets during the integration after the takeovers. This will 
decrease the book value of acquirer’s total assets, which creates a better book profit in terms of 
return on assets (ROA) or return on capital employed (ROCE) in their financial reports. 
However, this research employs profit margin to measure firm’s profitability. Firm’s profit 
margin is calculated by profit before tax over operating revenue. Thus, there is no significant 
influence on acquirer’s profit margin if it writes off intangible assets. 
In table 6.10, columns (5) and (6) show that horizontal M&A has a positive impact on acquirer’s 
post-acquisition profit margin in cross border deals if a firm acquires a low profit target. This 
is because acquirers can purchase unprofitable targets at a low transaction cost in order to 
exploit overseas markets. The host markets in the same industry provide the acquirer with 
enlargements in economy of scale and scope of product. The fast increase in sales with a slow 
increase in costs results in the acquirer’s high profitability level after takeovers. 
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Table 6.10  The impact of cross border M&A on acquirer’s profitability with dynamic model 
  All cross border deals high profitable targets low profitable targets 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
APMt+1 Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. Coef. Std. Err. sig. 
MAt -2.29E+00 9.18E-01 ** -1.25E+00 1.76E+00   -3.43E+00 1.84E+00 * -2.94E+00 3.52E+00   -2.31E+00 1.55E+00   -1.42E+00 3.39E+00   
APMt-1 4.06E-01 1.65E-02 *** 4.81E-01 5.04E-02 *** 4.73E-01 3.68E-02 *** 3.80E-01 8.75E-02 *** 4.09E-01 3.53E-02 *** 4.37E-01 1.12E-01 *** 
APM_MA t-1       -8.47E-02 5.31E-02         1.12E-01 9.61E-02         -3.12E-02 1.18E-01   
AGEAR t-1 -3.01E-03 2.29E-03   -6.57E-03 9.00E-03   -9.49E-03 5.01E-03 * 1.03E-02 2.16E-02   -2.40E-03 4.30E-03   -8.56E-03 1.20E-02   
AGEAR_MA t-1       3.65E-03 9.27E-03         -2.03E-02 2.21E-02         7.08E-03 1.28E-02   
ACF t-1 1.36E-07 2.52E-07   -2.31E-08 3.28E-07   -3.49E-07 8.83E-07   1.77E-06 1.58E-06   2.40E-07 4.25E-07   7.85E-07 7.33E-07   
ACF_MA t-1       3.51E-07 4.92E-07         -2.94E-06 1.91E-06         -1.01E-07 9.66E-07   
AIA t-1 -2.70E-05 1.30E-05 ** 1.56E-06 4.29E-05   -5.03E-05 2.93E-05 * -3.36E-05 8.50E-05   -1.01E-05 2.47E-05   5.06E-05 7.30E-05   
AIA_MA t-1       -3.20E-05 4.50E-05         -1.91E-05 9.05E-05         -7.22E-05 7.80E-05   
ATA t-1 -8.67E-09 2.62E-08   -7.63E-09 3.60E-08   4.53E-08 1.07E-07   -2.06E-07 1.87E-07   -4.79E-08 5.22E-08   -1.58E-07 1.15E-07   
ATA_MA t-1       -1.17E-09 5.37E-08         3.48E-07 2.32E-07         1.02E-07 1.30E-07   
Vertical_MA -1.14E+00 1.44E+00   -1.09E+00 1.44E+00   -9.55E-01 3.29E+00   -1.17E+00 3.30E+00   1.30E+00 2.37E+00   1.42E+00 2.38E+00   
Horizontal_MA -6.67E-02 5.67E-01   -9.50E-02 5.68E-01   7.21E-01 1.28E+00   8.06E-01 1.28E+00   2.07E+00 1.10E+00 * 2.02E+00 1.11E+00 * 
Constant term 5.94E+00 5.12E+00   4.90E+00 5.31E+00   -3.00E+01 1.72E+01 * -3.13E+01 1.74E+01 * 2.24E+01 1.49E+01   1.92E+01 1.53E+01   
Adj. R-squared 0.1772     0.1772     0.2515     0.2501     0.1865     0.185     
No. of obs. 3862     3862     780     780     948     948     
Note:    1. All regressions have controlled year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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The LR chi-square value between columns (1) and (2) of table 6.10 is 4.84 (p-value is 0.4353) 
based on the same observation numbers of the two models. Similarly, the LR chi-square value 
between columns (3) and (4) of table 6.10 is 4.28 (p-value is 0.5094), and the LR chi-square 
value between columns (5) and (6) of table 6.10 is 3.83 (p-value is 0.5741). They suggest that 
the three baseline models are not nested well in the three interaction models for the whole cross 
border M&A sample and two subsamples with high and low profitable targets. This can also be 
confirmed by greater adjusted R-square values of baseline models than those of interaction 
models for three samples. 
6.4.5 Comparison in Goodness of Fit for Static and Dynamic Models 
Based on the findings of this chapter, there is some difference between static and dynamic 
models for targets and acquirers respectively. From the aspect of targets, significant and 
negative coefficients of cash flow in static models change into positive in dynamic models 
respectively within the whole sample of international M&A and the subsample with low 
profitable targets. The significant and positive coefficient of firm size in static model changes 
into insignificant in dynamic model within the whole sample of international M&A. 
From the aspect of acquirers, the significant and positive coefficient of cash flow in static model 
changes into insignificant in dynamic model within the whole sample of international M&A. 
The insignificant coefficients of intangible assets in static models change into significant and 
negative in dynamic models respectively within the whole sample of international M&A and 
the subsample with high profitable targets. Moreover, in order to increase acquirer’s 
profitability in horizontal M&A, acquirers should buy high profitable targets without 
considering its previous profitability, while they should buy low profitable targets if considering 
its previous profitability. 
The diagnostics used by LR chi-squared and adjusted R-squared show whether the baseline 
models are nested in the interaction models. However, When considering which model can 
explain better the impact of cross border M&A completion on firm’s profitability between the 
static models and dynamic models, LR chi-square and adjusted R-square are unable to show 
the comparison of model fit. This research uses AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and BIC 
(Bayesian Information Criterion) to test model fit and compare the goodness-of-fit for both the 
above models. Table 6.11 reports measures of model fit for effects of cross border M&A on 
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target’s profitability. The results from likelihood ratio test from the above several sections have 
already indicated the more appropriate model from comparisons of corresponding baseline and 
interaction models. This section compares static baseline models (1, 3 and 5) with dynamic 
baseline models (2, 4 and 6) for targets within the whole sample of international M&A and the 
two subsamples with high and low profitable targets respectively. By using the same numbers 
of observations within the three samples, table 6.11 shows three positive values (391.108, 
155.804 and 42.552) of BIC’ difference between static and dynamic models respectively. These 
results provide strong supports for the target’s dynamic models for the three samples. 
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Table 6.11 Comparisons of fit for regresses of target’s post-M&A profitability 
  All international M&A High profitable targets Low profitable targets 
Type: Static Dynamic   Static Dynamic   Static Dynamic   
Model: (1) Baseline (2) Baseline Difference (3) Baseline (4) Baseline Difference (5) Baseline (6) Baseline Difference 
N: 3449 3449 0 1786 1786 0 1663 1663 0 
Log-Lik Intercept 
Only: 
-15394.179 -15394.179 0 -7954.083 -7954.083 0 -7315.99 -7315.99 0 
Log-Lik Full Model: -15285.194 -15085.567 -199.627 -7871.666 -7790.02 -81.646 -7230.477 -7205.493 -24.984 
D: 30570.388(3347) 30171.134(3346) 399.254(1) 15743.332(1686) 15580.040(1685) 163.292(1) 14460.955(1567) 14410.986(1566) 49.969(1) 
LR: 217.970(98) 617.224(99) -399.254(-1) 164.834(96) 328.126(97) -163.292(-1) 171.026(92) 220.995(93) -49.969(-1) 
Prob > LR: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R2: 0.061 0.164 -0.103 0.088 0.168 -0.08 0.098 0.124 -0.027 
Adjusted R2: 0.034 0.139 -0.105 0.036 0.12 -0.084 0.045 0.073 -0.028 
AIC: 8.923 8.808 0.115 8.927 8.837 0.09 8.811 8.782 0.029 
AIC*n: 30774.388 30377.134 397.254 15943.332 15782.04 161.292 14652.955 14604.986 47.969 
BIC: 3306.263 2915.155 391.108 3119.013 2963.209 155.804 2839.49 2796.937 42.552 
BIC': 580.322 189.214 391.108 553.988 398.184 155.804 511.28 468.728 42.552 
Source from the analysis by using the command of ‘fitstat’ in Stata package. 
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Table 6.12 reports measures of model fit for effects of cross border M&A on acquirer’s 
profitability. Similar to target side, the results from likelihood ratio test from above several 
sections have also indicates the more appropriate model from comparisons of corresponding 
baseline and interaction models. This section compares static baseline models (1, 3 and 5) with 
dynamic baseline model (2, 4 and 6) for acquirers within the whole sample of international 
M&A and the two subsamples with high and low profitable targets respectively. By using the 
same numbers of observations within the three samples, table 6.12 shows three positive values 
(569.119, 160.205 and 130.699) of BIC’ difference between static and dynamic models 
respectively. These results provide strong supports for the acquirer’s dynamic models for the 
three samples. 
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Table 6.12 Comparisons of fit for regresses of acquirer’s post-M&A profitability 
  All international M&A High profitable targets Low profitable targets 
Type: Static Dynamic   Static Dynamic   Static Dynamic   
Model: (1) Baseline (2) Baseline Difference (3) Baseline (4) Baseline Difference (5) Baseline (6) Baseline Difference 
N: 3862 3862 0 780 780 0 948 948 0 
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -16539.6 -16539.6 0 -3346.238 -3346.238 0 -3976.298 -3976.298 0 
Log-Lik Full Model: -16402.48 -16113.791 -288.689 -3270.524 -3187.092 -83.432 -3899.894 -3831.117 -68.777 
D: 32804.959(3762) 32227.582(3761) 577.378(1) 6541.048(690) 6374.184(689) 166.865(1) 7799.787(855) 7662.233(854) 137.554(1) 
LR: 274.240(96) 851.618(97) -577.378(-1) 151.427(86) 318.292(87) -166.865(-1) 152.809(89) 290.362(90) -137.554(-1) 
Prob > LR: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R2: 0.069 0.198 -0.129 0.176 0.335 -0.159 0.149 0.264 -0.115 
Adjusted R2: 0.045 0.177 -0.132 0.074 0.251 -0.177 0.061 0.187 -0.126 
AIC: 8.546 8.397 0.149 8.617 8.405 0.211 8.424 8.281 0.143 
AIC*n: 33004.959 32429.582 575.378 6721.048 6556.184 164.865 7985.787 7850.233 135.554 
BIC: 1734.825 1165.707 569.119 1946.135 1785.93 160.205 1939.314 1808.615 130.699 
BIC': 518.619 -50.5 569.119 421.272 261.067 160.205 457.229 326.53 130.699 
Source from the analysis by using the command of ‘fitstat’ in Stata package 
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Generally, dynamic model shows a better fit for both targets and acquirers based on the 
diagnostic analysis for goodness of model fit.  
6.4.6 The Impact of MNE Status on Target’s Profitability 
The impact of MNE status on target’s post-acquisition profitability is reported in table 6.13. All 
these models include the pre-M&A target’s characteristics such as profitability, cash flow, 
corporate financial leverage, intangible assets and firm size. Four models also include the target 
MNE status dummy and acquirer MNE status dummy respectively. The year and industry 
dummies are controlled in all the four models. 
In model (1) of table 6.13, when the acquirer is an MNE in the international M&A, target’s 
MNE status shows a significant and positive sign. This means MNE target’s profit margin will 
be improved when it is acquired by another MNE firm. The significant and positive sign of 
acquirer’s MNE status in model (3) suggests the same argument to model (1). The MNE status 
in model (2) and (4) is not found to be significant. This means that only the cross border M&A 
between multinational corporations can bring target firms an improvement in profitability. No 
significant evidence is found for the ownership advantage transfer from MNEs to non-MNEs 
in international takeovers. It can be interpreted that the synergy effect can only be created in 
the integration between MNEs. 
The coefficients in columns from (1) to (4) of table 6.13 show significant and positive signs. 
This means that the target’s pre-M&A profitability is positively related to its post-M&A 
profitability regardless of firm’s MNE status. The significant and negative coefficient of the 
target’s gearing ratio in column (1) suggests that a high level of the target’s leverage will reduce 
its profitability if it is acquired by an MNE. This can be explained that the sales generated are 
used to pay off the debt of targets, which leads to a low profitability in the balance sheets. In 
terms of the target’s cash flow, the significant and negative coefficients in columns (1) and (3) 
imply that the large cash holdings of targets reduce their profitability either when they are 
acquired by MNEs or when they are MNEs per se. This could be caused by a wayward 
expenditure of the target’s management on the large cash holdings. 
In model (2) of table 6.13, horizontal M&A shows significant and negative sign. This suggests 
that when a non-MNE firm acquires another overseas MNE target firm within the same industry, 
the acquired MNE target cannot achieve high post-acquisition profitability level. It can be 
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explained by a substitution effect on domestic exporting activity. Harris (2009) argues that 
domestic production is more likely to be substituted after horizontal M&A due to easy mobility 
of production across similar firms. If horizontal cross border M&A indeed replaces exporting 
activities of MNE targets, this will reduce the domestic production of acquired MNE targets. 
MNE targets lose their advantage in the scale economy of production. This increases the 
production cost and accordingly compress the profit of target firms. Thus, the post-acquisition 
profitability of MNE target will be reduced after horizontal M&A.  
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Table 6.13  The impact of MNE status on target’s post-M&A profitability  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 MNE acquirer Non-MNE acquirer MNE target Non-MNE target 
TPMt+1 Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. Coef. Std. Err. Sig. 
T_mne 2.58E+00 1.23E+00 ** -2.41E+00 2.14E+00               
A_mne             3.82E+00 1.81E+00 ** -9.46E-01 1.07E+00   
TPMt-1 4.31E-01 3.20E-02 *** 5.59E-01 5.33E-02 *** 4.56E-01 4.86E-02 *** 4.69E-01 3.22E-02 *** 
TGEARt-1 -5.30E-03 3.15E-03 * 2.19E-03 5.19E-03   -6.82E-03 5.74E-03   -2.65E-03 3.01E-03   
TCFt-1 -5.34E-05 2.82E-05 * -6.24E-05 4.67E-05   -1.30E-04 4.91E-05 *** -4.22E-05 2.74E-05   
TIAt-1 -4.76E-06 4.63E-05   -2.34E-05 8.00E-05   -1.68E-05 7.86E-05   6.82E-06 4.59E-05   
TTAt-1 2.41E-07 2.09E-07   2.00E-06 2.07E-06   2.01E-07 2.02E-07   1.78E-07 5.42E-07   
MAtype   
Vertical_MA 5.53E-01 2.54E+00   -2.90E+00 5.07E+00   1.84E+00 4.28E+00   -2.46E-01 2.60E+00   
Horizontal_MA -5.75E-01 1.07E+00   -4.43E+00 1.84E+00 ** 6.57E-01 1.83E+00   -1.50E+00 1.05E+00   
Constant term 2.72E+00 9.68E+00   5.40E+01 1.76E+01 *** -5.96E+00 1.19E+01   3.44E+00 1.56E+01   
Adj R-squared 0.1185    0.179    0.2774    0.1097    
No. of obs. 1845     666     482     2029     
Note:    1. All regressions include year dummy and NACE 2-digit industrial sector dummies.  
2. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
This research assesses the impacts of cross border M&A on targets’ and acquirers’ performance 
in terms of profitability by employing the firm’s information and M&A status in the period of 
2002-2011. It also investigates the participants’ post-M&A profitability level with the 
subsamples of previously high and low profit targets respectively. The firm level data from 
rumoured but uncompleted deals are adopted to stimulate the counterfactual situation which 
builds a high similarity with actual completed M&A. This provides a better control group 
compared with previous research. The impacts of cross border M&A on both target side and 
acquirer side are analysed respectively. The profitability of firms prior to the M&A is also taken 
into account in analyzing impacts of M&A on profitability itself. It also compares the dynamic 
mode of cross border M&A with static model of that which excludes the firm’s pre-acquisition 
profitability variable. 
Some important results are found from the analysis. Generally, Chapter 6 finds that the firm’s 
profitability level reduces once cross border M&A is completed for both targets and acquirers. 
One important reason is the complementarity in assets between the foreign acquirer and the 
domestic target which increases the transaction price. Thus, increased transaction costs result 
in low profitability. From another aspect, the takeover rumour can be regarded as a type of 
threat to replace the incumbent managements. Such threats from potential M&A motivate the 
incumbent managements to improve their firm’s profitability. However, when the rumoured 
deals are completed, firms may not make high profit due to considerable costs of transaction 
and integration. Therefore, in chapter 6, completed deals are found to have a low firm’s 
profitability level compared with rumoured but uncompleted deals. More specifically, in cross 
border M&A with the motive of synergy effect, firms are less likely to obtain a high profitability 
level due to the difficulty in integrating target’s competitive advantages. In contrast, in cross 
border M&A with the motive of disciplinary effect, the difficulty in transfer of managerial 
ability is more likely to result in a low firm’s profitability. 
In addition, the ex-post research on M&A performance suffers from the sample selection issues 
which may cause bias to the results on firm performance. To minimise this bias, the rumoured 
but uncompleted deals are adopted which provides a better control group compared with 
previous approaches. The profitability of the firm prior to M&A is also included to control for 
the effect of firm’s previous earning ability on its following performance. The firm’s pre-
acquisition profitability level is used to construct the dynamic mode of cross border M&A. 
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Chapter 6 finds that the firm’s post-M&A profitability level has a positive relation with its 
previous profitability level prior to M&A. This means that the post-M&A performance of 
targets and acquirers are found generally to inherit their previous earning ability prior to 
takeovers.  
As for the effects of firm-level characteristics, it is found that the firm’s leverage level is 
negatively related to target’s and acquirer’s profitability in the static models of international 
deals rather than the dynamic models. The firm’s liquidity level is negatively related to target’s 
profitability in international M&A in the dynamic models but is positively associated with both 
firms profitability in the static models. The firm’s intangible resource is only negatively 
associated with acquirer’s profitability in the dynamic models of international M&A. Therefore, 
firm’s leverage, liquidity and intangible assets are found to be negatively related to its 
profitability. Some explanations for these findings are: first, high level of leverage leads to large 
interest payments that exceeded the company’s operating cash flow, which results in the 
operating loss; second, the sufficient cash flows aggravate managerial discretions and poor 
investment targets are chosen in takeovers, which leads to low profit position after acquisition; 
third, transferring technological and managerial advantages across markets will increase the 
operational costs for firms, e.g. training the employees in newly acquired firms, or establishing 
brand reputation in the host country. All these reasons will reduce operation gains in 
international takeovers. However, the firm size has only positively effects on target’s 
profitability in the static models of international M&A.  
Horizontal international M&A is positively associated with the acquirer’s post-M&A 
profitability level in the dynamic models if its target has low profit. However, horizontal 
international M&A has similar effects for an acquirer in the static models if its target has high 
profit. The evidence shows that the acquirer and target firms could not make profit in the short 
term after they complete the international M&A. The results also suggested that the cross border 
M&A could not bring both target firms and acquirer firms with the synergy effect in terms of 
profitability. Furthermore, the acquirer firms cannot achieve high profitability through the 
disciplinary intention takeovers. However, the results from chapter 6 find that only when MNE 
firms acquire MNE targets via takeovers, target’s profitability is improved. It is concluded that 
the synergy effect can only be created in the integration between MNEs. However, there is no 
significant evidence to show a transfer of the MNE’s ownership advantages. 
There are also some limitations and implications for future research. First, there are ample 
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profitability studies in the literature which report a positive or negative impact of M&A on ex-
post profitability. Nevertheless, it is required to be cautious when drawing inferences from this 
body of research evidence. The approach with using accounting profit has inherent defect in 
measuring post-M&A performance improvement, particularly under the scenario where M&A 
can prompt market power. It is argued to be somehow problematic by using accounting data. 
For instance, the corporate management teams might manipulate accounting profits. Second, 
this research has not assessed other measures for firm’s profitability, for example, ROCE, ROC 
and so on. These measures perhaps will generate different results. Third, the profitability is one 
of the indicators for firm performance. The other one can be productivity. The impacts of 
employed factors in this research on firm’s profitability could not completely reflect the M&A’s 
function in firm performance after takeovers. In such a case, it is virtually impossible to 
distinguish the change in productive efficiency from that in profitability because enhanced 
market power may affect both productivity and profitability. Clearly, an increase in productive 
efficiency and management effectiveness does not necessarily lead to improvement of post-
merger profitability. However, a fall in productive efficiency and management effectiveness, 
ceteris paribus, probably infers a decline in ex-post profitability with decreased market power. 
After examining the impacts of cross border M&A on both productivity and profitability in the 
previous chapters, the negative results are generally reported in the research. This means that 
cross border M&A does not improve firm performance both internally and externally in spite 
of support from various motives. In the next chapter, some conclusions about the whole research 
project will be discussed and suggestions will be proposed for future research and practices for 
academics and professional practitioners.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has investigated the motives of cross border M&A and their impact on firm 
performance using a rich firm-level global dataset across over the period 2002-2011. The three 
empirical chapters employ information on firms in cross border M&A deals, which includes 
“rumoured” deals and “completed” deals. Although previous research focuses on the factors 
which initiate M&A activity, it has not investigated what factors determine a completed M&A 
deal. This thesis finds firm-level evidence which shows that some factors actually deter the 
completion of cross border M&A, while these factors are traditionally believed to increase 
M&A activity. Furthermore, the thesis identifies a negative performance effect of cross border 
M&A. Some firm-level factors facilitate firms to achieve positive internal returns (i.e. 
productivity) but negative external returns (i.e. profitability).  
This thesis exploits the determinants of M&A likelihood from a different perspective. It 
identifies what factors change a rumoured cross border M&A deal status to a deal that is 
completed rather than what factors initiate a takeover. This is new to the takeover prediction 
literature. In addition, the firm’s information from the acquirer’s side casts a new insight into 
the takeover likelihood. Meanwhile, previous literature conducts performance analysis by 
employing the characteristics of a likely target firm (e.g. Schiffbauer et al., 2009; Harris, 2009). 
However, the determinant of a likely target is a necessary but not sufficient condition for that 
of M&A completions. A likely target can be identified based on the determinants of M&A 
completions, while the completion of M&A is not necessarily subject to the determinants of a 
likely target. For example, the regulatory factor will affect the completion of M&A, but it shows 
less influence in selection of a likely target. Therefore, some bias may exist for the factors 
identified based on a likely target in previous research.  
From the results obtained in the present study, it shows that firm’s liquidity, profitability, 
investment size and the listed status are important determinants which influence the completion 
of international takeovers. Thus, cross border M&A is determined by efficiency motives. 
However, firms cannot achieve either productivity gains or profitability gains once the 
international deals are completed. Since firms cannot benefit from cross border M&A, why do 
they still actively engage in such activity given the increased volume and number of total cross 
border M&A? This chapter will discuss the question and provide several suggestions in terms 
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of information disclosure and risk control.  
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. The next section presents the research 
contexts. The research objectives are reviewed in the third section. The fourth section provides 
a brief summary and review of the empirical evidence found in the current study. This exhibits 
how the conclusions were derived. The implications about this evidence and the conclusions 
drawn from it are then discussed in the fifth section to make a contribution to the current debate 
on cross border M&A. This chapter also provides suggestions on the development and 
implementation of business strategies in the corporate domain and the competence of strategic 
management and thinking. It includes policy advice about the information disclosure 
requirements on acquirer and target firms. This would improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the market for corporate control. The final section presents research limitations and 
implications for future study. 
7.2 Research Contexts 
From the aspect of management inefficiency, some evidence suggests that differentials in 
corporate performance are magnified in the recessionary phase of the business cycle (Geroski 
and Gregg, 1997). Although the mean of profitability fluctuates with the economic cycle, the 
heterogeneity of profitability enlarges sharply in downturn of the economic cycle. This suggests 
that manager’s competence is more likely to be distinguished in the sluggish economy due to 
decline in demand markets. If the lack of management competence can be shown more clearly 
in recessionary conditions, takeovers would be expected to increase during recessions. This is 
consistent with the observation of this study over the period 2002-2011, and particularly the 
period after the financial crisis in 2007. Although it is observed that the volume of cross border 
M&A activity decreases dramatically during the financial crisis, the cross border M&A activity 
after financial crisis resumes the trend to increase in terms of volume and total value.  
This thesis adopts competition to explain the performance of cross border M&A and provide 
evidence about the operational consequences of M&A. The conventional theory argues that 
conglomerate mergers have little impact on competition, while horizontal and vertical mergers 
will restrict competition due to the increase in concentration. The potentially reduced 
competition due to takeovers is negatively associated with firm’s productivity because it 
reduces the motivations on innovation and work enthusiasm. Driffield and Du (2007) argue that 
foreign M&A have a significant effect on productivity, but a limited effect on profitability. The 
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relationship between foreign takeovers and firm’s financial performance is complex. Less 
competition in markets could result in high firm’s profitability due to the monopoly rent. In 
contrast, it is argued that low efficiency narrows access to resources and markets, and 
accordingly generates low profitability (Driffield et al., 2013). Thus, the balance between 
increased market power and increased efficiency during the takeovers is regarded as beneficial 
to the public interest (Williamson, 1963).  
Alternatively, private losses suggest that the market expects post-acquisition losses in 
efficiency and effectiveness. Such losses might not bring significant damage to the whole 
economy in the short term, but poorer resource allocations are more readily associated with 
social welfare loss in the long term. The evidence generated by the current study suggests, on 
the basis of this reasoning, that in the period 2002-2011, cross border M&A activity probably 
had negative consequences for the global economy as a whole.  
7.3 Research Objectives 
This present study has realised three main objectives. First, to investigate the determinants of 
making cross border M&A completed. These influential factors are extracted from the empirical 
literature of both industrial economics and financial economics. Some determinants are proved 
to motivate the completion of cross border M&A. At the same time, they also constitute factors 
to influence post-M&A firm performance. 
Second, to examine the impacts of cross border M&A on firm’s post-M&A productive 
efficiency. This objective is to answer whether cross border M&A can improve the firm’s 
productivity by comparing the different productivity in terms of TFP and labour productivity. 
It is hypothesized that acquired firms gain efficiency improvement from cross border M&A due 
to transfer of the firm specific advantages such as knowledge capital from parent firms to 
acquired firms. Thus, this requires that parent firms possess some firm specific advantages that 
acquired firms do not. In order to achieve this objective, chapter 5 differentiates the ex-post 
productivity effects from two subsamples of M&A in terms of the difference between acquirer’s 
and target’s pre-M&A intangible assets. On the one hand, to answer whether M&A can transfer 
the technological advantages e.g. knowledge capital from parent firms to acquired firms when 
acquirers own more intangible resource advantages than overseas targets. On the other hand, to 
answer whether cross border M&A can facilitate acquirer firms to make good use of acquired 
assets when acquirers aim to obtain complementary intangible resources from targets in 
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takeovers.  
Third, to assess the impacts of cross border M&A on firm’s post-acquisition profitability. This 
objective aims to answer whether cross border M&A can make the firm more profitable. This 
is built on the theoretical basis of the market for corporate control, in particular, to re-examine 
the management displacement hypothesis which considers the market as an effective discipline 
over corporate management teams. It differentiates the ex-post profitability effects from two 
subsamples of cross border M&A in terms of target’s pre-M&A profitability level. On the one 
hand, it aims to answer whether firms can obtain the synergy from acquiring a profitable firm 
in an international takeover. On the other hand, it also aims to examine whether international 
M&A can act in the role of effective management displacement mechanism when acquiring an 
unprofitable firm. 
The first objective has been the basis of a number of previous studies on M&A activity. This 
part of the work provides a prerequisite for the empirical work on the latter two objectives, 
which are investigations of the effects on firm performance. This study assesses the impact of 
M&A on firm’s productivity and profitability from the aspects of internal returns and external 
returns. An original contribution is the use of takeover rumour data from a different perspective. 
This thesis incorporates the rumoured data into the control group to address the sample selection 
issue. Previous research has indicated some drawbacks of accounting data and the potential 
sample selection bias which are discussed in Chapter 3. The rumoured M&A data represents 
those deals which potentially could happen but do not eventually proceed. This creates similar 
deals with the range of completed deals characteristics. It simulates the counterfactual situation 
and directly identifies the potentially involved firms (i.e. potential targets and acquirers in 
rumoured but uncompleted deals). These rumoured deals are used to compare with the actual 
takeovers to identify the determinants which make international M&A complete eventually. 
7.4 Summary and Review of Empirical Results 
In this section, the empirical results from chapters 4 through 6 are collated, summarised and 
analysed. These results are used to examine the questions set at the beginning of the thesis. 
7.4.1 Determinants of Cross Border M&A and Its Impact on Firm Performance 
Due to the different focal point of chapter 4 on M&A likelihood, this chapter finds some results 
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which are different from the previous literature. Traditionally, it is believed that the large 
amount of target’s intangible asset (RBV), sufficient acquirer’s liquidity (FCF hypothesis), and 
high acquirer’s profitability (efficiency theory) will increase M&A activity. However, in this 
chapter, they are proved to deter the completion of international takeovers. First, based on the 
framework of TCE and RBV, although acquirers are interested in the intangible assets of targets, 
the takeovers may not complete ultimately because of the high integration costs or the 
unachievable consensus between both firms on the transaction price. Second, according to the 
free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis, sufficient cash flow grants managers more discretion on 
investment attempts such as takeovers. Nevertheless, these deals are more likely to be thwarted 
by shareholders and boards, which lead to deals being abandoned. Third, firms with the 
advantage in earning ability are more likely to initiate takeovers, but potential managerial 
resistance may prevent the deals from being completed.  
Therefore, chapter 4 finds that acquirer’s liquidity and profitability, target’s intangible asset and 
absolute size measure, the relative size of acquirer over target, the listed status of both involving 
firms and GDP growth for the host country are important determinants of international takeover 
completion. Particularly, it is found that the small target’s absolute size and the large relative 
size of acquirer will increase the likelihood of M&A completions. This means that large firms 
have more efficiency in implementing M&A transactions than smaller firms. This high 
efficiency of large firms is reflected in the findings of chapter 5 which testifies the positive 
relation between firm size and TFP. Therefore, the overall finding in chapter 4 suggests that the 
cross border M&A are the efficiency seeking activity rather than a resource seeking one. It is 
concluded that the managerial discretion from agency problem, the incautiousness of 
managements and high level of intangible assets in target firms will impede the completion of 
international M&A. Given the motives of cross border M&A, the next step of research aims to 
reveal how firms perform in international M&A. 
Chapter 5 reports that the completion of a cross border M&A decreases the post-acquisition 
productivity level of targets and acquirers compared with the productivity of similar firms in 
takeover rumours. The information asymmetry across markets causes difficulty in integration 
between targets and acquirers. This results in high transaction costs and accordingly low firm’s 
productivity. Particularly in market driven expansions, cross border M&A will impair target’s 
and acquirer’s productivity in terms of TFP level and labour productivity level. Besides, cross 
border M&A will bring the low level of target’s labour productivity in strategic assets driven 
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expansions. This suggests that neither of these two motives behind cross border M&A could 
produce a high level of firm’s productivity in the short term. This chapter compares two kinds 
of firm’s efficiency measures, i.e. TFP and labour productivity. It is found that the increase in 
firm’s labour productivity is mainly caused by capital deepening rather than diffusion in 
technological or organizational knowledge and economies of scale. Therefore, TFP is regarded 
as a more appropriate measure for firm’s productivity.  
It is argued that productivity and profitability are closely related. Based on the finding of low 
productivity in chapter 5, it is questioned whether the weakened productivity will be 
transformed into low profitability. Firms with different earning ability levels are acquired in 
cross border M&A. On the one hand, some firms acquire profitable targets because managers 
think the profitability of acquired firms will contribute to the financial performance for both 
firms. In particular, the results in chapter 4 report that the lower an acquirer firm’s profitability, 
the higher the likelihood that a cross border M&A is completed. Unprofitable acquirers wish to 
improve their financial positions through acquiring profitable targets. On the other hand, other 
firms acquire unprofitable targets because managers believe in their ability of improving 
target’s financial performance. However, chapter 4 finds that profitable acquirers do not 
indiscreetly overtake unprofitable targets in order to avoid losing their existing earning 
advantages. Therefore, chapter 6 investigates the firm’s post-M&A profitability level with two 
subsamples of previously high and low profit targets to test the synergetic effect and managerial 
disciplinary effect respectively. 
More specifically, in cross border M&A with the motive of synergy effect, firms tend to acquire 
profitable targets. However, high earning ability of profitable target firms is rooted in their 
competitive advantages. High market risk causes uncertainty across countries (Norback and 
Persson, 2008). This increases the probability of failure in transferring the advantages about the 
high earning ability across markets. Thus, the finding in chapter 6 proves that, in spite of a good 
intention to achieve synergy gains, it is less likely to obtain a high profitability level due to the 
difficulty in integration of competitive advantages.  
From other aspects, some takeovers are underpinned by the motive of managerial disciplinary 
effect. In this type of M&A, firms tend to acquire unprofitable targets to replace poor 
management (Jensen, 1988). However, chapter 6 finds that such type of takeovers generate 
lower firm’s profitability once deals are completed. It is explained that some competitive 
advantages such as superior organisational routine cannot be easily adopted by targets. Besides, 
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some international M&A are just conducted because discretional managers waywardly choose 
targets for expansion. Thus, chapter 6 finds that the difficulty in transfer of managerial ability 
is more likely to bring low profitability.  
In summary, chapter 4 finds that the abuse of managerial power and the difficulty in transfer of 
intangible resource deters the completion of cross border M&A. The findings in chapters 5 and 
6 are consistent with the motives of international takeovers found in chapter 4. In chapters 5 
and 6, managerial discretion and the potential high transaction costs are concluded to have 
negative impacts on performance of cross border M&A. Therefore, although there are various 
motives to initiate cross border M&A, they are less likely to complete in the end due to the 
aforementioned reasons. Furthermore, with such reasons, completed cross border M&A results 
in negative effects on firm performance compared with rumoured but uncompleted deals. 
7.4.2 Comparison between Productivity and Profitability on Completion of M&A 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are generally argued to possess specific competitive 
advantages such as a superior production technology or organizational superiority (e.g., Caves, 
1996; Dunning, 1988; and Casson, 1987). Such superiorities can be transferred to domestic 
targets via international takeovers, which can improve target’s firm performance. In chapters 5 
and 6, the research tests the multinational status of firms on target’s productivity and 
profitability respectively to isolate firm’s ownership advantages on its performance. However, 
the results from chapters 5 and 6 find that the increase in target’s productivity and profitability 
only takes place in the integration between MNEs in the completed cross border M&A. 
Compared with small domestic firms, large MNEs have more advantages, especially in finance 
to get access to advanced technology or resources across the world. Such updated technology 
or intangible capability enables MNEs to achieve high productivity and profitability. This 
suggests that only integration between MNEs produces the synergy effect. Moreover, the 
transfer of MNE’s ownership advantages to non-MNEs is not significant. From chapters 5 and 
6, no significant finding on the transfer of MNE’s ownership advantages will improve firm’s 
productivity or profitability for all completed cross border M&A.  
In chapter 5, horizontal international M&A shows positive target’s labour productivity. It is 
explained that the expansion into the same industry often leads to substitution of domestic 
production in host country (Harris, 2009). This will reduce the workforce in target firms and 
bring capital deepening effect which increases firm’s labour productivity. In chapter 6, 
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horizontal international M&A is found to be positively related to the acquirer’s profitability. 
This is explained by the achievement in economy of scale. Host markets where acquirers are 
exploring are in the same industry to acquirer’s home markets. The broadened channels of sale 
enable firms to realise scale economy in production, which reduces the cost of products. The 
increase in sales with decrease in costs results in the acquirer’s high profit margin after 
takeovers. 
As for the effects of firm’s characteristics, firm’s high leverage level has found the negative 
effect on its post-M&A productivity and profitability. For example, high leverage level means 
that firms have to make large payments due to the high proportion of debt. The limited 
disposable capital can be used in innovation to improve firm’s productivity. Meanwhile, large 
interest payments exceed the company’s operating cash flow, which results in operating loss. 
Another factor, large firm size provides firms themselves with the possibility of access to 
available resources. They facilitate firms to improve their productivity and profitability in the 
short term. 
However, the thesis finds that several firm-level factors show different impacts on firm 
performance. For example, high levels of firm’s liquidity and intangible assets are found to 
increase firm’s productivity in chapter 5, but they are found to decrease firm’s profitability in 
chapter 6. Large amount of cash flow and intangible assets provide firms with sufficient capital 
and advantages of technology or brand in innovation activity, which facilitate the firm to 
improve its productivity. However, sufficient cash flows aggravate managerial discretions and 
poor investment targets are chosen in takeovers, which leads to low profit position after 
acquisition. Besides, transferring technological and managerial advantages across markets will 
increase the operational costs for firms, e.g. training the employees in newly acquired firms, or 
establishing brand reputation in the host country (Syverson, 2011). Such factors encourage 
managerial discretions and increase transaction costs, which squeezes firm’s profit margin, 
which reduces operational gains in international takeovers. This suggests that although certain 
firm’s characteristics will bring firms positive internal returns, the same characteristics will 
generate negative external returns due to the influence of external factors.  
More specifically, sufficient cash flow can cause large managerial discretionary power. The 
abuse of managerial discretion can be found to mainly come from acquirer firms in market 
seeking M&A or takeovers with acquiring unprofitable targets. These irresponsible behaviours 
lead to low firm performance after takeovers. Thus, it is necessary to find a way to effectively 
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supervise the behaviours of managers. The information disclosure on rationale of takeovers can 
provide a good channel to achieve proper supervisions. Another example, the difficulty in 
transfer of intangible resources between acquirers and targets, is reflected from both sides of 
involving firms in cross border M&A. From senders of action, transaction costs are generated 
in transferring intangible assets from targets to acquirers (e.g. brand and its reputation or 
technology) or from acquirers to targets (e.g. managerial or organisational superiority). From 
receivers of action, the success of integration depends on the adaptation of intangible assets in 
recipients, for example, workforce skills in host or home markets, customer satisfaction on 
introduced brands, etc. Thus, the improvement of firm performance requires not only the 
cooperation between targets and acquirers but also effective risk assessments on transaction and 
integration prior to M&A.  
7.5 Policy Implications of this Study  
7.5.1 Policy Implications of Merger Activity 
Since the completion of cross border M&A cannot bring positive impacts on firm performance, 
why does cross border M&A activity continue in the real world? What implications are there 
for cross border M&A? The results generated in the current study can make a contribution to 
the policy debate on M&A. 
On the one hand, the increase in concentration due to M&A will raise opportunities to abuse 
managerial discretion. The abuse of power leads to wayward expansion without caution. Given 
incautious selection of investment projects, markets fail to allocate resources properly. The 
inappropriate allocation of resources could have detrimental impacts on the competitiveness of 
the firms involved. This argument supports the findings in this thesis. Besides, it is argued that 
the acquirer firms feel less competitive pressures in M&A because takeovers reduce the 
competitive activity of rivals and the number of independent decision-making centres (Peacock 
and Bannock, 1991). This would suggest that, to an extent, internal growth might bring more 
benefit to the public interest because it protects the domestic competition and the pressure on 
innovation activity remains.  
On the other hand, Demsetz (1973) argues that it is the efficiency effect that brings high profits 
rather than abuse of market power. Littlechild (1989) further indicates that M&A activity should 
be encouraged because of its role in the disciplinary threat posed by the market for corporate 
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control. The threat of takeover motivates improvement in efficiency. In fact, it is not necessary 
to use the actual completed takeover to exert the disciplinary function of poorly-run firms 
(Franks and Mayer, 1996). With respect to successful bids, there is evidence that even if a bid 
is unsuccessful (i.e. only rumoured but uncompleted deals) it can produce a positive impact on 
the subsequent performance of the target firm (Pickering, 1983; loll and Pickering, 1988). The 
findings in this thesis supports this argument. However, the takeover threat leads potential 
targets to have to maintain short term profits by diverting resources away from investment and 
innovation. Such a threat may cause a potential misallocation of resources which leads 
management’s attention to short-termism performance rather than a long-term view (Grinyer et 
al., 1998). Some positive synergy gains will be only shown in the long term. 
It is important to consider the balance of costs and benefits when conducting a takeover. George 
(1989) concludes that the restriction of obtaining monopoly positions should be advocated in 
M&A activity. However, it is hard to detect whether dominant firms contain anti-competitive 
behaviour during takeovers. It is argued that mergers should be viewed with a more sceptical 
eye and a more balanced approach should be adopted. 
7.5.2 Recommendations on Practices of Takeover Activity 
In this section an attempt is made to explore how the results from this study could be utilised 
to suggest and improve merger activity directly. It will be argued that increased information 
disclosure should be required in order to improve the protection for shareholders of involving 
firms and facilitating the decision-making of corporate management teams involved in M&A. 
Given the empirical results above suggest that completed M&A produces more unsuccessful 
outcomes than rumoured but abandoned deals, Pickering (1983) indicates that the managers of 
potential acquirers should give their full consideration to the reality about the likely outcomes 
of any takeover that they have in mind. 
In order to assess the managerial performance and the commercial prospects of a takeover, 
shareholders are advised to obtain two types of information. First, a detailed proposal about the 
expectation of potential benefits generated from an acquisition. The information on rationale 
for M&A proposals should be a disclosure requirement. Specifically, the managers of acquirers 
should demonstrate in some detail why they are seeking to gain control of the target, and the 
specific pecuniary benefits to shareholders of acquirers from the acquisition. This ensures 
managers of acquirers behave on behalf of shareholder interests. It is also important to disclose 
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the risk of this potential takeover, and solutions to control the risk.  
However, the information about the perceived or estimated benefits of an M&A might be the 
competitive advantage of acquirer firms. Such disclosure may leak confidential information to 
potential rivals of the acquirer. The price of target firms will be re-evaluated, which leads to an 
increased transaction price. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the audience of information 
disclosure. However, the disciplinary mechanism of the market for corporate control suggests 
that targets are, on average, underperforming. In M&A motivated by this mechanism, acquirer’s 
management teams often select poor targets. Accordingly, many deals seem to be undertaken 
for reasons other than the benefit of shareholders. Therefore, it is difficult for managers to 
provide the persuasive reason why they intend to conduct such takeovers.  
The second element that should be disclosed is the post-acquisition audit on the subsequent 
performance. Managers should be obliged to report the subsequent outcome of the takeover 
when it is completed. Disclosure of such information would force management teams to 
exercise a greater degree of caution when undertaking expansion via merger. In addition, 
provision of a performance standard would offer managers an objective to achieve and reduce 
the unnecessary waste of their efforts. M&A often involves the complicated restructuration of 
assets and lines of business, so it seems reasonable to justify their business plans with a public 
declaration. 
Ron (2009) argues that the management of acquirer firm often regard post-merger disclosure 
as an additional and unnecessary cost. However, Mueller (1989) insists that it is good 
management practice to evaluate an acquisition. It should be affordable for good management 
to carry out the audit and scrutiny. The audit undertaken by the professional accountancy firms 
provides shareholders with information about the performance of professional advisers hired 
and the firm’s management team. However，such increased disclosure is also likely to deter 
potentially dysfunctional mergers which might impair the efficiency of firms.  
The disclosure on pre- and post-acquisition performance might be beneficial to the economy as 
a whole as well as private investors. This useful information to market participants will bring 
an improvement to the market for corporate control. Revealing the prediction of profit 
improvements to the shareholders may facilitate solving the problem due to the asymmetry of 
information between shareholders and managers. The increased disclosures enable the 
regulatory authorities to implement more effective surveillance on M&A activities. Better 
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decisions would be made if the potential acquirers could disclose their estimates of the costs 
and benefits associated with an acquisition. This would contribute to the interests of 
shareholders and the public as well as improvement in the success rate of M&A deals. 
7.6 Research Implications for Future Study 
Several issues regarding cross border M&A still require further research. 
First, it is worthy of combining the PSM approach and rumoured M&A data. Most previous 
research presumes there are a large number of target firms, while new research could pay more 
attention to the availability of appropriate target firms. Sometimes, the takeover rumours 
provide observers with a potential M&A pool to identify the appropriate target firms. Given the 
advantages of takeover rumour data in constructing the control group, future study can apply 
PSM approach to match firms from the pool of takeover rumours. This will generate more 
relevance than studies which only match firms from non-targets populations. 
Second, this study did not examine the integration process of cross border M&A. The firms 
with previous experience in overseas markets have an advantage in the process of operating 
international business. The international experience from various operations and cultural 
practices in several host countries should be learnt by investing firms. The effective integration 
of target firms after acquisitions benefits from the investing firm’s knowledge of international 
practices. As such, the experience factor and its impact on cross border M&A is worth study. 
Moreover, considering the process of integration, the long-term performance of M&A should 
be studied. This research only examines the short-term effect of takeover on firm performance. 
With the integration process deepening, long-term firm performance may be different from 
short-term. Although the short-term M&A performance in this study fails to offer incentive for 
M&A activities to complete, post-M&A performance could be changed in the long run. 
Furthermore, future research could use performance growth data apart from performance level 
data to examine the effect of takeovers. 
Third, the resource based view requires academics to pay more attention to the organisational 
capability framework. Most measures of firm-level resources should be elaborated. The 
resource based view emphases that firm’s resources and competencies are important, unique, 
non-duplicable and discrepant. Thus, more elaborated measures will contribute to empirical 
research although it is not easy to measure the unique value of firm-level resources and 
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competencies. For example, the intangible asset comprises technological ability, good will, 
brand value, marketing channel, etc. These specific aspects could have different impacts on 
firm performance. Future study can distinguish the intangible asset from these aspects. 
Fourth, given various motives behind takeovers, different operations and implementations 
during integrating involving firms will lead to different firm performance. As for the 
determinants of acquisition, further study could attempt alternative indicators to measure firm-
level characteristics in order to check the consistency of results. Such measures could be 
employee numbers, sales revenue, return on investment and return of capital employed, etc. 
These measures will perhaps generate different results. Furthermore, given the impact of M&A 
on competition, future research could continue to exploit the performance of M&A by 
controlling for the market conditions from aspects of industry concentration, market share, etc. 
The change in performance of M&A can be detected whether it is owing to the change in market 
power. Moreover, future study could exploit the effect of the means of transaction payment, 
such as cash or share exchanges, on firm performance. It is also worth investigating the impact 
of the extent of ownership change, e.g. percentage of shareholding acquired on firm 
performance. 
Fifth, most studies on M&A are static, and M&A has not been connected with other corporation 
forms such as contractual alliances and joint ventures. However, M&A can evolve from other 
corporation forms with the development of globalisation and improvement of organisational 
learning. For example, joint venture, compared to M&A, provides firms with an advantage of 
flexibility under the context of information asymmetry. Firms can purchase their partner’s stake 
in international joint venture to complete acquisitions under certain conditions. It is interesting 
that the research could focus on the dynamical evolution of these strategic alternatives. 
Although M&A are the foundation of business development at a new stage in the invested 
markets, further development from the dynamic and longitudinal perspectives could be 
investigated to expand the scope of cross border M&A.  
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